Marching Drums
Identifications and Securitizations in Contemporary Britain

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Identifications and Securitizations in Contemporary Britain

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For everyone I laughed and walked with throughout this experience.
You made it, and everything else I try to do, possible.

Contents

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Abstract

"March to the beat of your own drum…but what if your drum is broken or you're hearing someone else's drum by mistake?"

-Giles Andreae

As I am told is often the case with PhD theses, the final product you see here bears little resemblance to the best laid plans I initially had for this project. Yet, while over the past few years different ideas, methods, theories, and research avenues were cast overboard, I believe I can say that one central nugget has remained present, on some level, throughout. That is that this project emerged from, has been partly driven by, and goes some way towards addressing the following inquiry: "how do a people's vision of themselves and their attitude towards (in)security impact each other?"

This was simply the initial inquiry that gave rise to the thesis at hand. The actual research question of my thesis – which I lay out in my opening chapter – reflects this initial inquiry, but is more specific and constructed with particular methodological considerations in mind. Nonetheless, this inquiry contains the two core elements which remain at the roots of the hypothesis I have developed and tested through empirical research. These elements are, firstly, how a people have come to perceive themselves and, secondly, how they have come to perceive security and security threats. In other words, this inquiry is about public identifications and securitizations, and how they interact. By pursuing this inquiry, I have produced the following thesis in which I explore the influence of public identifications on securitizations, along with an enhanced understanding of both.

This research has far-reaching implications and significance for a broad range of important academic and practical policy concerns. Few processes carry such immense consequences as those that lead a people to believe that they face a security threat. "Security" is a powerful word, its invocation triggering some of our most fearful and dangerous characteristics. Claiming that there is an imminent threat to our way of life can generate toxic environments, give apparent justification to more underhand motivations, and offer leaders potentially unbefitting mandates. On the other hand, failing to perceive certain developments as security threats can lead to significantly reduced qualities of life or even prove fatal. With both traditional and diverse usages, "security threat" has been applied by Nigel Farage to EU membership, by Joseph McCarthy to homosexuality, by Kofi Annan to climate change, and by Donald Trump to undocumented immigrants, to name a few. Securitization matters.

Likewise, public identifications can lie at the heart of some of the most impactful events, shifts, and orders that shape the domestic and international world. The ways in which we fundamentally perceive our own people, nation, locality, ethnicity, civilization or political tribe can set firm limits on the range of interactions we are open to having with other groups, as well as on the ways we conduct ourselves. Identifications can forge group boundaries and conflicts, override hypothetically "rational" decisions, and delimit international values and even strategies.

An enhanced awareness of the influence of public identifications on securitizations can open up, as I will show in this thesis, a much-improved understanding of what leads to

"successful" securitizations, how impactful our identifications are, why we appropriate force, and how we maintain and express our international self-images. This understanding can enable us to more properly forecast, shape, or block future securitizations and forge more sustainable international policies in tandem with shifting identifications. These are acts of real significance. As such, this understanding is not benign; its development directly affects how securitizations and broader international relations processes play out and can temper the extremity of their consequences.

It is with this in mind that I present the following thesis. It aims to produce an enhanced understanding of the influence of public identifications on securitizations, and in doing so contribute to these, and wider, highly meaningful fields of study.

CHAPTER ONE
Developing Securitization

Chapter Abstract

In order to set the stage for my hypothesis, which is laid out in Chapter Two, in this chapter I overview the main shortcomings in the study of securitization that my research aims to address, as well as the specific developments in securitization studies that I consciously build on and synthesise. This overview orients itself around the place of the public audience in securitization. I outline not only that there is space for a theory that systematically looks at how public audiences power securitizations, but also that bringing the public audience into securitization can have meaningful impact. I show that the audience has been addressed by securitization scholars in a manner that has been unclear and that has suffered from a series of tensions, mistreatments, and omissions. Nonetheless, some positive steps towards integrating the audience into a securitization framework have been made, and I seek to develop these further while forwarding my own take. My research also builds on and contributes to studies in several fields beyond securitization. Some of these, such as research into the link between identity and security and the role of public opinion in foreign policy, are laid out in this chapter, while others are laid out in Chapter Two.

Introduction

A securitization process is one that moves towards, and perhaps reaches, the point where a certain collection of people conceptualise a given issue as one that must be treated as a security concern. More specifically, a securitization process leads towards an audience conceptualising something as an object of worth, agreeing that there is a threat to this object, and deciding that this threat must and can be dealt with via certain means. Differing theories, "schools", or independent scholars of securitization argue that this process involves and is powered by different series of components. However, despite the securitization field's many internal debates and contradictions, a core principle linking different securitization schools and scholars is the idea that perceived security issues are not necessarily objective or real "things", but rather can be (or always are) perceived qualities or constructions that result from a securitization process. As such, a security issue "becomes" a security issue (and is treated in what is deemed a commensurate manner) when an audience accepts that an issue is a security matter.[1]

In this thesis, I examine how the public audience's identifications impact the securitization processes leading to such an acceptance. The core research question I ask is

[1] Waever, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery"; Buzan, *People, States & Fear*; Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory"; Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*; Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization"; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited"; Williams, "The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory"; Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq"; McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security"; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*; Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization"; Wæver, *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe*; Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization."

"How do the public audience's identifications influence the success and failure of securitizations?"

The "public audience's identifications" refers to the identifications that are most commonplace amongst the citizens of a state in situations where securitizing actors are trying to convince a majority of these citizens that a certain matter must be treated as a security concern. To put this simply, in a country there are citizens. These citizens are individuals. They each hold identifications. Let's say there are 1,000,000 individual citizens in the country. Some of these people are members of the military, some are members of the state bureaucracy, some are scientists, but all 1,000,000 citizens in the country, regardless of military or professional status, are members of the public. In certain situations, a securitizing actor might want to convince the majority of the individuals in the military that a certain matter must be treated as a security concern. In this situation, the audience is the members of the military. We would call these people the "military audience." Let's say there are 20,000 such individuals. 12,000 of them hold identifications A and B, 5,000 of them hold identifications C and D, and 3,000 of them hold identifications E and F. The "military audience's identifications" refers to the identifications that are most commonplace amongst these military officers. So, in this situation the "military audience's identifications" are identifications A and B. Note that the military is not seen as a unitary group in any sense other than the fact that the securitizing actor is trying to get the majority of the people in this group to agree with him/her that there is a security threat. The identifications held by members of the military are held by individuals, not by the group, and the "military audience's identifications" is just a term for the identifications that are most commonly held by individuals within this group.

In other situations, the securitizing actor might want to convince the majority of the individuals in the state bureaucracy that something must be treated as a security concern. In this case, the members of the state bureaucracy would be the audience. We would call this the "state bureaucratic audience", and the identifications that are most commonplace amongst these people would be the "state bureaucratic audience's identifications". In some situations, the securitizing actor might want to convince the majority of the 1,000,000 citizens in the country, regardless of their military or professional status (in other words, the majority of the public), that something must be treated as a security concern. In this situation, the audience is termed the "public audience". The identifications that are most commonplace amongst these 1,000,000 people would be termed the "public audience's identifications".

My research examines the role that the public audience's identifications play in securitizing arguments being accepted/rejected by the majority of the public in situations where securitizing actors are trying to convince the majority of the public that something must be treated as a security concern. My research is therefore aimed at, and this thesis is about, illuminating how the public audience's identifications influence securitization success and failure.

Beyond this core output, my research can provide further insights. By studying how public audience identifications influence securitizations we gain insights relevant to broader fields. These include identity research. Empirically, my research has required that I conduct an identification tracking study. In this study, I have traced the detail and prevalence of the modern British public's national identifications over time. This research has provided a vast swathe of data regarding the content and trajectory of modern British national identifications, data that is

in and of itself highly informative for international relations and identity scholars concerned with Britain's current direction.

My examination of identifications' changeability here also speaks directly to – and provides a platform for improving – contrasting research in identity scholarship regarding the persistence and impact of identifications in the face of broader forces. For instance, my research has produced an empirical dataset that highlights how, in one context at least, identifications remained persistent in the face of securitizing speech. This finding, *though not generalisable*, is noteworthy for sociological research arguing that state security rhetoric both attempts to, can, and does shape identity discourses. Without in any way arguing against the idea that state security rhetoric attempts to, can, and does do this, my research reveals one instance in which the other side of the coin (where identifications shape foreign policy, rather than foreign policy shaping identifications) appears to be at work. *This is not a core finding*, nor is it intended to represent a general process of identification persistence/changeability during securitizations, but it remains a dataset to be noted, built on, or refuted elsewhere.

Beyond identity and security, my research can also shed light on how public audiences come to accept, reject, or drive demand for the formation of a much wider array of international policies. This includes commitments to international institutions, normative frameworks underpinning international affiliations, and varying sides of moral debates such as migration and interventionism. These insights into the relationship between public audiences and international policy formation can in turn enhance the study and practice of strategic communications between the political institutions developing these policies and wider publics – an enhancement which can directly produce more politically feasible, and hence sustainable, policy output.

Identity and Security

However, as mentioned above, the primary output of my research is an illumination of how public identifications influence securitization success and failure. In this regard, my study sits within and contributes to existing research on the link between identity and security. This research has adopted several different analytical foci and come to differing conclusions, some of which I build on and some of which I challenge.

One thrust within this body of research that I challenge is the idea that security discourse and foreign policy actions are building blocks of identity. To be clear, I do not argue that security discourse and foreign policy activity do not *impact* notions of identity. However, I challenge any hard focus on this impact by highlighting how identity also impacts security discourse and foreign policy activity. A prime example of established work that focuses strongly on how security acts as a building block of identity comes from David Campbell. The underlying thrust of Campbell's analysis of the link between identity and security is that notions of threat and danger are central for the creation and maintenance of an identity. Campbell argues that the way an individual formulates their identity is directly linked to that which they consider dangerous, stating that "the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger."[2] He argues that is through an awareness of a malevolent or threatening other that a nation gains an idea of what it *itself* is,

[2] Campbell, *Writing Security*, p3.

summarising his own argument as one that "proposes that United States foreign policy be understood as a political practice central to the *constitution, production, and maintenance* (emphasis my own) of American political identity."[3] For him, the interaction with the dangerous Other, who is dangerous by the very nature of holding and demonstrating alternative identities (hence denaturalising identity and in doing so endangering identity)[4], generates an idea of the self.

Unlike Hansen, who also addresses the link between and security and identity and also sees identity as relational[5], Campbell repeatedly emphasises that a portrayal of the Other as dangerous is central to this generation of self-identity. He argues that "the project of securing the grounds for identity in the state involved an "evangelism of fear" that emphasized the unfinished and endangered nature of the world."[6] Campbell makes explicit the argument that foreign policy affects identity, *not* the other way around, stating that "identity can be understood as the *outcome* (emphasis my own) of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of "danger" with threats identified and located on the "outside"…foreign policy (conventionally understood as the external orientation of preestablished states with secure identities) is thus to be retheorized as one of the boundary-producing practices central to the *production and reproduction* (emphasis my own) of the identity in whose name it operates."[7] State security actions therefore generate state identity discourse in Campbell's thesis.

I accept fully that state security actions impact identity discourses. Nonetheless, my research is aimed at highlighting that pre-existing identity discourses simultaneously delimit the range of security actions available to the state. I argue that identity is both produced by and produces state security discourse and foreign policy action. In doing so, I present a challenge not to Campbell's findings, but to his tight analytical focus (and, to be more direct, his overemphasis) on security's impact on identity.

In doing so, my work more closely approximates and builds upon the research done by Lene Hansen, who argues that "foreign policy discourse in general *draws upon* representations of identity (emphasis my own)…for problems or facts to become questions of security, they need therefore to be successfully constructed as such within political discourse".[8] Hansen builds explicitly on Campbell, seeing identity as relational but refining Campbell's straightforward Self-Other foundation of identity to one of degrees of difference between different identities. She also challenges Campbell's emphasis on the state's ability to forge identities through state practices. She does so by emphasising that non-state actors have a significant impact on the kinds of security discourses state actors can adopt, stating that security "representations…*draw upon* (emphasis my own) and are formed by the representations articulated by a larger number of individuals, institutions, and media outlets."[9] My research

[3] Campbell, p8.
[4] Campbell, 71.
[5] Hansen, *Security as Practice*, p5.
[6] Campbell, p61.
[7] Campbell, p68.
[8] Hansen, *Security as Practice*, p30.
[9] Hansen, p6.

adopts this emphasis to an even greater extent, and aims to show that this "drawing upon" process (rather than any "imposing on" process) is indeed central to securitizations.

However, my research does not fully, or even fundamentally, accord with Hansen's perspective on the link between identity and security. Hansen consistently emphasises that she is adopting a "non-causal epistemology"[10] concerning this link. While my research does not adopt any traditional rationalist methodology (I instead embrace interpretivism), I cannot claim to be completely shaking off the shackles of causal explanation. Instead, I adopt a lighter causal perspective of "permissive causality," whereby I see identity formulations as setting the permissive/preventive conditions for securitization success, while not guaranteeing or causing any specific security discourses. So whereas Hansen explicitly states that her "book argues that representations of identity and policy…do not stand in a causal relationship with one another as representations of identity are simultaneously the precondition for and (re)produced through articulations of policy"[11], I argue that *in the moment of a securitization* pre-existing identifications have a great sway in permitting and delimiting possible securitizing rhetoric. This securitizing rhetoric can in turn shape identifications, but I show that the influence of pre-existing identifications on securitizations is considerable and empirically traceable. I agree that identity and policy are mutually constitutive, but securitizations take place in time and identities often precede them. Once they meet they then shape each other, but we cannot underestimate the extent to which pre-existing identifications delimit and permit securitizing rhetoric. Causality therefore has its place in my research.

A further fundamental element of Hansen's research that my work builds on is the observation that *linking* representations of identity and security to each other is the means for (re)producing certain identities and policies. Hansen argues that "the goal of foreign policy discourse is to create a stable link between representations of identity and the proposed policy" and additionally she sees one's "identity as built through processes of linking and differentiation" to and from other identities[12]. Huysmans research into the link between identity and security argues along similar lines. Huysmans states that security representations are built through a similar process of linking, arguing that "the meaning of security is interpreted as a constellation of rules that define enunciations as security enunciations. In other words, a specific organization of enunciations makes them security enunciations."[13] For Huysmans and Hansen, the successful creation of security representations depends on elements of these representations linking well to pre-existing elements in other representations, including identity representations. My research takes up this idea and operationalises it, showing precisely which elements of identity discourse (which I outline as norms, influence, affiliations, and imagined perspectives of others) need to link to which elements of security discourse (which I outline as objects of worth, threats, and appropriate and feasible actions) in order for a securitization to be successful.

Huysmans also asks a question which my work builds upon. Interrogating the process whereby new security discourses are introduced to existing discursive environments "of

[10] Hansen, p4..
[11] Hansen, p9.
[12] Hansen, 16.
[13] Huysmans, "Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies", p45.

cultural/ethnic identity and public order,"[14] Huysmans points out that "alternative constructions do not exist in a vacuum or in a sheltered space. To be part of the game, they must, for example, contest political constructions. This raises the question of how the 'engagement' actually works."[15] Essentially, Huysmans is asking why certain security discourses win out when they engage with each other. Just having an alternative discourse of security is not enough to undermine existing dominant discourses. I agree with and build on this perspective. Simply because a securitizing actor introduces a new security discourse does not mean they will be successful. They must go through an "engagement" which they do not fully control. I argue and demonstrate that a major force within this engagement is the permissive/preventive capabilities of publicly held identity representations. These representations, I argue, partly determine the winner when new and differing security representations (for instance, a securitizing argument and an anti-securitizing argument) are articulated and contest each other. In doing so, my work goes some way towards addressing Huysmans' query of how the engagement between security discourses within pre-existing discursive landscapes (such as a landscape of identities) operates.

However, while Huysmans does argue that this engagement must take place, his vision of such an engagement is highly discursive. Indeed, the above authors all adopt strong discursive ontologies in their visions of the links between security and identity. I do not deny the productive power of language, but my research additionally draws from a cognitive and psychological rather than purely a discursive base. In contrast to these authors, and more in line with Hopf, (who argues that "the only motive for the ubiquitous presence and operation of identities is the human desire to understand the social world and the consequent cognitive need for order, predictability, and certainty"[16]), my study holds that language is both productive *and expressive* of deeper cognitive conditions. As such, discursive ontologies only cover part of the picture. I will argue in Chapter Two that insights from cognitive and neural research can help provide a more robust understanding of the engagement between discourses.

My focus on the cognitive mechanisms underlying the interplay between identity and security discourses imbues my research with a certain level of trans-contextual applicability. While the symbols these cognitive mechanisms process would be expected to differ across cultures and eras, the cognitive mechanisms themselves would be expected to remain relatively uniform across different contexts. However, this is the only element of my research that is not thoroughly contemporary in its claims to validity. While I argue that pre-existing identities can permit/prevent new elite-imposed security discourses from taking root, the counter-argument that elites can override existing identities and indeed forge new identities through security discourse may have a greater claim to accuracy if we are not focusing on the 21st century, particularly the 21st century West.

Campbell and Williams both engage a great deal with 20th century and indeed 16th and 17th century examples of elites using security to override old identities and generate new ones. They both portray Hobbes and Locke as deliberate generators of a modernist identity which they forged from security concerns. Both authors give extensive examples of how Hobbes in

[14] Huysmans, p41.
[15] Huysmans, p50.
[16] Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics, p4*; Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations."

particular instigated an "evangelism of fear" towards anything that was not based on reason, rationality, logic, and science, in order to create a modernist identity that would end the identity-based strife of his day[17]. Williams also presents a history of how the rationalist school of thought is actually a by-product of identities that were deliberately manufactured out of security concerns in the aftermath of the English Civil War.[18] Campbell and Hansen both also use case studies of European and American foreign and security policy in the 20th century to demonstrate the interplay between identity and security in this period.[19] While these authors may convincingly show how elite-driven security rhetoric that ran against the grain of pre-existing identities in these periods was still able to gain wide acceptance and even transform identities, I argue that to assume elite-driven security rhetoric still has this capability in the 21st century may be a mistake.

The late 19th and 20th centuries featured a broadcast media that allowed information to reach millions simultaneously and relatively uniformly. Earlier periods were characterised by a highly restricted access to political commentary. These characteristics may have provided the necessary conditions for a small number of elites to impose security rhetoric on a much greater discursive landscape without great reference to existing mass identity formations. However, the 21st century is much different. As argued separately by Mendelsohn, Smith-Shomade, Hayes, and Geraghty[20], we now have a hyper-fragmented media landscape in which few people receive the same news in the same way, everyone has the ability to change the channel, and there is a growing distrust of politician rhetoric and political institutions. This makes it much more difficult for elites to seed any rhetoric that goes against the grain of pre-existing visions held by the public, including identifications, as the modern public is capable and cognitively incentivised to avoid any information that does not sit well with their pre-existing beliefs. This creates incentives for elites to ride the wave of pre-existing identities rather than challenge or ignore them.[21] I therefore argue that conclusions about the interaction between elite security discourses and pre-existing popular identity representations that were built from cases within even as recently as the 20th century must be reconsidered. It is not that they are inaccurate or theoretically insufficient. It is simply that we must consider the possibility that these conclusions may be inapplicable to the modern day in which pre-existing public identifications' have an increased potential to delimit the success of elite security discourse. As such, my research adopts a self-consciously contemporary focus, with case studies from 2013 and later, in contrast to the above-listed works.

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[17] Campbell, *Writing Security,* pp58-60; Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security.", p211, 213, 214.
[18] Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security," p213–16.
[19] Campbell, *Writing Security*; Hansen, *Security as Practice*.
[20] Mendelsohn and Richard Nadeau, "The Magnfication and Minimization of Social Cleavages By The Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media"; Beretta E. Smith-Shomade, "Narrowcasting in the New World Information Order: A Space for the Audience?"; Lincoln Geraghty, *Popular Media Cultures Fans, Audiences and Paratexts.* http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=2057777; Hayes and Guardino, *Influence from Abroad*.
[21] Matthew Mendelsohn and Richard Nadeau, "The Magnfication and Minimization of Social Cleavages By The Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media"; Beretta E. Smith-Shomade, "Narrowcasting in the New World Information Order: A Space for the Audience?"; Lincoln Geraghty, *Popular Media Cultures Fans, Audiences and Paratexts.* http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=2057777; Hayes and Guardino, *Influence from Abroad*.

Ole Waever provides further evidence that by the end of the 20th century public identities were showing signs of resisting and indeed defying elite guidance. This observation comes from Waever's research into the concept of the "security identity." Asking "who or what is constituted as security reference in post-bipolar Europe?" and asserting that "an answer to this question will tell us something not only about European security, but also about what Europe is politically"[22], Waever develops the security identity concept as a complete overlay of the concepts of security and identity. He argues that a group or political entity can establish its very identity as being a thing, as being a political entity, *by* asserting its right to security. "Who today is able to establish itself with the self-referential gesture of security as a survival-demanding unit?" Waever asks.

While this question itself is an interesting development in the examination of the link between identity and security, the element of this research that is most meaningful for my work is Waever's answer to this question. "It is arguments about the survival of the nation that are mobilized - and in most cases this definitely does not happen from the usual cockpit of the state. 'The state' - state elites - recommend integration, surrender of sovereignty, a gradual winding up (or Europeanization) of itself, *whilst the 'populations'…say no* (emphasis my own)."[23] Waever observes that when European elites present security concerns that are centred on (and indeed are intended to build) European identities, European publics respond by reasserting their national identities and refocusing their attention on national security concerns. Here, Waever is explicitly acknowledging that nations or other identity groups have the capability and now even the tendency to construct security concerns based on certain identities (such as the national society) that are in complete contrast to the security concerns based on other identities (such as the European society) that the state would wish them to. This, oddly enough, goes against the central thrust of most of the core securitization work Waever otherwise contributes to, as I will outline later. Nonetheless, this element of Waever's research is one that I build upon, as my research shows how public identities can not only defy state security discourses but also actually shape them.

A common thread that runs between the research on the link between identity and security conducted by these scholars is that security can be used to call to the fore, highlight the value of, and consequently reify and stabilise, certain identities. This focus on how securitizing an identity can render that identity temporarily stable relates well to the ontological security field. This field of research has argued that a sense of insecurity can provide group members with a stable and fulfilling identity (and so these group members will subsequently cling to these insecurities).[24] However, this perspective on the link between identity and security has not gone unchallenged. Browning has argued that "identities are always in the making, never fully stable, settled and complete." Browning additionally argues that securitization can be just as destabilizing as desecuritization, so "the association of securitization with stability

[22] Waever, "European Security Identities," p110.
[23] Waever, p111.
[24] Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics"; Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*; Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security"; Steele, "Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War". For a summary and critique of the ontological security field see Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.

and desecuritization with change and instability is also problematic."[25] This insight that the link between identity stability and securitization might not necessarily be so strong is one my research builds on. I agree that identities can be instable even during securitizations and that a securitization may prove to be too much of a destabilizing force, in which case it may well be rejected. My research accounts for both this potential instability of identities and for the possible rejection of securitizations that destabilize pre-existing identity discourses. It then seeks to empirically observe these trends and outcomes in action.

While the above authors present research into the link between identity and security that I partly build on, am distinct from, and challenge, perhaps the research into this link that my research runs most parallel to is Ted Hopf's, both in terms of theoretical basis and methodology. While Hopf agrees that state security and foreign policy actions can have an impact on societal identities, he argues that states which fight the tide of societal identities are at a significant disadvantage, stating that "norms are more likely to be adopted by a state if its society already has a dominant discourse within which that norm resonates".[26] More directly, Hopf argues, and I agree, that we should "reject the assumption that identities are intentionally or deliberately chosen, used, and/or strategically manipulated"[27]. In the same vein as Hopf, I do not see identities as easily malleable or manipulable. They are developed slowly, held deeply, and acted out habitually. This does not equate to any fixed or permanent status, but it may enable identity representations to defy easy manipulation. My research allows for this possibility and empirically tests for its indication.

Hopf also builds from a strongly cognitive basis of research, arguing that "the only motive for the ubiquitous presence and operation of identities is the human desire to understand the social world and the consequent cognitive need for order, predictability, and certainty…identities operate like cognitive devices"[28]. As a consequence, though "it is tempting to attribute causality [of foreign policy decisions] to discrete decision-makers; this would be a big theoretical and methodological mistake…once one has uncovered a prevailing discourse of national identity one can expect that discourse to both persist over time and explain a broad range of outcomes, regardless of who is making foreign policy in that state."[29] This perspective of Hopf's research, which I also adopt, differs greatly from Campbell and Hansen's. Whereas these authors treat identities as products of thoroughly political processes, I hold that identities are partly cognitive devices that stem from cognitive needs and which then have political impacts. They are not purely political devices that stem from political needs and then have cognitive impacts. As such, elites cannot generate a societal identity for use as a political device any more than one can command a wave to rise. But one can ride a wave, and the riding of the wave may well affect the wave to an extent over time.

Methodologically, my research also runs quite parallel to Hopf's. Hopf makes the case for a methodology that adopts "a thin cognitive account of identity that is thickly inductive and empirical"[30], arguing that identities should not be assumed to have any particular form or

[25] Browning and Joenniemi, "Ontological Security, Self-Articulation and the Securitization of Identity," p32.
[26] Hopf, "Identity, Legitimacy, and the Use of Military Force," 240.
[27] Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, 3.
[28] Hopf, 4.
[29] Hopf and Allan, *Making Identity Count*, 11.
[30] Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, 3.

researched using any specific pre-conceived categories. Instead, they should be recovered inductively. After overviewing a range of tried methods of tracing identity and demonstrating their shortcomings, Hopf argues that the best way to operationalise and gauge national identity is through "discourse analysis of a broad range of relevant texts"[31] through which identities are "inductively recovered"[32], as this is the only way to "let the subjects speak"[33] without preconceived identity labels. Hopf adopts an "interpretivist epistemology"[34] and reconstructs identities by "contextualising them within the texts and relating them intertextually to the vast variety of other texts"[35] from that period, before finally combining them into discursive formations. My own research similarly seeks to empirically operationalise and recover identities from widely read texts from specific periods, interpretively and intertextually sorting these identities into analytically meaningful data points only after they have been inductively uncovered (as detailed fully in my Methodology Chapter).

Along with building on and speaking to this research into the link between security and identity, my research further relates to existing work in a related but distinct vein of research that focuses on the role of public opinion in foreign policy. Specifically, in contrast to previous decades when this field largely saw publics as "volatile, lacking a coherent structure, and naively following elite leadership"[36], in the last 20 years a large body of work in this field has coalesced to acknowledge the relatively steady democratic constraint that publics place on elites whose ideas diverge from theirs. In 2006 a thorough review of existing scholarly understanding of public opinion's impact on foreign policy concluded that there is "reason to believe that the public does have coherent foreign policy attitudes [and that the] electoral connection leads policy makers to consider public opinion consequences as they shape their foreign policies. In sum, the public can influence foreign policy."[37] By 2008, there was an "emerging recognition among scholars who study the interactions of the public, leaders, and the media that these actors are interdependent".[38] Notably, Baum and Potter document that "this scholarly evolution began with a revolution—originating in the cognitive sciences—in our understanding of when and how citizens gather, retain, and retrieve information."[39] As FPA scholars began to pay more attention to the ways in which human beings process discourses and narratives, and did so with reference to cognitive research, it became difficult to accept a perspective in which elites could manipulate or manage pre-existing publicly held foreign policy norms. Consequently, the importance of pre-existing public ideas and the mechanisms whereby elite manipulative strategies simply utilise (rather than shift or generate) these ideas became a central focus of this scholarship into the role of public opinion in foreign policy generation. My research in turn adopts this focus and seeks to operationalise exactly how pre-existing public visions constrain elites and demand utilisation rather than alteration.

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[31] Hopf and Allan, *Making Identity Count*, 15.
[32] Hopf and Allan, 16.
[33] Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, 23.
[34] Hopf, 23.
[35] Hopf, 24.
[36] Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," 44.
[37] Aldrich et al., "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," 478.
[38] Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," 40.
[39] Baum and Potter," 44.

For instance, Hayes and Guardino have shown that the fragmentation and globalization of 21st century media has greatly reduced elites' abilities to speak to their publics in any controlled or controlling manner. The social media bedrock which now underlies even traditional media institutions means that publics are exposed to a vast array of information streams that operate transnationally.[40] As Rothschild and Shafranek comment, this "further complicates an already complex picture"[41] of information flows between elites and publics, making it even more difficult for domestic elites to exert control over narratives and discourses, and giving publics more autonomy than they ever had before. Consequently, Gilens has suggested that such a complex media landscape (which prevents idea manipulation) incentivises elites to cater to certain constituencies whose pre-existing ideas already approximate theirs. Gilens uses this to explain why US foreign policy often reflects the ideas and predispositions of wealthier Americans when it comes to trade and international aid issues.[42] Work by Baum and Potter has further shown that the ability of a public to constrain the military actions of the state is both notable and increases depending on the political variety within a state, the freedom afforded to the press within a state[43].

Perhaps the FPA research which my work most directly builds on is that of McLeod and Shah. These authors, after outlining the significant shortcomings of FPA literature that downplays the ability of publics to constrain elites, advocate a "Message Framing Model" and a "Message Processing Model" for researchers. These models are explicitly geared towards a focus on "audience predispositions" and "the activation of existing mental schemas" by elites[44]. McLeod and Shah argue that researchers who want to understand the link between foreign policy and public opinion must take these components into account. My research directly adopts this focus and provides a clearer empirical understanding of how this process of tapping into existing mental schemas works. More generally, McLeod and Shah and the above-mentioned works each emphasise a need for elites to craft foreign policy statements that reflect public discourses, a perspective I provide additional evidence for and speak to.

It is important to note that one of the earliest texts in this body of research is actually one that my research fundamentally challenges, despite the fact that it laid the groundwork for much of the above-referenced research which I build upon. Jentleson's 1992 work "The Pretty Prudent Public" argues that public acceptance of elite-driven foreign policy rationales is not guaranteed but rather conditional, and conditional on more than just the human cost in war casualties (which had been the previous focus of scholarly work on how and why publics reject elite foreign policy rationales)[45]. He argues that the public is rather consistent and autonomous in its reactions to elite-driven foreign policy, and he shows through a review of existing literature that this "is a very different portrait than the [previous] portrayal found in much of

[40] Hayes and Guardino, *Influence from Abroad*, 137.
[41] Rothschild and Shafranek, "Advances and Opportunities in the Study of Political Communication, Foreign Policy, and Public Opinion," 638.
[42] Pimpare, "Review of Martin Gilens" p352.
[43] Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," 58.
[44] McLeod and Shah, *News Frames and National Security*, 25–33.
[45] Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," 71.

the literature on public opinion and foreign policy."[46] In this regard, Jentleson's work paved the way for the later works referenced above and is one I build on.

However, Jentleson also attempted to pinpoint an absolute set of real conditions which predicted public support or rejection of foreign policies. He argued that public support will be forthcoming depending on the "principal policy objective", stating that if there is an aggressive adversary public support will be forthcoming, but if there is not (such in cases of humanitarian interventions) public support will only arise if costs are low.[47] I argue that such an analytical focus, on objective foreign policy goals and costs, fundamentally misses the mark of what influences public support for foreign policy actions. It does so because it sees these conditions as objective and absolute, and almost completely ignores the public's ability to conceptualise different goals, threats, and costs in their own terms. I argue that we cannot decide which goals, costs, or threats publics are generally going to be more or less likely to accept. We must firstly interrogate public schemata and understand how publics themselves conceptualise seemingly objective goals, threats, and costs. Only then can we evaluate whether or not they will support the overriding foreign policy rationale.

Overall then, research into the link between identity and security has taken on different perspectives and conclusions, some which I adopt and build on, others of which I challenge. Campbell's hard focus on how foreign policy constitutes and produces political identities (by deliberately generating ideas of a malevolent Other through which the nation comes to understand itself) is one that I challenge. While no doubt foreign and security policy impact domestic identities, I argue and aim to empirically show that these policies are also strongly constrained and impacted by these identities. This brings my research much closer to Hansen's focus on identity and security formulations' mutual importance for each other. Nonetheless, I do not adopt Hansen's non-causal epistemology, as I argue that security policies occur in time. As such, they are often preceded by pre-existing identities which exert a visible influence in permitting or preventing certain security discourses from taking root. "Permissive causality" therefore has its place in my research. However, both Hansen and Huysmans focus on how identity and security notions are formed by linking different identity and security concepts to each other, a focus I also adopt and operationalise by showing precisely which identity and security concepts need to link to each other in order for new security discourses to gain traction. My work further builds on Huysmans observation that when differing security discourses are articulated they must contest with each other, and this engagement is not fully in the control of the elites introducing these discourses. I show that the winner in such an engagement will be partly determined by the permissive causal functions of pre-existing identity formulations.

Nonetheless, while these authors all view the interaction between security and identity notions as taking place in a discursive landscape, my research does not purely adopt a discursive ontology but instead draws strongly on cognitive research. I view identity not simply as a political object, but rather as a cognitive product with political implications. This cognitive focus gives my research a degree of trans-contextual applicability, but otherwise my research is thoroughly modern. This is unlike Williams, Hansen, and Campbell's examinations of historic cases whereby elites imposed security rhetoric that challenged and indeed reshaped

[46] Jentleson, 72.
[47] Jentleson, 72.

existing identities. I argue that this process is much less likely to be possible in the 21st century, building on Waever's observation that by the late 20th century general populations not only had the capability but also the tendency to reject elite security rhetoric that was based on identities contrary to those held by the general population. I further build upon Browning's observation that, in contrast to the position held by the ontological security field, securitizations of identities are not necessarily likely to stabilize these identities. Securitizations can be destabilizing, and if they are too destabilizing they may be rejected. I therefore adopt Browning's openness to the possibility of securitizations both stabilizing and destabilizing identities (and consequently being accepted or rejected), and I consequently attempt to empirically test for both outcomes. Perhaps the research on the link between security and identity which my work most closely follows (both theoretically and methodologically) comes from Ted Hopf. Hopf rejects the idea that identities are strategically generated or manipulated, instead seeing them as habitual, cognitively derived, and likely to persist in their form and impact regardless of the specific elites in power or the security rhetoric these elites espouse. Methodologically, Hopf argues that the best way to trace identities and their impact on state security action is through empirical inductive recovery of identities via an interpretive examination of widely read texts. My research adopts and applies both these theoretical and methodological perspectives.

My work further speaks to research into the role of public opinion in foreign policy. In recent years a consensus has emerged in this area of scholarship that publics do have the ability to constrain foreign policy and indeed tend to do so in a relatively coherent manner. In previous decades this field generally viewed publics as easily manipulated and generally ignorant of foreign policy. The shift away from this perspective emerged from a focus on cognitive mechanisms that govern how we gather and retain information, along with a focus on 21st century fragmentation and globalization of media landscapes, and a concentration on mental schemas and their activation. I adopt each of these perspectives, and build on this field's observation that in the complex modern media landscape elites are much less able to defy existing identity discourses and as such they are incentivised to ride the wave of these discourses. Despite largely building on and agreeing with the perspectives this field has recently adopted, I nonetheless challenge the focus of the work that paved the way for this body of research. While Jentleson's research on the principal policy objective did highlight the conditional nature of public support (a perspective I aim to build on), it also treated security goals, threats, and costs as objective. In contrast, I argue that such conditions must be treated from the viewpoint of the publics themselves, who have the ability to conceptualise these conditions in a wide array of terms.

Causes of Securitization Success and Failure

While my research speaks to, builds on, and challenges existing works in the above fields, the area of scholarship I speak to and build from most directly is the securitization field. My primary aim is to detail the influence identifications have on securitizations and in doing so significantly enhance our understanding of securitization success and failure. Despite the potential impact of examining the role of public audiences and their identifications in securitizations, the audience remains a significantly understudied aspect of what determines securitization success and failure. Many – and indeed the initial – readings of securitization processes have seen these processes primarily as persuasive moves or struggles operated at the

elite level, involving bureaucratic interests, forwarding private goals, and potentially undermining the democratic limits of executive powers. As such, much securitization literature focuses heavily on the securitizing actors or high-level security professionals making such moves, along with their intentions, power relations, and effects. It has consequently been criticised for over-emphasising the ability of securitizing actors and their rhetoric to shape securitization processes while under-examining the role of audiences, both public and otherwise.

Côté has argued that "the treatment of the audience within securitization theory has been inconsistent and at times non-existent, creating confusion surrounding both its identity and its purpose", while Williams has described the audience as "radically underdeveloped", and even Waever has contended that the audience requires "a better definition and probably differentiation."[48] Where the securitization field has examined the audience, it has had to spend much time on what might be termed preliminary questions of identifying the audience and its signs of acceptance. It has also developed several competing, unclear, and at times self-contradictory views of the audience's precise role in securitization. As such, the study of the audience's impact on securitizations both promises extensive meaningful output while also being glaringly missing. This under-conceptualization and under-examination of the audience – which has been noted by several prominent securitization scholars including Balzacq, Stritzel, Léonard, Kaunert, and Salter[49] – is no meagre item of neglect, as the audience was hypothetically one of the central elements of the original securitization framework as it was presented by what came to be known as the Copenhagen School.

This framework innovatively forwarded the hypothesis that security, rather than belonging to the world of external or objective "realities", is a discursive act. In this framework, security issues are not things in the world that need to be discovered. Rather, they are linguistic constructions waiting to be created through speech acts, or acts of saying "security", which are conducted by a certain securitizing actor and to a certain group or audience.[50] While the introduction of the word "securitization" by the Copenhagen School was indeed novel, the fundamental hypothesis behind it was a development on pre-existing fields of study. The idea that the allotment of certain issues into a certain category (for instance, seeing the establishment of Islamic courts in Britain as a security threat or as a deviant act or as a criminal activity) is the result of linguistic interactions on a societal basis rather than anything objective had previously been (and continues to be) explored under social constructivism and (in particular French) sociology[51]. Indeed, although the securitization concept has emerged from a post-positivistic and relatively non-structural academic tradition the basic premises behind the

[48] Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory"; Williams, "The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory"; Waever, "Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies.", p26.

[49] Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond"; Leonard and Kaunert, "Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory"; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited"; Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization"; Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization."

[50] Buzan, *People, States & Fear*; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*; Waever, "Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies"; Wæver, *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe*; Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization."

[51] Loseke, *Thinking about Social Problems*; Spector and Kitsuse, *Constructing Social Problems*; Heilbron, *French Sociology*; Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*.

concept can be traced back at least to Durkheim[52]. Explicitly applying this theoretical standpoint to security, however, denaturalised one of the most "external-seeming" concerns of a human life, in that it transformed a "security threat" into a flexible, social, and non-objective concept.

This denaturalisation of security opened several new avenues of inquiry, not least among them the question of "what quality makes something a security issue?"[53] As was noted above, one of the central tenets of securitization theory is the idea that a security issue "becomes" a security issue when an audience accepts that an issue is a security matter, as it is audience acceptance that allows the flexible, social, and non-objective concept of security to gain some transient and socially-situated meaning. Indeed, the role of the audience in legitimising, authorising, and indeed creating the "securityness" of a given issue has been described as "*the* key insight"[54] (emphasis in original) that makes securitization a distinct theory, although others may contend that the denaturalisation of security or the normative delegitimization of security practices are just as central to the securitization field's distinctiveness. This would seem to place the audience at or close to the heart of the securitization framework, and would warrant a concerted study of how different audiences come to accept/reject securitizing arguments and subsequently power/prevent different securitization processes.

Nonetheless, three approaches to explaining what causes securitization success and failure (each of which ignore or downplay the role of the audience) have received the majority of scholarly attention so far. These are (i) non-causal perspectives on securitization success, (ii) securitizing move-focused explanations of this success, and (iii) securitizing actor-focused explanations of this success. My research into how the audience influences securitization success/failure challenges these three outlooks. It does so by rejecting non-causal perspectives and highlighting that the securitizing move and the securitizing actor influence securitization success in tandem with the influence of the audience. I argue that non-causal explanations of securitization success have serious shortcomings and should be dispensed with. I do not seek to undermine the validity or importance of securitizing move-focused and securitizing actor-focused explanations. Instead, my focus on the audience challenges any exclusive focus on the securitizing actor or securitizing move. Variations in securitizing moves and securitizing actors will surely impact securitizations' probability of success. However, so does variations in audience characteristics. My research aims to show that the public audience's identifications have a permissive causality on securitization success. I argue that if certain public audience identifications are not present, a securitization is doomed to fail. If they are present, then other factors (including the characteristics of the securitizing move and the securitizing actor) will determine securitization success. All things being equal, audience characteristics can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization.

Non-causal perspectives on securitization success have been severely critiqued by a range of authors already. Guzzini has highlighted and criticised the original formulation of securitization theory for "leaving 'explanation' and/or all versions of causality to the positivist

[52] Macionis and Gerber, *Sociology*; Spector and Kitsuse, *Constructing Social Problems*; Heilbron, *French Sociology*.
[53] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 21.
[54] Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory.", p544.

other [and in doing so] the Copenhagen School also left its own explanatory status often implicit"[55]. This is something of a hangover from securitization theory's commitment to its post-structuralist roots (with its concentration on the constitutive and performative nature of language). Guzzini argues that this leads the theory to reduce far too much of a securitization process to the speech act itself, ignoring the link between speech acts and outcomes and treating speech acts as outcomes in themselves[56]. Van Rythoven has further argued that the regular equation of a speech act with a securitization is a detriment to the theory of securitization and one that can only be maintained if the field ignores the myriad cases of failed securitization available.[57] Baele and Thomson have pointed out that the equation of the securitizing move with securitizing outcomes has left "the question of the determinants of success or failure of securitizing moves…one that most securitization scholars agree is underdeveloped."[58] Moving away from equating speech acts with securitization certainly represents a departure from the original securitization concept, and leaves modern versions of the theory more than a little detached from their roots (in which language is of prime importance). Nonetheless, building on these authors I agree that the possibilities and examples of failed securitization attempts (including one of my case studies, and the ongoing attempt to securitize climate change which continuously fails in large parts of the US) render non-causal accounts of securitization success insufficient.

Although still "underdeveloped" as the above authors have mentioned, causal explanations of securitization success have been forwarded by several authors and even acknowledged by the Copenhagen School (who nonetheless focus heavily on those causal factors that are most closely related to the speech act itself). Buzan et al. originally distinguished the two sets of factors determining securitization success as "internal linguistic-grammatical factors" and "external, contextual and social" ones[59]. However, the since evolution of the securitization field is such that it might be more helpful to widen these categories into securitizing move factors, securitizing actor factors, and audience factors.

Of these three, by far the most attention has been given to securitizing move factors. Much of this is the result of the original securitization framework and its hard focus on the productive power of language. Thomson has noted the large tendency of the securitization field to adopt this focus, arguing that "since the original securitization framework, it is assumed that security words are performative and can trigger perlocutionary effects broadly speaking—that is, they 'produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience'".[60] However, in recent years explanations of securitization success that still concentrate on the securitizing move itself have broadened and nuanced their focus. Questions have been asked of what specific types and mediums of language evoking which kinds of responses are most effective in securitization processes. The utility of scientific language has received particular focus, with Berling arguing that scientific language has significantly

[55] Guzzini, "Securitization as a Causal Mechanism," 329.
[56] Guzzini, 331.
[57] Van Rythoven, "Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear?," 443.
[58] Baele and Thomson, "An Experimental Agenda for Securitization Theory," 651.
[59] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 32.
[60] Baele and Thomson, "An Experimental Agenda for Securitization Theory," 655, quoting Austin, 1962, p101.

enhanced the securitization of climate change[61], and Coan et al. showing that simply the use of numbers in securitizing texts can affect the success of the securitization[62]. The efficacy of particularly emotional language has also begun to receive its own focus, with Van Rythoven arguing that the focus on emotions in securitization is still undertheorized but showing progress.[63] The range of mediums that securitizing move-focused research has examined has also expanded, with images and video are now receiving much needed attention alongside text. This includes Hansen's examination of how images played a powerful role in (de)securitization processes surrounding Abu Ghraib and Muhammed Cartoon Crisis[64], and Caverley and Krupnikov's study of how images with particular arrangements are more likely to make people support military policies than very similar images with simple differences.[65]

While each of these works provides nuance and expansion on the original securitization formulation which focused almost exclusively on security utterances, they all nonetheless focus very tightly on how the characteristics of the securitizing move itself determine the success of the securitization. A second camp has also emerged that takes a different focus, instead looking at how the characteristics of the securitizing actor affect securitization success. This area of research has focused mostly on the social authority of the securitizing actors. Theiler has overviewed that "most theorists accept that…the securitizers must enjoy sufficient status and credibility among the audience,"[66] while Baele and Thomson observe that much of the securitization field has acknowledged that securitization can only be done by certain social elites. Investigating the origin of this idea, they point out that "Bourdieu's legacy on "authorized language" and symbolic power has been influential in shaping securitization theory's recognition that not everyone has an equal probability of success in securitizing an issue"[67]

While most research focuses on the domestic securitizing actors and their authority, Coan et al. have expanded their focus in order to treat terrorists themselves as securitizing actors and to compare audiences' reactions to threatening messages that come directly from terrorists to warnings about terrorists that come from governments. Kahan et al. have added further detail to this line of research, demonstrating that the same securitizing actor will enjoy different images of legitimacy amongst different audiences within the same political space[68]. Thomson has further argued that a range of pioneering work from outside the securitization field should now be built upon by securitization scholars via experiment-based research, in order to demonstrate how the ethnicity, age, and gender of securitizing actors also affects securitization success.[69] If such experiment-based research were to be taken up by more scholars, we would likely see a great depth of detail and nuance added to our understanding of how the characteristics of the securitizing actor influences the success of the securitization.

[61] Villumsen Berling, "Science and Securitization," 392.
[62] Baele and Thomson, "An Experimental Agenda for Securitization Theory," 655.
[63] Van Rythoven, "Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear?," 3.
[64] Hansen, "Theorizing the Image for Security Studies"; Hansen, "How Images Make World Politics."
[65] Caverley and Krupnikov, "Aiming at Doves," 1492.
[66] Theiler, "Societal Security," 107.
[67] Baele and Thomson, "An Experimental Agenda for Securitization Theory," 656.
[68] Kahan et al., "The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks."
[69] Baele and Thomson, "An Experimental Agenda for Securitization Theory," 658.

Nonetheless, continued focus on this influence runs a danger of further obscuring the audience in securitization theories.

As previously outlined, despite the audience being regularly noted as central to securitizing theory several authors (including Balzacq, Stritzel, Léonard, Kaunert, Côté, Williams, Waever, and Salter) have lamented its under-theorization. As I will outline below in more detail, the question of the audience's role in securitization has been asked by a number of authors, and I aim to build on their work. In doing so, I am not seeking to undermine or reject the validity of securitizing move- or securitizing actor-focused explanations of securitization success. Instead, I argue that the characteristics of the audience, the securitizing actor, and the securitizing move all influence the success of securitizations, and an over-focus or under-focus on any of these elements will result (and has resulted) in an insufficient understanding of securitization success. More specifically, I argue that the characteristics of the audience have a permissive/preventative causality on securitization success. Specific audience characteristics can prevent securitization success but not guarantee it. If favourable audience characteristics are present, then other factors including the characteristics of the securitizing move and securitizing actor will determine the success of the securitization, and all things being equal audience characteristics can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization.

Before I go through my research and how it attempts to address shortcomings in the study of the audience in securitization, I will first overview these shortcomings and the existing attempts to address them which I build upon. I will start with the lack of clarity regarding who the audience in securitization is.

The Unclear Audience

A major factor undermining a clear understanding of why the audience comes to accept/reject securitizing arguments is the lack of clarity surrounding the nature of the audience. The initial securitization framework only loosely defined the audience as "those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issues"[70]. Indeed, one of the earliest questions asked of the securitization concept was how to even identify who the audience is at any given moment. Scholars including Salter, Roe, Léonard and Kaunert have pointed out that different securitizations are likely to have different audiences[71], such as public (which this thesis focuses on), elite, technocratic and scientific audiences, or even a multiplicity of audiences in a single securitization. These different groups can be relevant audiences who enable the adoption of new security practices or rationales for different reasons. Public audiences may sometimes provide moral backing for a securitization, while at other times powering the demand for direct action. Elite audiences such as parliamentarians may provide the legal permissions necessary to enact certain directives, and technocratic or scientific audiences may frame and provide the precise ways and means of such missions, although each of these audiences may play different roles depending on context. Roe even argues that single securitizations can be divided into

[70] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*.

[71] Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization"; Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq"; Leonard and Kaunert, "Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory."

different stages, with the relevant audience changing from stage to stage. For instance, the relevant audience in Tony Blair's securitization of the potential presence of WMDs in Iraq would initially have been the British public at large, while later being the British parliament itself.[72]

This confusion over who the audience is becomes further complicated by a lack of clarity over when an audience has accepted a securitization proposition. As has been called out by McDonald, Salter, and Waever,[73] under-theorisations of the politics of audience acceptance make it difficult to ascertain the "signs of acceptance" that might indicate the moment a securitization process has culminated in a certain group agreeing that a certain issue is a security concern. How to know when a securitizing argument has been accepted, and to what extent, was left particularly unclear by the initial securitization framework, and remains difficult to fully clarify, although (as I will detail below) this clarification is possible for certain audiences in certain situations. Consequently, without a clear understanding of who the audience is and when it has accepted a securitizing argument, the development of an understanding of why audiences are moved to make such acceptances was for some time overshadowed by these more preliminary questions. However, as I will outline below, progress has recently been made in this regard and my thesis seeks to builds on these developments.

The Public Audience Omitted

An additional problem that has deterred an understanding of the dynamics between public audiences and securitizations is that one major arm of the academic securitization field, namely the Paris School, along with several scholars that might be described as independent of scholastic categories, have largely omitted the public audience from their analytical framework. Instead, they relegate the "audience" to a closed and mappable group of individuals at the upper echelons of professional fields[74]. This relegation is a consequence of these scholars' vision of the role of linguistics in securitization processes. The Paris School subsumes (though does not eliminate) the role of linguistics under the more overarching influence of praxis.[75] Indeed, although the Paris School is often counted as a school of securitization its departure from a linguistically-based analysis of the processes that produce security rationales makes it more than a little detached from the original Copenhagen School framework.[76]

Led mostly by works from Bigo, the Paris School centres its analysis on fields of practice located largely at the professional level of security management. In doing so, it sheds light on the bureaucratic and elite processes that lead to professionals categorising security

[72] Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq."
[73] McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security"; Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization"; Waever, "Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies."
[74] Bigo and Guild, *Controlling Frontiers*; Crowley, "Where Does the State Actually Start?"; Floyd, "When Foucault Met Security Studies"; Tsoukala, "Looking at Migrants as Enemies"; Bonelli, "The Control of the Enemy Within?"; Ceyhan, "Policing By Dossier"; Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease"; Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe"; Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*.
[75] Bigo and Guild, *Controlling Frontiers*.
[76] Floyd, "When Foucault Met Security Studies"; Waever, "Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies"; Waever, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery."

issues as such and developing subsequent policies. Emerging from the academic traditions of Foucault and Bourdieu, these studies utilise the concepts of *habitus* and *dispositif* to highlight how the everyday interactions, power relations, interests, and bureaucratic projects of different security professionals give rise to dominant security rationales at the higher ranks of professional fields which then have implications for the broader society[77].

As such, in this vision of securitization linguistics and linguistic receptions by public audiences play a much more secondary role in the allotment of an issue into the "security" category than does the practice of the immediate elite or professional "gatekeepers" in these high ranks of the security field. Audiences are therefore relegated to the technocratic and the elite, while identifications are subsumed under interests and perceived "knowledge". This treatment of the audience is not exclusive to the Paris School, but emerges also in the works of several independent scholars including Bright, Curley, Piché, Vaugh, and Vuori who have largely focused on donors, bureaucracies, governments and experts and (not consistently but often) excluded public audiences[78].

As such, while clearly informative and enlightening as to securitization processes that take place at this "high" level, this vision of securitization focuses on elites and their knowledge bases at the expense of non-technocratic audiences and their identifications. Indeed, this vision has made the production of public audience-centred research even sparser, as it has deterred a portion of the securitization field from developing parallel theories of public audience acceptance. This is well highlighted by Balzacq, who argues that the practice turn in securitization has gained a great deal of scholarship as it circumvents the analytical problems of identifying the signs of public audience acceptance and tracing society-wide discursive landscapes[79].

The Public Audience Undercut By The Speech Act

While the Paris School largely omits the public audience, the other two major "schools" of securitization, the Copenhagen and Welsh Schools, along with more "independent" securitization scholars such as Abrahamsen, Hansen, Hughes, and Roe, are largely open to the role of public audiences in securitization.[80] The Copenhagen and Welsh Schools' differences are found more in respect to normative attitudes towards securitization (anti-securitization vs open to its emancipatory potential, respectively), intellectual backgrounds (building on Austin and quietly Schmittian vs proudly Gramscian, respectively), and levels of objectivism (thoroughly viewing insecurity as a construct vs allowing for the possibility of both real and

[77] Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease"; Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*; Floyd, "When Foucault Met Security Studies"; Waever, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery."

[78] Bright, "Securitisation, Terror, and Control"; Curley and Herington, "The Securitisation of Avian Influenza: International Discourses and Domestic Politics in Asia"; Salter and Piché, "The Securitization of the US–Canada Border in American Political Discourse"; Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders"; Vaughn, "The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness."

[79] Balzacq, "Securitization Theory Now and Then."

[80] Abrahamsen, "Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear"; Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School"; Hughes, "Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social Construction of Security"; Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq."

illusory insecurity, respectively).[81] However, while these schools and scholars allow public audiences into their analytical framework, their treatment of these audiences in turn suffers from a fundamental tension that exists in the original securitization framework and has persisted in several securitization strands. This is the tension between a vision of speech acts as performative and an understanding of security as intersubjectively constructed.

As was noted above, securitization's distinctiveness as a theory, despite its many strands and internal debates, arises from its core assertion that audience acceptance of a securitizing argument is what allows the non-objective concept of security to gain some transient and socially-situated meaning. This grounds the securitization field's vision of security's construction in an intersubjectivity between an audience and socially authorised "securitizing actors", as these actors are making assertions about security issues which the audience *may* then accept and consequently legitimise.[82] In other words, the necessity of security meanings being negotiated and mutually accepted makes securitization an intersubjective process between audiences and securitizing actors.

However, the place of intersubjectivity in many (particularly in the Copenhagen School's) securitization frameworks is often strongly undermined by a simultaneous, competing, and more thoroughly theorised emphasis on performative speech acts. Compared to the audience and its intersubjective relation with securitizing actors, the place of performative speech acts emerges in securitization theory in great detail. It also has a clearer sense of development from the performativity and decisionist theories of Austin and Schmitt, from research into the ability of language to create rather than merely represent reality, and from studies into social authority's influence on arguments' acceptability.[83] According to this idea of performative speech acts, the *act of saying* "security" itself reorients the world by virtue of this very utterance. Security talk does not simply describe threats, it generates issues' status as threats. This is because saying "security" is an act in and of itself, a performative utterance. Once "security" is invoked, the "logic of security" sets in and infuses subsequent assertions about security threats with an urgency and subsequent semi-immunity to cautious challenge. This immunity is bolstered and mediated via the social authority of the speaker which imbues these utterances with weightiness[84]. The speech acts themselves, therefore, create subsequent security rationales through their own performative power.

It should be noted that the Copenhagen School's utilisation of speech-act theory and pre-existing ideas of performativity is very selective here. They produce arguments about the performativity of security talk by explicitly building on the works of Butler, Arendt, and Derrida,[85] but simultaneously ignore how these authors define as "linguistic" a range of social

[81] Booth, "Security and Emancipation"; Booth, "Security in Anarchy"; Booth, *Theory of World Security*; Wyn Jones, "'Message in a Bottle''? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies'"; Wyn Jones, *Critical Theory and World Politics*; Waever, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery"; Waever, "Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies"; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*; Buzan, *People, States & Fear*; Ruzicka, "Failed Securitization: Why It Matters."

[82] Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*.

[83] Williams, "The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory"; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*; Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization"; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited."

[84] Theiler, "Societal Security."

[85] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, p46-47.

actions and norms that go far beyond speech acts and instead encompass wider social contexts. Essentially, the authors who the Copenhagen School builds its theory on emphasise the productive symbolic power of non-speech and social context, but the Copenhagen School's readings of these authors focus very heavily on speech acts themselves.[86] This focus on the performative power of speech is more in line with the theories of Austin – who places the source of speech acts' effects primarily with speech acts – an author whom Butler heavily critiqued and with whom Derrida has been deemed difficult to reconcile.[87]

This selective reading of performativity theories and mixing of divergent authors' perspectives helps to explain why there is an unignorable tension between the Copenhagen School's idea that security conceptions only gain salience upon acceptance by the audience following *intersubjective negotiations between securitizing actors and audiences*, and the School's more thoroughly theorised idea that *the security utterance itself creates a new reality through its own performative power*.[88] Stritzel goes as far as to argue that the "performativity of security utterances as opposed to the social process of securitization, involving (pre-existing) actors, audience(s) and context(s) are so different that they form two rather autonomous centres of gravity"[89] in securitization theory. This tension has stymied the production of a thorough and consistent treatment of the public audience's role in securitization. On the intersubjectivity side of things, we have an audience that plays a direct and fundamental role in the creation of security issues, while on the performativity side we have an audience that at most receives security at the behest of securitizing actors who make the decisive performative speech acts.

McDonald, Balzacq and Stritzel argue that solving this tension will require a downplaying of either the performative or the intersubjective side of securitization theory.[90] Different securitization scholars have reacted to this tension in different ways. Some, such as Peoples and Floyd, choose to downplay the intersubjective negotiation of security meanings between elites, audiences, and broader social landscapes by marginalizing the audience analytically and underplaying its active role.[91] The Copenhagen School has acknowledged this tension and argued that – while intersubjectivity between elites, audiences, and broader social landscapes remains an important part of securitization, and audiences' predispositions make up a part of what Buzan terms the "facilitating conditions" of securitizations – identifying the audience and how they accept security concepts is not only difficult but almost impossible in practice.[92] As Balzacq critiques, this "suggests that securitization is an intersubjective process, one side of which is virtually impossible to pin down."[93] As such, it enables an outbalanced focus on the performativity of speech acts and deters a thorough study of why public audiences accept or resist securitizations. On the more extreme side of things, Floyd has even argued that in light of this tension audience activity should be analytically dismissed and audience

[86] Stritzel, *Security in Translation.*
[87] Stritzel, *Security in Translation.*
[88] Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization."
[89] Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.", p364.
[90] McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security"; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited"; Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond."
[91] Peoples, "The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control"; Floyd, *Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy*.
[92] Buzan and Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations."
[93] Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited." p501

acceptance should be removed from securitization theory altogether and replaced with more tangible indicators of speech acts having real world effects such as policy changes[94].

We can also detect an implicit alignment with performative speech acts and downplaying of audience activity in the Welsh School. Both Wyn Jones and Booth (I qualify Booth's inclusion here in this footnote[95]) have argued that international security projects are usually conducted by states and for states (for instance nuclearization). These, they argue, generate and maintain an outbalanced idea of the state as the referent object of security. In "reality", it is the people within the states are those who are truly under threat, with states only being means to these peoples' security. These people are distracted from the more pertinent threats of oppression and economic struggle that make life insecure for populations at large by these illusory state-centric threats which are generated by and for state activities.[96]

These arguments suggest and indeed rely on a vision of securitization processes in which state authorities create security rationales which populaces then tacitly or even enthusiastically endorse at their own expense (or rather, a vision in which state authorities "appropriate" security from populaces). This is consequently a vision in which the audience is rather inactive or at least generally incapable of having their "true" security concerns expressed through state activity. However, it should be acknowledged that the Welsh School does not see the audience as completely and eternally passive in this process, as the School is in part motivated by a Gramscian normative drive to emancipate the public audience or humanity from statist projects and enable humanity as a whole to take more control over security policies and rationales. Nonetheless, the School is less than convinced that such a thing is a common occurrence. An active role for the public audience in securitizations is therefore striven for while implicitly recognised as generally lacking.

Empirical and Theoretical Audiences

On the other hand, there are several authors who – either explicitly through theory or implicitly through empirical examination (or both) – apply a more intersubjective view of securitization processes and afford a commensurate role to the audience in these processes. As noted above, many of these authors focus largely on technocratic or elite audiences, but some, such as Abrahamsen, Hughes, Hayes, Lupovici, and Salter take a broader perspective noting larger public audiences in various Western and non-Western settings.[97] While these studies are not problematic in and of themselves, the majority of empirically-driven studies present

[94] Floyd, *Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy*.

[95] It should be noted that Booth distances himself from the securitization field, not least due to his refutation of the core securitization idea that security is a construction. For Booth there are real insecurities which genuinely threaten humanity. Nonetheless, he has been described as a core member of what is termed by others as the Welsh School of securitization, not least by Ole Waever in "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery" and by Matt McDonald in "The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and the Politics of Security," and his writings have provided effective critiques of the Copenhagen School which impact broader securitization research.

[96] Booth, "Security and Emancipation"; Booth, *Theory of World Security*; Wyn Jones, *Critical Theory and World Politics*.

[97] Abrahamsen, "Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear"; Hughes, "Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social Construction of Security"; Hayes, "Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties That Bind"; Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization"; Lupovici, "Securitization Climax."

context-specific analyses of processes or events which occurred in very particular settings. These studies, while highly informative, do not in themselves provide a more broadly utilisable theoretical understanding of the dynamics between public audiences and securitization processes. However, they do offer a very good overview of the range of roles, which can be highly active, that audiences in securitizations can play depending on context. These include resisting[98], greatly deterring[99], even intensifying securitizations[100].

In the wake of such empirical studies into intersubjective securitization processes there have been moves to build a more generalisable and theoretical tenable understanding of how and why the audience assents to or resists securitizing moves. However, it has been well argued by Côté that their remains a tension between the data on audiences in these empirical pro-intersubjectivity studies and the postulates regarding the audience in more theoretical pro-intersubjectivity works. Côté demonstrates that the theory-driven studies, while including audiences and emphasising intersubjectivity, tend to treat audiences as "agents without agency". In this sense, the audiences are portrayed as important yet passive modulators of securitization grammars who have the power to give their assent or refusal but do so based on wider contextual factors. While these factors do include more than just performative speech acts, these authors' emphasis on contextual influences on audiences' decisions still omits the possibility of the audience creating rather than merely processing security meanings. This contrasts with the demonstrated active agency on the part of audiences that we see in wider empirical works.[101] As I detail below, this critique by Côté needs to be taken into account, but should also be balanced out and measured against the promise of contextual theories of the audience's role in securitizations.

Overall then, we have a series of tensions, mistreatments, omissions and a lack of clarity regarding both the audience in general and the public audience in particular in various strands of the securitization field. Despite the audience occupying a fundamental if not essential place in the idea that visions of security are flexible and socially constructed – the idea that remains at the core of securitization theory's variants and provides them with their distinctiveness from other fields – the audience has proven to be an elusive and poorly theorised element of securitization frameworks. This has significantly impaired the production of a theory of why a public audience will assent to or resist a securitization process.

How to identify when the audience gives its acceptance to such a process and even who the audience is have proven to be notable holes in the framework which have taken considerable effort to address (although, as I will outline below, progress is being made in this regard). One major arm and several independent scholars of securitization have relegated the audience to a closed and elite group of technocrats and professionals. While certainly informative and relevant, these studies exclude a broad swathe of audience forms and functions that have the potential to impact securitization processes. A fundamental tension underlies much of the remainder of the field's treatment of the audience, which is pulled between intersubjective and performative visions of securitization processes. Some have reacted to this

[98] Bright, "Securitisation, Terror, and Control"; Lupovici, "Securitization Climax."
[99] Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization."
[100] Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?"
[101] Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory."

tension by marginalising the public audience analytically or even theoretically. Many of those who have sought to emphasise the public audience and intersubjectivity have done so in an empirical way which, while illuminating the many modes of audience activity in securitizations, lacks an extractable theory of public audience acceptance. Meanwhile, the theoretical overhauls of audience dynamics have been critiqued as implicitly denying audiences the possibility of being active creators of security meanings, a critique which must be taken into account while balanced. As a whole, therefore, the role of the public audience in securitizations is significantly under-theorised, a situation I attempt to remedy with my study of the influence the public audience's identifications have on securitizations.

Stepping Stones

In light of the significance and absence of a thorough understanding of how active public audiences affect securitizations through the intersubjective processes between securitizing actors and audiences, it is not surprising that some moves towards developing such a theory have been pursued – or at least the groundwork for them has been laid – by a few key securitization scholars, namely Balzacq, Bourbeau, Bubandt, Côté, and Stritzel. My step towards producing a systematic theory of the intersubjective dynamics between public audience identifications and securitizations builds from these scholars' works but also critiques and seeks to balance some of their competing theoretical standpoints and concerns. Beyond synthesising these authors' works, a core contribution I add to their research is the insight that *by looking to the fields of identity and cognitive studies and extracting from them the concepts of identifications and schemata* (which I will detail in the next chapter) *we can translate these authors' works into a concrete, applicable, and systematic theory and analytical tool.*

Côté, the Audience Defined, and Why The Public Can A Be Relevant Audience

As has been outlined above, the issue of identifying the audience has been the subject of much scrutiny by securitization critics, and it has been argued by the Copenhagen School that any attempt to pin down the audience empirically is bound to flounder. An understanding of how public audience identifications influence securitizations cannot, therefore, comfortably stay afloat without being buoyed up by a developed notion that the public can be identified as a relevant audience. Côté provides the theoretical life raft for this[102]. Building on contributions from Vuori, Salter, Balzacq, Roe, Léonard and Kaunert, Côté identifies the audience in a manner that balances the concerns of practical applicability and theoretical holism. He takes into account the work done by Salter, Roe, Léonard and Kaunert in noting that several different audiences can play different roles in different stages of different securitizations. He then adds to Vuori and Balzacq's "capabilities" definition of the audience, which sees the audience as that group which can enable the securitizing actor to enact their security practice. Côté critiques Balzacq and Vuori by arguing that the audience does more than just empower an actor to act; they also "sanction the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor."[103] As such, audience acceptance enables both security views and practices, or, as Côté puts it, the audience is "the individual(s) or group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue

[102] Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory."
[103] Côté, p548

presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice."[104]

While challenging the Copenhagen School's trouble with audience identification, this definition actually remains consistent with and even backs up the original Copenhagen School's vision of securitization processes, which sees securitizations as generating not just security practices but more fundamentally security rationales and visions.[105] This definition further avoids the pitfalls of essentialising the audience through over-specificity, while also providing the audience with an identifiable trait that can be used to note different relevant audiences in different securitizations.

Following from Côté's definition of the audience (those with the ability to authorize the views presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice) we can see that ***the public can be a relevant audience in certain securitizations***. Of course, technocratic or elite audiences are often the ones that design and execute security practices, or provide the final domino in a long chain that enables these security practices. Nonetheless, I contend that the public will meet Côté's definition of an audience in scenarios where two criteria are met. These criteria are (i) securitizations which are publicly visible and provocative[106], and (ii) securitizations that require the approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can come into effect.

If these two criteria are met, then the public view of an issue (whether or not the public believes the issue should be seen as a security issue and should be treated as such) will influence the authorization and legitimation of the proposed security rationale/practice. This is because provoked public's view can directly impact elected officials' chances of re-election, which will deter these actors from defying the public. Defying the public in such situations would result in security policies that the public passionately disagrees with and resents. It would additionally erode elected officials' aura of legitimacy (which they depend on). Long-term losses of this perceived legitimacy threaten (if not ruin) these officials' chances of re-election. In short, ignoring or defying the public view of a securitization (in scenarios in which the public is both aware of and provoked by the securitization) carries significant negative consequences for elected officials.

As such, if the proposed security measures require elected officials' approval then the view of this provoked public will influence whether or not the measures will go ahead. Consequently, the public will significantly influence the *authorization* of proposed security rationales and/or practices. Furthermore, defying a passionate public view of an issue is particularly likely to delegitimise any resulting security rationale/practice, particularly in democratic environments where the perceived "will of the people" is considered to be fundamental for legitimizing state action. In such environments, public support will not only influence the (de-)authorization but also the *(de-)legitimation* of the security rationale/practice. As such, (and perhaps most importantly, as this gets at the most commonsense idea of an audience), in these situations the securitizing actor will know that they must convince the public

[104] Côté, p548

[105] Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization"; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*.

[106] This can be noted as moments when securitizations gain widespread media coverage and invoke passionate reactions from large segments of the public. Though such a condition may be hard to gauge in certain situations, in other situations it is undeniable (the Iraq War for example).

to accept the securitization viewpoint, and as a consequence they will direct their speech (at least in part) towards the public.

So, in certain situations the public view of the issue can influence the authorization and legitimation of security rationales and practices, and is a view that the securitizing actor is actively trying to influence. Therefore, the public can be identified as a relevant audience in securitizations if we adopt, as I do, Côté's definition of the audience. Furthermore, in scenarios where the public is an audience the securitization could not be said to be successful if the public does not accept the securitization. Recall that a securitization aims to have an audience conceptualise something as an object of worth, agree that there is a threat to this object, and decide that this threat must and can be dealt with via certain means. Consequently, securitizations require both audiences' views to be changed and measures to be adopted in order to be successful. As such, if the public is a relevant audience in a securitization but they do not accept the securitization, then the securitization has failed at least in part and likely in full. This is because the public's rejection would signal a failure to influence the viewpoint of a key audience, and because the public's rejection will likely mean that the proposed security measures will not go ahead.

Admittedly, even in scenarios that meet my two criteria, securitizing actors may opt to avoid searching for public assent for their security rationales, or simply ignore public dissent. Such instances in which securitizing actors ignore public opinion and push on with their securitizations are not unheard of (Trump bombing Syria comes to mind) but for highly visible and politically charged security policies this is not a viable long-term strategy for securitizing actors (as Trump seemingly learned). Additionally, there are of course securitizations which do not meet my criteria, such as securitizations which largely escape media attention and/or are enacted by empowered technocrats rather than elected officials. I am not, therefore, arguing that the public is always a relevant audience for securitization. Instead, I am arguing that members of the public can be a relevant audience for securitizations, and when they are (as I will detail later) their identifications are key to the securitization's success.

If the public can have a significant impact on securitization processes, then understanding what moves the public in a securitization can impact the theory, practice, and consequences of securitizations. The significance of this impact emerges, firstly, from the possibility that a more holistic apprehension of the important factors influencing different securitization outcomes can enable these securitizations to be better managed/deterred, and secondly from the far-reaching consequences that well or poorly managed/deterred securitizations can have. Understandings of what powers securitization processes can enable us to monitor and potentially impact these processes through our awareness of what makes them pan out in different ways. In contrast to a performative understanding of securitization – which places responsibility for and power over securitizations in the hands of securitizing actors – and beyond a theory of the power relations within a restricted field of security professionals, an understanding of the role of the public audience can allow us to impact securitizations even after they have gained acceptance in a small group of high level technocrats or securitizing actors.

This is a contribution of significance. Securitizations happen frequently. In fact, despite the securitization field's regular assertion that security characterises a departure from the regular and ordinary, with Balzacq going so far as to describe securitization as the "politics of

the extraordinary",[107] security is one of the most basic, pervasive, consequential, and ordinary concerns of life. This has been well highlighted by both the Paris School and the somewhat related research building on "risk society" which have demonstrated how security logics are being infused into ever more sectors and aspects of modern life. From the basic architecture of modern cities and the rationales towards policing, to the typical mindset of consumers interacting with potential risks in society at large, risk and security are increasingly ubiquitous concerns.[108] Each of these security logics are powered by different groups' acceptance of security rationales, acceptances which happen via securitization processes. As the consequences of securitizations become increasingly ubiquitous across domestic and international societies, so too does the importance of understanding the factors influencing these securitizations *throughout* their development. As such, public audiences, how they affect securitizations, and how securitizations affect them, must be brought into a securitization framework in a more holistic and systematic manner. This is one of my thesis' core aims.

Balzacq and the Need to Look at Intersubjectivity and Orientations

While Côté, by synthesising and critiquing other authors, provides a strong basis for identifying the audience, my hypothesis also builds directly on Balzacq's work regarding the perlocutionary aspect of securitizing arguments and the consequent need to take audiences into account in securitization theory. It was noted above that several authors marginalize or downplay the role of the audience in securitizations as a result of the tension between performative speech acts and intersubjectivity in several (and the original) securitization frameworks. I take the opposite route, balancing out speech acts with an emphasis on intersubjectivity with the audience. In my hypothesis, as will be outlined in Chapter Two, securitizing actors make securitizing arguments but the effects of these speech acts are co-dependent on the speech act and the character of the audience who process the speech act (or rather, are dependent on the *relationship* between the speech act and the character of the audience who process the speech act). In this regard I build from Balzacq, who has argued[109] that theories of the performativity of language as set out by Austin are not at all adequately captured by securitization theory.

Balzacq demonstrates that speech acts entail both illocutionary utterances and perlocutionary effects, and these perlocutionary effects are crucial not only for theories of performativity but also for understandings of what makes securitizations successful. Perlocutionary effects are "the 'consequential effects' or 'sequels' that are aimed at evoking the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience", while illocutionary utterances concern simply the speech itself.[110] It is only these perlocutionary effects, triggered by but not encapsulated in an illocutionary utterance, that entail the adoption of a new security rationale (through which adoption we see the performative power of speech acts at work).

Both the perlocutionary and illocutionary elements of performativity must therefore be included in our analytical lens, and including them both means emphasising the intersubjective

[107] Balzacq, "Securitization Theory Now and Then."
[108] Beck, *Risk Society*; Bigo and Guild, *Controlling Frontiers*.
[109] Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization"; Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited."
[110] Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization.", p175

dynamics between audiences and securitizing actors. This is because the perlocutionary effects of a securitization can only arise if there is some sort of relationship between the audience and the securitizing actor, as otherwise an illocutionary speech act *would have no medium* through which it could invoke a perlocutionary effect. The character of this relationship is not universal, rather it will differ from case to case. This relationship must therefore be ascertained rather than assumed, and subsequently taken into account. Taking into account the varying (which are, necessarily, shifting) relationships between audiences and securitizing actors demands treating securitizations as intersubjective processes. In Balzacq's words, "the speech act view of security does not account for the relation between the persuasive power of an agent and a concomitant swing in the attitude of the target audience".[111]

In addition, Balzacq argues, accounting for the perlocutionary aspect of speech does not simply mean that we must see speech as something that moves an audience and leave it at that. Whether or not – and how – an audience will be moved by a speech (and consequently, whether or not the "desired" perlocutionary effects will come about) depends on more than the speech itself. Balzacq lays this out when he argues that "security as a speech act is highly problematic because it overlooks…the psycho-cultural orientation of the audience."[112] As such, the perlocutionary aspect of speech demands that we account for rather than marginalise intersubjectivity with the audience, and that we ascertain rather than assume the relationship between audiences and securitizing rhetoric. This further means that we must examine what characterises and effects this relationship, including the audience's "psycho-cultural orientation".

Building on these insights, *my hypothesis posits that utilising the concepts of identifications and schemata can allow us to analytically grasp this psycho-cultural orientation of the audience and show how it feeds into a security utterance's perlocutionary effects by strongly influencing the shifting relationships between the audience and the securitizing actor.*

Bourbeau, Bubandt, and Context

This brings us to the position of context in my hypothesis. While the groundwork for this has been laid by several authors, I build most directly from the works produced by Bourbeau, Bubandt, and Stritzel, while accounting for how these works have been challenged by Côté[113]. Bourbeau actually downplays the audience's role as an active agent in securitization, which Côté critiques him for. Nonetheless, Bourbeau's argument[114] that the audience occupies a position within the wider context of a securitization is one my hypothesis builds on. He contends that "linguistic utterances are always produced in particular contexts and that the social properties of these contexts endow speech acts with a differential value system". He then presents "an analytical framework that understands the relationship between agents and contextual factors as mutually constituted".[115] He also argues that contexts can not

[111] Balzacq., p176
[112] Balzacq., p174
[113] Bubandt, "Vernacular Security"; Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*; Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond"; Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory."
[114] Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*.
[115] Bourbeau.

only facilitate, but also constrain and limit, securitization success, an argument that forms an important part of my work.

Bubandt[116] utilises a similar framework, which he uses to illuminate how Western-derived notions of security unravel in their basic claims to universality when they encounter alternative local understandings of security, or "vernacular security." Arguing that securitizations are "related to the political history of the local ontological ways in which danger, risk and (in)security are defined"[117] he goes on to explicitly link security with notions of the self, stating that "securitization is a discursive device for community-building, for the rhetorical evocation and political realization of imagined communities at various scales".[118] My hypothesis builds on Bubandt's linking of security with community-formation, as I take the link between securitization and imaginations of communities and theorise as to the two-way dynamics between them (rather than Bubandt's more one-way vision of securitization as a tool for community-building). Additionally, both Bubandt's and Bourbeau's frameworks of mutually-constituted agents and contexts form part of the basis for my hypothesis. In these two approaches of securitization the audience is envisioned as embedded within and partly constituting a broader local context which must be inquired into, a vision I adopt into my hypothesis. Specific aspects of this context subsequently become key to understanding the audience and how it is moved by certain speech acts. While Bubandt looks largely at local political histories and Bourbeau at governmental practices and norms, *I seek to illuminate the role of identifications and schemata (culturally/politically oriented and linguistically composed) in co-constituting these audiences and their contexts.*

Stritzel and Resonant Values

Stritzel and his theory of security as translation has provided a strong springboard for this work.[119] Stritzel argues that securitizations occur within sociopolitical and sociolinguistic dimensions, in that securitizations are embedded within broader social environments and operate under the dynamics of intertextuality. He forwards the thesis that for new security rationales or texts to be successfully adopted in new local settings, or for them to be "translated" and "localized", they must be compatible with local sociopolitical and sociolinguistic environments. In being adopted in these new settings, these security rationales indeed transform the discursive landscape – and in this sense the speech acts involved maintain a level of performativity – yet they do so only if the pre-existing linguistic and social landscape is conducive to their adoption. "Resonant values" therefore become essential in the transmission of a security logic from one locale to another. As I will detail below, my hypothesis argues that *an aspect of these sociopolitical and sociolinguistic contexts which is crucial to influencing a public audience's effect on a securitization is the identifications and schemata (culturally/politically oriented and linguistically composed) and associated values held by that public.*

[116] Bubandt, "Vernacular Security."
[117] Bubandt. p276
[118] Bubandt.
[119] Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond."

Balancing Côté and the Above

At this point, Côté's critique of Stritzel, Balzacq, and Bourbeau should be addressed, as my research seeks to balance his view of audience agency with the more context-oriented views of these scholars. Côté argues that while the treatment of the audience in these scholars' works constitutes a commitment to the intersubjective side of securitization and a centralisation of the audience in securitization theory, the place of context in these works would seem to subsume the audience within a network of influences that denies them agency.[120] Côté forwards evidence illustrating that "securitization audiences are not *inextricably linked* to their contextual circumstances but can instead act to create, reproduce, reappropriate, or transform these contextual circumstances through their interactions with securitizing actors" (emphasis in original).[121] He emphasises that securitizations involve deliberative processes between securitizing actors and audiences, and as such the audience should be seen as more than the sum of their influences but rather as independent agents with agency.

My research takes this critique of contextual considerations seriously. Audiences have agency and maintain the ability to reproduce and fashion themselves in the light of wider contexts, while also engaging deliberatively with these contexts to an extent. This "to an extent" is the important marker. My hypothesis allows for the audience to have the capacity in certain circumstances to deliberatively engage with securitizing arguments in a highly agential manner. Nonetheless, the extent to which this deliberative engagement can take place is affected by contextual factors directly tied to the audience's identifications (rather than just the speech act), which can sometimes prohibit active deliberative engagement with ideas or arguments. *I therefore afford public audiences a* constant *influence over securitizations (at all times maintaining the ability to reject or deter securitizations), but also only a* conditionally limited *agency in light of the broader context which they sit within.* This is laid out in more detail later.

Summary

To summarise, this thesis will present a hypothesis of how public audiences' identifications influence securitizations. This is a meaningful contribution to the securitization field (and wider fields, as will be detailed in subsequent chapters) because the audience is simultaneously one of the most central elements of the securitization framework and one of the least understood parts of this framework. Examinations of how the public audience affects securitizations have been inhibited by preliminary questions of identifying the audience and its signs of acceptance, by a relegation of the audience to a closed group of professionals, by an undercutting emphasis on speech acts, and by mismatches between empirical and theoretical studies. This is a significant detriment, as public audiences can be a highly influential component of securitization processes, which are themselves processes of immense consequence.

To address this, I build on Côté's work on identifying the audience, Stritzel's work on the need for new security rationales to be compatible with pre-existing discourses, Bourbeau and Bubandt's vision of the role of context, and Balzacq's emphasis on the perlocutionary side

[120] Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory."
[121] Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory," p551.

of securitization, while balancing Côté's push for greater levels of active agency to be attributed to audiences[122]. Synthesising these contributions, I introduce a theory that emphasises the importance of the public audience and its psycho-cultural orientation, as encapsulated in their identifications, in co-constituting highly important sociopolitical and sociolinguistic contexts in securitization processes. By demonstrating how these audiences and identifications – and these contexts they sit within and channel – significantly affect the intersubjective negotiation of security meanings, my hypothesis emphasises the intersubjective character of securitization and counters the previous emphasis on how the performative power of speech acts generates security rationales. My hypothesis treats the public audience as conditionally active agents capable to varying context-dependent degrees of deliberative moves, yet constantly affecting securitizations' developments through their (sometimes non-deliberative) character. This takes into account and balances different concerns about audience agency and the role of context in securitization.

My research ultimately aims to systematically illuminate how public audience identifications affect securitizations. In doing so, my work enhances our understanding of how and why securitization processes, outcomes, and consequences are affected by public audiences and does so in a way that builds on and contributes to existing securitization works. In my next chapter I will detail the hypothesis itself and how it also builds from and contributes to research on identifications and wider fields.

[122] Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond"; Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*; Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*; Bubandt, "Vernacular Security"; Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory."

CHAPTER TWO
Identifications, Hypothesis, and Aims

Chapter Abstract

In this chapter, I lay out the hypothesis that my empirical research sets out to test. I begin by summarising my hypothesis concerning how identifications influence securitizations. I then unpack this hypothesis in more detail and fully define and detail the concepts of identifications and schemata. The hypothesis I lay out here is that the receptivity of the public audience to securitizing arguments is delimited by the public audience's identifications. As I unpack this hypothesis, I detail how it builds on and contributes to fields of cognitive studies, identity research, and social psychology, and I outline how my research has entailed an identification tracking study which has produced a valuable dataset. Overall, this chapter seeks to detail my research aims, my hypothesis, and the concepts of identifications and schemata.

Abridged Hypothesis

I will first present an abridged version of my hypothesis which omits the finer details of the hypothesis and its theoretical underpinnings. After I present this abridged version I will then go into the details of the hypothesis and its theoretical underpinnings, with the aim of fully clarifying what I quickly introduce here. The abridged version is as follows.

Public audience *receptivity* to securitizing rhetoric is delimited by public audiences' identifications. If the audience is unreceptive then the securitizing actor/rhetoric will have little influence over the audience. If the audience is receptive then the securitizing actor/rhetoric will be able to (but is not guaranteed to) influence the audience. Identifications affect receptivity, and as such identifications have a permissive/preventive influence on securitizations.

In what way do identifications affect receptivity? As lay out in the table here, an individual's identifications can be seen to have three characteristics relevant to securitizations: strength or embeddedness over time (they can be strong or weak), density (thick/usually thin/thin), and alignment of their content to the securitizing argument (aligned/non-aligned).

Table 2.1

Characteristic	*Strength*	*Density*	*Alignment of Content*
Character	Strong	Thick	Aligned
	Weak	(Usually) Thin	Non-aligned

I argue that public audiences' receptivity to a securitizing argument will increase/decrease if their identifications are in certain configurations, as illustrated in Figure 1 on the next page and quickly outlined thereafter.

Fig. 1


The public audience's pre-existing identifications
Are they strong or weak?
Weak (*no schemata – receptivity increases*)
+1 Increase in Receptivity
Strong (*more restricted sec. actor*)
Are they thick or thin or usually thin but sometimes thick??
Thin (*less regularly invoked schemata – receptivity increases*)
+1 Increase in Receptivity
Usually Thin but Sometimes Thick (*inconsistent effects*)
(*more restricted* Thick *sec. actor)*
Is their content aligned or non-aligned to the (anti-) securitizing argument?
Is their content aligned or non-aligned to the (anti-) securitizing argument?
Aligned (*receptivity and resonance increase*)
Misaligned (*receptivity decreases*)
Aligned (*receptivity and sometimes resonance increase*)
Misaligned (*receptivity sometimes increases and sometimes decreases*)
+2 Increase in Receptivity
-1 Decrease in Receptivity
+1.5 Increase in Receptivity
0 Effect on Receptivity

I will now quickly go through the hypothesis outlined in the above diagram, before getting into this hypothesis in more detail.

Identifications are not identities. Rather, they are an individual's multiple conceptualisations of their identity (i.e. they are the ways in which individuals conceive of themselves). Strong identifications are those that are highly embedded over time. These act as self-schemata. Self-schemata are resistant to change and prevent the individual who holds them from being receptive to any rhetoric that runs counter to their content. As such, *if an individual's identifications are strong then the individual will reject any securitizing rhetoric that misaligns with these identifications. Strong identifications therefore <u>can</u> decrease audience receptivity to securitizing rhetoric* if securitizing actors do not align their rhetoric to their audiences' identifications. This restricts the securitizing actors.

Meanwhile, weak identifications are open to change, and consequently the individuals that hold them are open to certain arguments even if these arguments contradict the individuals' current identifications. *Weak identifications therefore increase audiences' receptivity to securitizing rhetoric and get a receptivity score of +1.* This leaves the securitizing actor less restricted and make securitizations easier.

Thin identifications are identifications that have less frequently primed content. As the amount of frequently primed content in identifications decreases, the range of securitizing rhetoric that this content can misalign with also decreases. As such, *thin identifications filter out little rhetoric and therefore increase audience receptivity to securitizing rhetoric (they therefore get a receptivity score of +1).* This leaves the securitizing actor less restricted, which consequently makes securitizations easier.

Meanwhile, thick identifications are full of frequently primed content, which means that there is much more securitizing rhetoric that they could misalign with. This means that *thick identifications narrow the parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric and consequently <u>can</u> decrease audience receptivity.* This restricts securitizing actors.

As such, when identifications are strong and thick they both resist change and narrow the parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric. *If such identifications then misalign with securitizing rhetoric at hand, audience receptivity to this rhetoric will decrease (so a receptivity score of -1).* However, if strong and thick identifications align with the securitizing rhetoric *then not only with the audience be receptive to the rhetoric **but also** the rhetoric will ring true with the audience (i.e. resonate with them), so in this situation there is a receptivity score of +2.*

Finally, identifications that are usually thin but sometimes thick have inconsistent effects, sometimes acting as thick identifications and sometimes as thin ones. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct an investigation into whether or not they act as thick identifications often, rarely, or usually. As such, a reasonable way of taking usually thin identifications' inconsistent effects (by which I mean, their inconsistent activity as thick or thin identifications) into account is to hedge our bets and posit that they will act as thick identifications 50% of the time and thin identifications 50% of the time.

Consequently, we would give strong, <u>aligned</u> and usually thin identifications a receptivity score of +1.5. This represents these identifications acting as thick identifications 50% of the time, consequently giving us strong, thick, and aligned identifications 50% of the

time (which would have a receptivity score of +2). The other 50% of the time they would act as thin identifications (hence gaining a receptivity score of +1). As 50% of the time these strong, aligned and usually thin identifications have a score of +2 and 50% of the time they have a score of +1, they have an overall score +1.5.

Next, strong, misaligned, and usually thin identifications would be given a receptivity score of 0. This represents them acting as thick identifications 50% of the time, which would mean 50% of the time we would have strong, thick, and misaligned identifications (with a score of –1). The other 50% of the time they would act as thin identifications with a score of +1, hence giving them an overall score of 0.

Overall, identifications will modulate the restrictions on securitizing actors by *delimiting* the parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric and the extent to which individuals are able to engage with arguments that run counter to their identifications. This hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1 above. I will now unpack this hypothesis in clearer detail and outline its theoretical underpinnings.

Receptivity, Schemata, and Identifications

Receptivity and Schemata

What is the meaning and place of receptivity and schemata in this framework? Let's start with the meaning. By an "audience's receptivity to an argument" I refer to the extent that an audience will deliberatively engage with the argument's information, rather than reject it outright. This extent is determined by the individual's multiple *schemata*. Schemata are the individual's fundamental, organised, and organising structures of knowledge regarding the way everything "is." This includes information about the worldly and the personal, the physical and the metaphysical, the normative and the value-free. Schemata organise information into certain relational laws regarding how things relate to each other and can be conceptualised (e.g., "rain is water," "killing is wrong," "the Japanese are from Japan"). In doing so, schemata provide the individual with *automatically* referenceable rules for how the world works, for what "is" and "is not," and what is and is not "acceptable."[123] As such, these linkages are fundamental and operative – fundamental in the sense that they are deeply embedded in the individual and often appear to be natural or undeniably true to them, and operative in the sense that they will organise the structures of knowledge that the individual develops and holds.

While embeddedness (defined in terms of relative stability or persistence over time) is the key characteristic of schemata[124], automation is one of their key functions. Physiological studies into schemata have argued that schemata are one of the primary cognitive devices that enable learning and deter cognitive processual overload. They do this by rendering very well-embedded relational laws about the world as automatically referenceable. Once well embedded, we no longer deliberatively engage with the information encapsulated in a schema. Rather, we simply access it and apply it to explain situations, process new information, and

[123] Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self."; Davis, "Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression"; Davis and Unruh, "The Development of the Self-Schema in Adult Depression."; Kelley, "Causal Schemata and the Attribution Process."

[124] Davis, "Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression"; Davis and Unruh, "The Development of the Self-Schema in Adult Depression."; Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self."

categorise the objects we encounter, but particularly to cope with information that seems ambiguous or non-sensical. This reduces cognitive overload and makes the world far more cognitively manageable, and further enables individuals to accumulate knowledge over time and learn. As newer, more complex information about the world is introduced to us, we can process it and store it by relating it our pre-existing schemata.[125] While there are clearly positive outputs to such a cognitive device, it does come with some troublesome drawbacks. The application of automatically referenced and non-deliberative conceptual laws to the processing of information can certainly make the world a more manageable place, but it has been evidenced that schemata cause us to interpret and even rewrite and misremember ambiguous information in ways that simply fit with our pre-existing world view.[126]

This is because *automatic rejection* of contradictory information is another key function of schemata.[127] These schemata act as filters; any information that does not fit within the relational laws of the schemata will be filtered out as "impossible" or "wrong" or "completely unknown." The individual will not comprehend such information as true or indeed may not comprehend it at all. For instance, the idea that the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line, or – for Islamic fundamentalists – the idea that Christianity is the one true religion. The audience *will not* engage with (be receptive to) information that schemata filter out, and they are even likely to quickly forget it. This process of rejection becomes all but instantaneous and invisible to the individual deliberating. The audience will be receptive to information that is not filtered out, but once this information is engaged with it still may not be agreed with.[128] Schemata might be thought of as the "nets" around the individual's cognitive "boxing ring"; they determine who can compete in the arena but do not decide exactly who will win. The ultimate winner will depend on other factors including the active deliberation of the individual and the performativity of the securitizing rhetoric. As will be outlined in the ***Tracking Identification Strength*** section later in this chapter, sometimes these schemata can be changed, but generally they are stable and spell-binding to the individual that holds them.

While the study of schemata emerged within the field of cognitive research – with their initial study largely taking place in laboratory settings before being applied more generally in the analysis and treatment of depression[129] – the effects of schemata have been the subject, directly and inadvertently, of political theory and social psychology. For instance, studies into the "politics of memory" examine the actual social processes, taking place on a wider scale, through which people negotiate historical narratives and construct contexts of meaning in

[125] Snow, "Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity"; Lieberman and I. Eisenberger, *Conflict and Habit: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to the Self*; Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations"; Lieberman, "Intuition"; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, *Habits as Knowledge Structures: Automaticity in Goal-Directed Behavior*; Wegner and Bargh, *Control and Automaticity in Social Life*; Evans, "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition."

[126] Brewer and Treyens, "Role of Schemata in Memory for Places."

[127] Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self."; Davis, "Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression."

[128] Davis and Unruh, "The Development of the Self-Schema in Adult Depression."; Kelley, "Causal Schemata and the Attribution Process"; Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self."; Davis, "Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression."

[129] Davis, "Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression"; Davis and Unruh, "The Development of the Self-Schema in Adult Depression."

which they can situate their own group.[130] While these processes are socially enacted and indeed their development is socially dependent, they are additionally facilitated by the cognitive filtering mechanisms surrounding schemata. Through this filtering effect, schemata act as one of the prime cognitive facilitators of narratives which explain the past in terms of coherent, flowing, and relatively comprehensible collections of events that all makes sense in relation to each other. It is only by systematically rejecting (to the point where we do not deliberate on, seriously acknowledge, or even remember) information that does not fit with our basic historical narrative, we are able to maintain such an attribution of coherence to the social world, which is in fact far messier than narratives would portray it to be.

Social psychological research into confirmation bias[131] and intergroup relations[132] also observes the actual individual processes and group dynamics that are partly powered by cognitive schemata. Again, these processes are socially dependent, and cannot be reduced to the cognitive understandings that are schemata. Schemata simply provide part of the fuel and tools that enable these socially situated processes to take place. Understandings of schemata therefore enhance, but do not encapsulate, understandings of these social processes. The sociological concept utilised in securitization research which perhaps most closely relates to schemata is the Bourdieusian concept of *doxa*. Utilised by the Paris School, *doxa* describes the sense that certain orders are self-evident and that there are certain limits to what is conceptually or socially possible. *Doxa* therefore delimits what one considers to be the self-evident "rules of the game", beyond which activity is seen to be simply not feasible.[133] Works such as Berling's and Bigo's have used the concept of *doxa* to partly explain why high level security professionals follow certain security practices and not others simply because, within their own professional field, they only see a certain range of professional activities as feasible, and as such they never challenge the limits of these perceived professional rules.[134]

Identifications

Identifications are not identities. Rather they are an individual's multiple conceptualisations of, or relational laws regarding, their identity[135]. In other words, identifications are an individual's internal understandings of what they believe to be their identity. Identifications are to identity as securitizations are to security. As nouns, both an identification and a securitization represent a vision of something that seems objective but rather is the result of societal, psychological, and linguistic constructions. As verbs, they both represent the processes of attaching or relating one core concept (identity or security) to another arbitrary object or concept. In the same sense that we "securitize" something (anything) by attaching the label of security to it, we identify with something (anything) by attaching the label of identity to it. Such attachments – particularly when developing en masse – that link

[130] Verovšek, "Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past: The Politics of Memory as a Research Paradigm."
[131] Nickerson, "Confirmation Bias."
[132] Tajfel, "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations."
[133] Bourdieu, *Distinction*; Dunn Cavelty and Balzacq, *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*.
[134] Dunn Cavelty and Balzacq, *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*; Bourdieu, *Distinction*; Berling, "Bourdieu, International Relations, and European Security"; Bigo and Guild, *Controlling Frontiers*.
[135] Roberts and Donahue, "One Personality, Multiple Selves"; Stryker, "The Vitalization of Symbolic Interactionism"; Lebow, *The Politics and Ethics of Identity*; McCall and Simmons, *Identities and Interactions*.

identity to cultural or political objects partly build the psycho-cultural orientations of audiences and the sociopolitical/sociolinguistic landscapes mentioned in the previous chapter.

These attachments are continual, shifting, and reinforcing processes beyond simple "acts" or events signified and completed by the act of saying "identity" or "security". In light of these attachments we come to see that which we call identity or security as real, denoting something actual in the world, and undeniable. It can be as difficult for me to deny that I am Irish as it was for many Americans to deny that communism was a security threat. Yet these both remain constructions, socially and linguistically generated and culturally and politically oriented. They nonetheless, by virtue of how powerful a motivator or drive they can be, have extensive consequences for individual behaviour and the social world.

As having identifications requires cognitive ability and self-awareness, individuals can hold them, while constructs such as states and organisations cannot. However, these constructs can have identities thrust upon them by others. In this sense, they have a "Me" (a social self or externally assigned description of what is seen by others to be their identity) but no "I" (a reflexive self or an internally sensed idea of their own identity, which is an identification).[136] Indeed, it is by fundamentally building the "I" that identifications become such a powerful social force. When asked "who are you?", "what are you?", or "how would you describe yourself?" the answer "I am…" contains nothing more than your identifications; the attachments and relations you have derived between various aspects of the world and what you are calling "yourself".

Individuals have both Me's and I's, and these may often be incompatible in the sense that someone may not feel that they are who society tells them they are. This tension between the social self and the reflexive self can be a significant source of anxiety. This anxiety can be dealt with by reconciling the two selves via the pursuit of authentic living (externalising the "I" reflexive self), or conversely an attempt to live up to society's expectations and demands (internalising the "Me" social self)[137]. The latter route, in which identifications *weaken* or change, enables social and state elites to alter individuals' identifications, as will be discussed in the "**Forces Weakening Identifications**" section later in this chapter. Particularly in the modern era, with its proliferation of roles available to participants in society, the tension between social and reflexive selves has become more prevalent and with it identifications have grown as a topic of central importance to people's everyday lives.[138]

Strong identifications act as self-schemata, or in other words identifications that are very well embedded and do not change act as schemata regarding the self (recall that schemata are relational laws defined in terms of embeddedness or relative stability/persistence over time). When strong or well embedded, these identifications or self-schemata determine what kinds of information about themselves individuals will be receptive to[139] (I will detail more on identification strength later in this chapter). Consequently, examining an individual's strong

[136] Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*.
[137] Lebow, *The Politics and Ethics of Identity*.
[138] Lebow.
[139] Davis, "Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression"; Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self."; Davis and Unruh, "The Development of the Self-Schema in Adult Depression."

identifications provides an access point for understanding certain ranges of information about themselves which they are not likely to engage with.

Furthermore, recall from the previous chapter that I am building on authors whose works argue that we should take into account contextual factors in securitizations including the sociopolitical and sociolinguistic landscapes which host and are co-constituted by audiences' psycho-cultural orientations. As I will further detail later in this chapter, examining public audiences' identifications where these identifications are politically oriented (e.g. "as a British citizen, I stand for democracy") does precisely that. It provides us with an access point to these psycho-cultural orientations and sociopolitical landscapes on a societal level, as identifications are readily identifiable and core aspects of these orientations and landscapes. My research therefore translates calls to account for these securitization components into a concrete analytical tool. This will be fully detailed below.

The Place of Receptivity, Schemata, and Identifications

As such, schemata are the individual's automatically referenceable relational laws about the way the world "is", and self-schemata or strong identifications are those same laws that concern the self. The individual will not engage with, or be receptive to, information that does not fit within these schemata. This brings us to the place of receptivity, schemata, and identifications in my hypothesis. Strong identifications or self-schemata delimit the range of conceptualisations of themselves (and, with certain identifications, of their relationship to their polity) that audience members will be receptive to. I will show that this range is directly relevant to securitizing arguments. In doing so, I argue that *certain self-schemata filter in/out, and consequently modulate audience receptivity to, the precise kinds of information that are contained in securitizing arguments*.

As such, I argue that public audiences' identifications – which partly constitute, generate, and express contexts of pre-existing psycho-cultural orientations and sociopolitical/sociolinguistic landscapes – delimit public audiences' receptivity to securitizing arguments. If securitizing arguments are made that the public is receptive to, then the public will *gain the agency* required to deliberate and engage with the argument in a way that is more commensurate with Côté's outlining of audiences as agential and deliberative processors of information. If, on the other hand, the audience's self-schemata *automatically* filter out the information in a securitizing argument then this agential deliberation will not take place, the securitization will have been prevented (as the audience did not even engage with the securitizing argument), and the audience will have acted in a more knee-jerk manner.

I therefore balance out Côté's, Balzacq's, Stritzel's and Bourbeau's works on context and audiences' agency in securitization, allowing instead for *conditional audience agency* that is dependent on contextual conditions which are modulated by identifications. Note that in either situation (high or low audience receptivity) the securitization remains an *intersubjective* process in which the meaning of security is negotiated via the viewpoints and subjectivities of both the securitizing actor and the audience. When audiences are receptive to the securitizing rhetoric their side of the negotiation is done in a deliberative manner that opens up the possibility of agreement with the securitizing rhetoric or some kind of halfway point being found. When they are unreceptive their side of the negotiation is done automatically and closes off the possibility of pre-existing understandings of security being altered by the securitizing

actor. In both situations both sides still hold viewpoints, and the (dis)agreement of these viewpoints is crucial to the success or failure of the renegotiation of security meanings which the securitization entails.

Important Note

Identifications can be seen to have varying characteristics that are relevant to securitizations, namely density, alignment of their content to the securitizing argument, and strength. How do these characteristics affect individuals' receptivity to securitizing arguments? The following paragraphs, up until the section titled **Strength and Receptivity**, all describe the effects different identifications' characteristics have *if these identifications are strong and consequently act as self-schemata*. In fact, identifications can also be weak, in which case they will not act as schemata. This scenario will be accounted for in the section titled **Strength and Receptivity**. For now, though, I will discuss how the characteristics of strong identifications or self-schemata affect receptivity.

Group Orientation and Receptivity

National Identifications

Before we get into the main three characteristics of identifications (density, alignment, and strength) there is a fourth characteristic which I will quickly overview. This is group orientation. Our identifications are, in part, derived from our perception of the groups we see ourselves as being a part of. That is, when we identify with a group we imagine that the group's fundamental characteristics and identity are intertwined and in tandem with our own.[140] We cling to group identifications because they provide access to group-belonging,[141] through which one receives self-esteem (a core human drive), a relative sense of security, intimacy potential, and the material benefits emerging from established relationships.[142] This can make control over group identity a coveted resource for certain elites, as group members can conform quite steadfastly to ideas which are painted as being fundamental to the group. An individual's group orientation affects their receptivity to a securitizing argument because securitizing arguments assert that a particular group – or, more specifically, a particular group's object of worth – is under threat. National identifications are one such group orientation.

National identifications are *not* identifications held by the nation, but rather are identifications which concern the nation and are held by *individuals* in the nation.[143] They tell me that I am not just part of a nation, but that the nation is an extension of myself and that something that happens to the nation is something that happens to me. Indeed, individuals are often encouraged to derive self-esteem through the successes and character of their nations. The content of national identifications additionally tells me what my nation is and what its fundamental characteristics are. There are, of course, non-national group identifications, for

[140] Goldstein and Cialdini, "The Spyglass Self"; Aron, Aron, and Smollan, "Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the Structure of Interpersonal Closeness."; Hinshelwood, "The Social Relocation of Personal Identity as Shown by Psychoanalytic Observations of Splitting, Projection and Introjection."

[141] Hogg, "Social Identity and the Sovereignty of the Group: A Psychology of Belonging."

[142] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.

[143] In nation-states, where the population of the state almost entirely consists of one nation that sees itself as having achieved national self-determination through this state, a national identification concerns the nation and the state simultaneously.

instance familial, local, regional, ethnic, or civilizational identifications. Most individuals will feel several different group identifications which are primed at different times. *A public's national identifications are therefore a psycho-cultural orientation that make up an important component of the sociopolitical/sociolinguistic landscape, as they partly encapsulate and express (and contribute to the generation of) how a people conceptualise their nation.*

The Public and the Politically Relevant Majority

Recall that our definition of the audience, taken from Côté, is "the individual(s) or group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice." Recall also that I delineated the criteria in which the public will meet Côté's definition of the audience and have relevance for the securitization. Note also that "members of the public" are defined here as citizens of the state, irrespective of professional status, social authority, or military/security rank. As such, if the public is the audience then the public has this authorizing and legitimizing capability, and this capability cannot be derived through the professional status, social authority, or military/security rank of any member of the public – as the public is not defined in these terms. It emerges instead from the moralising facility and legitimising force wielded by a *politically relevant majority* of citizens. Numbers of people, not the status of these people, is what is fundamentally important here[144]. Again, the public is *not* a unitary entity. It neither functions nor acts as a whole. However, when the number of members of the public assenting to a securitization – individuals who may belong to several distinct groups – seems to reach a politically relevant majority of that public, then the views and practices proposed by the securitizing actor can gain whatever authorisation and legitimation that comes with the perceived "will of the people" (which is precisely what the securitizing actor is seeking when the public is a relevant audience, as was outlined previously).

"Seems to reach" is important here, as outside of elections or referendums the precise number of people holding one view or another will be difficult to identify. Additionally, the precise number of people who would be required to hold one view or another before the securitizing argument can be deemed accepted is equally if not more difficult to ascertain, and would be different in different political contexts. Depending on the polity or the issue at hand, the "politically relevant majority" may possibly refer to simple majorities, proportional majorities, or the majority of citizens in the majority of constituencies. However, while the exact amount of public assent required and whether or not it has been reached can be difficult to identify with precision, instances in which it has clearly (not) been reached can certainly arise, not least through strong majorities in favour or against a clearly stated securitizing proposition being observed through polling.

Invoking the National

As such, when we say that the public is a relevant audience we necessarily mean that the "success" of the securitization depends on a politically relevant majority of that public assenting to the securitizing argument. In such securitizations, the securitizing actors need to

[144] Whereas if the securitization's relevant audience were a technocratic, elite, or professional group, convincing the right people would be more important than convincing more people.

invoke either national identifications or identifications that are national in scope.[145] Why do they need to do this? Such securitizations are typically made by (aspiring) state officials who are arguing for the government to take a certain course of action or adopt a certain vision. This is because final decisions on security practices are usually the jurisdiction of state authorities, albeit with the demand, design, and enactment of these practices coming from both private and public sectors (and the lines between these sectors blurring within the security/industrial complex). State-level security activities visible to the public incur national costs, create nationwide moods of anxiety, use national resources of public interest, and will likely colour the image of the nation as a whole. Additionally, as outlined above, these securitizations seek the approval of the politically relevant majority of citizens in order to authorise and legitimise these views and practices.

As such, the securitizing actors are proposing that the entire citizenry incur costs, and simultaneously they need the relevant political majority of the public to back them. *If everyone is to take on the costs, and everyone or most must agree to this, then the securitization will only be successful if it is proposed that the object under threat is an object of worth for all or most of the public.* In other words, in order for a politically relevant majority of the public to agree with the securitizing argument, this majority must feel that they (or an object of worth to them) are under threat (or would be vulnerable to a threat if they did not take a certain action). Proposing that the politically relevant majority of citizens are party to the object under threat can only be done by arguing that the threatened object is valuable to the nation as a group or to a group that is national in scope. A prerequisite for securitizations that require public audience approval is therefore to invoke national identifications or identifications that are national in scope.

Consequently, the public audience will only be receptive to the argument if they see themselves as being members of that national group or group that is national in scope. Members of the public will not always necessarily do so. Take for instance Mohammed Ali's famous remark outlining why he refused to fight in the Vietnam War, in which he argued that fighting against the Viet Cong would be "simply to continue the domination of the white slave masters of the darker people the world over.[146]" Here we see an example of an individual identifying far more strongly with a racial group rather than the ideological (capitalist), national (American), or civilizational (Western) groups invoked in the securitization of communism. If, like Ali, members of the public audience do not have the requisite identifications, then their receptivity to the securitizing argument will decrease, as their group self-schema will filter out/prevent an engagement with the claim that "*my* group is under threat." Conversely, if they do have these identifications, then their receptivity only has the *potential* to increase. In order to know if receptivity will increase, we now need to examine these identifications' density.

In sum, if the public is a relevant audience then securitizing arguments will need to convince the politically relevant majority of the public that one of their objects of worth is

[145] Identifications that are national in scope are group identifications that are commonly held by a number of people equal or greater to the politically relevant majority of the public – for instance, "Protestant" in 1960s Northern Ireland, "Communist" in 1970s Ukraine, or "German" in 1980s East Germany. For those who hold them, an identification that is national in scope is composed of the same components as national identifications (components described in the "***Alignment and Receptivity***" section below).

[146] "Muhammad Ali Explains His Refusal to Fight in Vietnam (1967)."

under threat. They will consequently need to argue that the group whose object is under threat is the nation or a group that is national in scope. Therefore, if a public audience member's identifications' do not hold such a group orientation, then their receptivity to the argument will decrease. However, simply having identifications that are national (in scope) will only *potentially* increase receptivity. Any subsequent increase will depend on identification density.

State-Centric Criticism

Before we cover identification density, however, a potential criticism should be addressed. It could be said that by focusing on how securitizations are influenced by the politically relevant majority of citizens – who require addressing in terms that are national or national in scope – this becomes a state-centric study. Several securitization scholars have focused on decentralising the state as a locus of security studies. This is particularly true of the Welsh School, which has argued that the state is not so much an appropriate locus for security practices as it is one of the primary generators of security problems.[147] Transnational causes of securitizations have also been a significant element of securitization studies, particularly amongst the Paris School, and have highlighted how forces operating independently of national borders can be significant influences on securitization processes.

I do not seek to deny any of these works' validity.[148] Transnational forces are highly likely, if not certain, to play a significant role in the formation of the security rationales and identifications that I am studying. Even national identifications have their roots in transnational developments, and states and security professionals always operate in a transnational and international context where public and private influences beyond their own borders must be acknowledged and incorporated into security policies and rationales. However, none of this is to deny the central argument that securitizations often require public approval and when this happens transnationally-generated security rationales and identifications impact sections of securitization processes which play out within national institutions. Amongst other concerns, leaders and elected representatives often if not usually take into account the viewpoints of constituents which are specific to their own state. Additionally, while the Welsh School powerfully argues that the state should be reconsidered as the referent object in need of securing (with humanity as a whole being a more appropriate referent object in the School's views), the School does not deny and indeed emphasises the way in which states are often (again, inappropriately in their view) the centre of gravity in securitizations, with most security practices and rationales being conducted for and largely by the state[149]. As such, states' roles may well have been overemphasised and overvalued in traditional security studies, but the balancing out of state-centrism does not require us to ignore how state-specific activities, or at least state-specific manifestations of transnational developments, occur and impact securitization processes.

[147] Booth, "Security and Emancipation"; Booth, *Theory of World Security*; Wyn Jones, *Critical Theory and World Politics*.
[148] Tsoukala, "Looking at Migrants as Enemies"; Ceyhan, "Policing By Dossier."
[149] Booth, "Security and Emancipation"; Booth, *Theory of World Security*; Wyn Jones, *Critical Theory and World Politics*.

Density and Receptivity

Identifications have content with varying density, ranging from thick to thin. "Thin identifications" refer to identifications that are rarely primed, evoked, or expressed. Thick identifications are those that are more frequently primed, evoked, or expressed. Identifications can also be usually thin but sometimes thick, in that they can go through long periods of infrequent priming or evocation and then go through short periods of regular priming and evocation. Density is directly related to how relevant an identification is to an individual's everyday life – not just their functional or active life but also their political life as they perceive their place in a political universe. Additionally, if an identification is discussed or primed frequently it will usually become more densely packed with information and content points. For instance, someone could feel "American" or "Parisian," but if these identifications are thin or rarely primed then they would likely not have a specific collection of attributes which they will list as defining America or Paris. On the other hand, as they are discussed much more, "thick" identifications are more likely to be full of specific content. For instance, "I am American, and that means I am democratic, Christian, capitalist, and anti-gun control."

How does density relate to receptivity? As thin identifications are only rarely primed and tend to contain a lower number of information points or relational laws, they only act as sparse filters of incoming arguments, tending to reject less arguments than thick identifications. They might be thought of as a fence with a very low number of panels. These panels will also not be particularly sturdy. This is because a key element in the cognitive construction of schemata is *repeated exposure* to relational laws. The more an individual encounters the same basic information or has that information invoked in their environment, the more embedded this information becomes, the more it will function as a schema, and the sturdier the panels in the fence.[150] Consequently, most information attempting to fit within thin self-schemata will encounter little resistance as a result of the low number of panels most of which are unsturdy. Without many pre-conceived ideas of what "Britain" is, or just ideas that are rarely reinforced, the individual is likely to be more open to a broader range of well-argued and collectively backed information about Britain and Britain's objects of worth. This means that *if thin, identifications will broaden the parameters of acceptable securitization rhetoric.* As such, identifications that are strong, national, and thin will allow individuals to be receptive to more securitizing arguments. Note that this is still an iteration of identifications delimiting the parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric. In this case, it acts to broaden these parameters.

Thick national identifications have a less straightforward relationship with receptivity, as they could cause receptivity to increase or decrease. As the filters in the individual's self-schemata become denser, it will be required that the specific details of the arguments the individual encounters align with these filters before receptivity to these arguments will increase. This constrains the parameters of acceptable securitization rhetoric and restricts securitizing actors. For instance, someone may feel British, but believe that Britain is and should always be a defender of international law. They then encounter a securitizing argument which claims that Britain is under threat, but needs to break international law to tackle the

[150] Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations"; Lieberman, "Intuition"; Kelley, "Causal Schemata and the Attribution Process"; Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self."; Davis, "Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression."

threat. In this case, the individual's receptivity will decrease, as their identifications' content is not aligned to the argument. The restricted securitizing actor will then need to amend their argument so that the breaking of international law is no longer included therein. However, if the argument does align with these strong, thick identifications, then this means that the argument actually runs parallel to the individual's pre-existing fundamentally held schemata, and as such the argument will ring true or resonate with the individual. Strong, thick and aligned identifications therefore provide both receptivity and resonance.

There is then the issue of usually thin but sometimes thick identifications. Usually thin identifications are not regularly invoked, as they go through long periods of quiet, so classifying them as simply being thick seems insufficient. However, treating them as simply thin is also problematic, as they do go through periods of regular invocation and even intense bursts of invocation. If we take this into account, we can posit that usually thin identifications' periods of regular invocation or intense bursts may make them more relevant – more "at the mind's forefront" – for some members of an audience in certain periods. In other words, the fact that the identification recently went through a period of regular or intense invocation may have primed it enough to temporarily render it of great importance to some audience members' current conceptual landscape. This would mean that, so long as these identifications are also strong, any securitizing rhetoric would need to fit within these primed barriers before being accepted, as they would with thick identifications. However, this priming effect would not be as reliably prevalent as it is for persistently thick identifications, and for many audience members the identification would likely still act as a thin one. In other words, *identifications that are "usually thin but sometimes thick" may act as "thick" identifications for some people and as "thin" ones for others.*

However, we could not feasibly argue that usually thin identifications will have similar effects as thick ones always and for everyone. Additionally it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct an investigation into whether or not they act as thick identifications often, rarely, or usually, or for all, some, or a few members of the audience. As such, a reasonable way of taking usually thin identifications' inconsistent effects (by which I mean, their inconsistent activity as thick or thin identifications) into account is to hedge our bets and posit that they act as thick identifications 50% of the time and thin identifications 50% of the time.

Alignment and Receptivity

Why is it the case that thick identifications' content could be disruptively misaligned with or contradictory to securitization rhetoric? Might not thick identifications be populated with information that is irrelevant for securitizing arguments? This brings me to a key tenet of the argument that a public audience's receptivity to a securitizing argument is delimited by their national identifications. The tenet is as follows: *the types of schemata that filter in/out the key information points in a securitizing argument are the same types of schemata that thick national identifications can be seen to consist of.* I will now lay out why this is the case.

Schema Types in Thick Identifications

Part of this tenet concerns "the types of schemata that thick national identifications can be seen to consist of." As such, to demonstrate this tenet I need to provide an overlay of the content categories (schema types) in thick national identifications.

These schema types are typically coded in terms of the historical narratives we carry, the affiliations we hold, and the roles we play[151].That is to say, we derive our national self-descriptors from our perception of the characteristics our nation inherited from its historical narrative,[152] our perception of the characteristics of the nations we affiliate with,[153] and our perception of the characteristics of our nation's roles.[154] We therefore form our national identifications by asking "*what is our nation's history?*", "*where are its affiliations/ estrangements?*"[155], and "*what role does it play?*" I will break the question "what role do we play?" into its constituent parts.

Roles provide us with a socially recognised category defined in terms of repeated action and carrying a level of status. Consequently, they give us the appearance of distinction, purpose and worth, all of which contribute to self-esteem[156]. Roles are therefore, in part, behaviours, so the first constituent part of the "what role do we play?" question is "what do we repeatedly do?" This question can be further broken down, as we tend to judge what we do both in terms of our aims and our abilities. We seek to do a certain something, and have a certain level of ability to do this thing. "Defender of democracy" and "world guardian of democracy" are therefore two different roles with the same aim, whereas "defender of democracy" and "defender of meritocracy" are different roles with the same level of ability.

This makes "what do we repeatedly do?" both an aspirational question and a present continuous question. In its aspirational sense, it refers to what we represent, stand for, or seek to achieve/maintain. It is thus a question of what our values and intentions are, and can be rephrased as "*what norms guide our actions?*" In its present continuous sense, it concerns what we believe we *actually* can do in action; what our ability to *actually* conduct certain roles is. It can therefore be rephrased as "*what is our level of influence?*" This entails an implicit question of how much influence others have over us. It also enables identifications such as "leader" or "declining power." Combining our self-perceived norms and influence, we envision our role's rights and responsibilities.

The second constituent part of "what role do we play?" is "how is what we do perceived by others?" This is because roles come with status packages which are usually arranged in a more or less hierarchical manner.[157] These status packages are part of the incentive for performing roles, as they provide the holder with self-esteem. Status, by definition, requires recognition of status by others, or at least the perceived recognition of others (we can fool ourselves into imagining how others see us). Consequently, when asking "what role do we

[151] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.
[152] Friedman, "The Past in the Future."
[153] Goldstein and Cialdini, "The Spyglass Self."
[154] Burke and Reitzes, "The Link Between Identity and Role Performance"; Reitzes and Mutran, "Multiple Roles and Identities"; Turner, "The Role and the Person."
[155] By "estrangements" I am referring to the relationships characterised by a sensation of detachment and mutual negativity. If I feel my nation is estranged from nation X, then I feel my nation has little in common with nation X and also that we dislike them, even distrust them, in fundamental ways. This is in contrast to a nation that we affiliate with, which is a nation we see as quite similar to us in important ways and as a nation we fundamentally like and trust.
[156] Biddle, "Recent Developments in Role Theory"; Burke and Reitzes, "The Link Between Identity and Role Performance."
[157] Goode, "Norm Commitment and Conformity to Role-Status Obligations"; Stryker, "The Vitalization of Symbolic Interactionism."

play?", the questions of "what norms guide our actions?" and "what is our level of influence?" are followed by questions of "*how are our norms and influence perceived by others?*"

Overall then, thick national identifications consist of schemata pertaining to what norms the nation holds, what influence it has, who it has affiliations/estrangements with, its history, and its perception in the eyes of others.[158] I will now show that these are the schema types that are relevant for filtering securitizing arguments' key information points. I do so keeping in mind that, as was outlined earlier, a securitization process leads towards a group conceptualising something as an object of worth, agreeing that there is a threat to this object, and deciding that this threat must and can be dealt with via certain means. As such, in order for securitization to be successful it must establish an object of worth, a threat to it, and an appropriate and feasible course of action to deal with this threat.[159]

***Alignment of* Norms *with* Objects of Worth and Appropriate Missions**

As noted above, securitizing arguments involve an assertion of what we deem to be a national "object of worth." This is the thing that we are willing to expend resources in order to secure. Deliberations on what qualifies as a national object of worth are therefore deliberations on what the nation values. As was outlined above, a public audience's strong and thick national identifications include normative schemata, i.e. schemata regarding the nation's values. *These schemata will therefore strongly delimit which arguments pertaining to objects of worth the individual will be receptive to or reject outright.*

Similarly, the potential for deliberation on what qualifies as an appropriate mission will be constrained by a public audience's normative system. This is because these norms will delineate the parameters of acceptable security practice and of how many resources (other objects of worth) are worth spending/sacrificing in order to secure the threatened object of worth. As such, receptivity to the objects of worth and appropriate mission elements of the securitizing argument is delimited by the public audience's normative schemata. These schemata make up a part of the individual's national identifications, so by examining these national identifications we gain an access point to specific information that will illuminate what kinds of securitizing arguments an audience is likely to reject or actively deliberate on.

In this arena, the distinction between interests and norms becomes less relevant. It may well be the case that the object that is denoted as an object of worth may be an "interest" grounded in physical or material desires, rather than a more abstract normative ideal such as the spread of democracy. Either way, the object of worth will still be categorised as such within and with reference to a nation's value system, which may well attribute more worth to the physical than the abstract. By definition, the relative worth of even basic resources (and hence our willingness to expend other resources to secure that resource) is assigned by a value system. Some may wish to argue that certain interests, such as basic survival or economic prosperity, will always trump certain other interests (and all abstract ideals). Proponents of such an argument should note that it is our normative system that will determine whether or not we value economic prosperity less than we value anti-imperialism (and hence whether we will

[158] While thick identifications that are national in scope consist of schemata pertaining to what norms the group holds, what influence it has, who it has affiliations/estrangements with, its history, and its perception in the eyes of others.

[159] Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq."

forego economic gains that would be attained through imperialistic acts), or our lives over our way of life (and hence whether we will give our lives in order to maintain our cultural character). The choice between peace and righteousness is still a choice that different nations have made differently.

As such, in order for an individual to be receptive to the "object of worth" and "appropriate mission" elements of a securitizing argument, that individual's national normative schemata (which is part of their thick national identifications) must be aligned with the information in the securitizing argument pertaining to the proposed worth of the object and to the appropriateness of the mission, so that this information is not automatically rejected.

***Alignment of* Levels of Influence *with* Feasible Missions and Threatening Capabilities**

When deliberating on the feasibility of the proposed mission, we are considering our potential for success. This is, by definition, a consideration of our nation's level of influence. If the public audience's schemata pertaining to the nation's level of influence is not conducive to the idea that the nation can succeed in its mission, then the audience will filter out the mission as infeasible and this deliberation will not take place. To use a simplified example, if the audience had a schema that said "we are an ineffectual nation" or "the Middle East is uncontrollable" then they are not likely to see a mission that has to do with specifically influencing the Middle East as feasible. Conversely, if they had a schema saying "Britain has great influence in the Middle East" then they would be receptive to the idea that the mission is feasible.

Indeed, if they had a schema saying "Britain has great influence in the Middle East" they would likely filter out information arguing that the mission was infeasible. This brings us to the role of identifications in delimiting public audience receptivity to "anti-securitizing" rhetoric. For every major securitization aimed at the public, there is likely to be a dissenting "anti-securitizing actor" arguing that the securitizing actors are misinformed, mistaken, or worse[160]. Public audiences' identifications play the same role in delimiting public audiences' receptivity to this anti-securitizing rhetoric as to the securitizing rhetoric, in that these schemata will automatically reject and prevent deliberative engagement with elements of the anti-securitizing argument that misalign with these identifications. As will be laid out in more detail in my Methodology Chapter, I have also empirically examined this relationship between public identifications and anti-securitizing rhetoric for this thesis.

Additionally, our schemata regarding our relative level of influence will affect our receptivity to arguments that we are under threat. Arguments about threats are divided into two parts: one part concerning the threatening capabilities of another entity, the other part concerning the threatening intentions of that entity if the entity is an actor[161]. Specifically, our receptivity to the argument that another entity has *threatening capabilities* will be strongly affected by how much influence we attribute to ourselves in relation to others. If we see

[160] I use the term "anti-securitizing" as opposed to the more common "desecuritizing" to emphasise that the anti-securitizing actor may not be trying to desecuritize something that has already been securitized, but may indeed be trying to prevent the securitization of something that has not already been securitized.

[161] The entity may indeed be non-agential, for instance if the threat is climate change or HIV/AIDS, in which case intentions have less bearing.

ourselves as relatively weak (or weak if we adopt a certain stance), we will be more receptive to arguments that others threaten us (or could threaten us if we adopted that stance).

As such, in order for an individual to be receptive to the "feasible mission" and "threat" elements of a securitizing argument, that individual's national influence schema (which is part of their thick national identifications) must be aligned with the information in the securitizing argument pertaining to the proposed feasibility of the mission and to the presence of the threat, so that this information is not automatically rejected.

Alignment of **Estrangements, Histories, and Perception *with* Threatening Actors and Feasible Actions**

Believing that we are under threat is not just a case of believing that another actor has the physical capability to threaten us. It is also a consideration of that actor's willingness to use their capabilities against us[162]. This, by definition, is a consideration of our estrangements and perception in the eyes of others, or more simply our negative relationships. Our schemata regarding these elements of the sociopolitical universe will therefore delimit our receptivity to arguments about the threatening intentions of other actors. These elements of our self-schemata also impact our sense of how much we can feasibly achieve in cooperation with or against other actors, based on their perceived willingness to work with/against us.

Additionally, our estrangement and perception schemata (and to an extent every element of our self-schemata) are built by frequent practices and historical narratives of interaction. In this sense schemata both enable the construction of and are reinforced by historical narratives. Historical narratives, being largely described in terms that are linear and causal, often generate expectations of being repeated or continuing into the future.[163] Consequently, if we believe that we have a long-standing history of conflict or tension with a certain group, then we will be receptive to the assertion that this group is now actively contemplating ways to get the better of us. On the other hand, our schemata will likely reject any assertions that groups that we have long been friendly with are now suddenly and purposefully threatening us in some way.

These conceptual co-locations and potential (mis)alignments are illustrated in Figure 2 on the next page, which can be overlaid on the two "Alignments" boxes in Figure 1.

[162] This is, again, less applicable for securitizations regarding non-agential entities such as climate change or disease.

[163] Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach."

Fig. 2



Recall, however, that the last few sections have all concerned situations in which identifications are strong. We must now account for the issue of identification weakness.

Strength and Receptivity

The above situations, in which securitizing arguments' content points *must* align with the identification content points that they complement, all rely on an implicit rule: if the securitization rhetoric does not align with its complementary identification point then the individual will maintain the identification point and reject the rhetoric. This steadfastness of identifications is not necessarily a given; identifications can change. Recall that identifications are an individual's conceptualisations of their identity, and only strong or very well embedded identifications act as self-schemata.[164] Weak identifications are those that are not well embedded, in that they change easily and frequently, to the point that they may even be open to manipulation. Being changeable or open to manipulation, weak identifications accommodate the performative power of securitizing rhetoric. Met with weak identifications, security talk is less obstructed in its reorganisation of the linguistic and material landscape, due to the audience's lack of obstructively steady pre-existing conceptualisations of the nation. Securitizing actors are consequently afforded the possibility to manage audience identifications. Therefore, weak identifications loosen restrictions for the securitizing actor, and do not bring the audience member to reject securitizing rhetoric in the same way that strong identifications do. This means that *the possibility of the audience being unreceptive to the securitizing argument decreases as identifications weaken*.

Hypothesis Summarised

Overall then, so long as an individual's identifications are strong and thick, the individual's receptivity to information regarding objects of worth, threats to that object, and courses of action to secure that object that are feasible and appropriate (a securitizing argument) are largely delimited by the individual's pre-existing schemata regarding the nation's norms, influence, estrangements, histories, and perception in the eyes of others (the individual's pre-

[164] As schemata are defined in terms of embeddedness or relative stability/persistence over time, as was outlined above.

existing strong, thick, national identifications). A misalignment of the securitizing argument with the content of these identifications should therefore greatly decrease the individual's receptivity to the argument. Meanwhile, neither weak nor thin identifications decrease audience receptivities, and usually thin identifications have inconsistent effects.

If receptivity is low then the individual will not engage with the securitizing argument, and consequently the securitization will be prevented. If receptivity is high then the individual will be receptive to the argument, in which case the securitization is possible but still not guaranteed (other factors such as the securitizing actor and securitizing move will now be important in determining securitization success). As such, identifications provide the permissive/preventive conditions for securitization success, and all things being equal identifications will make the difference between a successful/failed securitization.

This hypothesis – which was illustrated in Fig. 1 earlier in this chapter – looks to the fields of identity and cognitive studies and extracts from them the concepts of identifications and schemata. It then synthesises these concepts with Côté's vision of audience agency and with Balzacq, Bourbeau, Stritzel, and Bubandt's[165] visions of the role of sociopolitical contexts and the psycho-cultural orientations of the audience in securitizations. In doing so, the hypothesis *highlights identifications as specific and identifiable aspects of these orientations and landscapes* which, if examined in different and unique cases, can reveal how and why certain securitizations are facilitated/deterred by the character of the public audience.

We see that an audience member's ability to actively engage with the different elements of a securitizing argument (rather than automatically reject them) is delimited by their national identifications. These identifications emerge from individuals' repeated exposure to cultural and political visions of their nation. By taking alignment of audience identifications to securitizing rhetoric into account, we acknowledge the importance of the relationship between audiences and securitizing rhetoric and we highlight identifications as an identifiable and influential aspect of this relationship. We further build on Stritzel's[166] work on the need for new security rationales to be compatible with pre-existing discourses. This relationship is treated as varying and shifting, with my hypothesis only highlighting which aspects of this relationship (identification strength, density, and content alignment) need to be examined in different cases, hence maintaining a wider applicability across disparate and unique securitization cases.

Building on Balzacq, we see audiences as holding an influential psycho-cultural orientation which effects their relationship with the securitizing rhetoric, and we highlight identifications as a specific entry point for an investigation of this orientation. In relation to Stritzel and Bourbeau[167], we see securitizations as taking place within sociopolitical and sociolinguistic contexts and highlight that a key element of these are identifications which facilitate, constrain, and limit the adoption of security rationales in specific locales. In relation to Bourbeau and Bubandt[168] we see these contexts and audiences as co-constitutive, as these

[165] Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond"; Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*; Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*; Bubandt, "Vernacular Security"; Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory."
[166] Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond."
[167] Stritzel; Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*.
[168] Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*; Bubandt, "Vernacular Security."

contexts are actualised in audiences who hold certain orientations which are partly developed through their environment. Balancing Côté,[169] these audiences are seen as having conditional agency to actively deliberate on arguments, and even without this deliberation the character of the audience maintains a powerful constraining influence on securitizations by bringing about the rejection of securitizing rhetoric. Through this hypothesis, the role of public audiences and their relationship with the securitizing actor (through which they intersubjectively negotiate security meanings) is emphasised, and the factors influencing this relationship are identified and presented for investigation in different cases. In doing so, we enhance our ability to understand how this public audience guides the far-reaching effects and consequences of securitizations.

Tracking Identification Strength

Incorporating varying identification strength into my work requires that I do not assume identification strength or weakness, but instead conduct an empirical study into identification changes over time in order to ascertain identification strength/weakness in specific contexts. Aside from being necessary for my research, this empirical study has produced data on the tendency of identifications to strengthen or weaken. This is a valuable dataset. Currently, different research shows identifications as being both persistent and changeable in short time frames[170], and the existing literature on this subject is contradictory. Some schools of thought argue that once identifications become strong they are practically immovable in the short term – only changing slowly over time – and that security rhetoric does not just arise because it fits within these identifications but rather it perpetuates for these identifications' very maintenance.[171] Meanwhile, others have argued that at specific moments even previously strong identifications can undergo rapid shifts, particularly at times of heightened security anxiety.[172] The empirical study into identifications which I have conducted goes some way towards contributing hard empirical data that can inform this debate.

[169] Côté, "Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory."

[170] It should be kept in mind that the securitization attempts under study in this thesis (my case selection criteria are outlined in the upcoming Methodology Chapter) took place over the course of several weeks/months, rather than years/decades. This time frame is important, as over larger time frames macro-historical developments can see identifications shift more extensively, whereas I am more concerned with how persistent identifications are across shorter time frames.

[171] Snow, "Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity"; Lieberman and I. Eisenberger, *Conflict and Habit: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to the Self*; Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations"; Lieberman, "Intuition"; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, *Habits as Knowledge Structures: Automaticity in Goal-Directed Behavior*; Wegner and Bargh, *Control and Automaticity in Social Life*; Evans, "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition"; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, *Habits as Knowledge Structures: Automaticity in Goal-Directed Behavior*; Hogg, "Social Identity and the Sovereignty of the Group: A Psychology of Belonging"; Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*; Eidelman and Crandall, "Bias in Favor of the Status Quo"; Moshinsky and Bar-Hillel, "Loss Aversion and Status Quo Label Bias"; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making"; Eisenberger, "Does Rejection Hurt?"

[172] Hogg, "Social Identity and the Sovereignty of the Group: A Psychology of Belonging"; Eidelman and Crandall, "Bias in Favor of the Status Quo"; Abrams et al., "Innovation Credit"; Fielding and Hogg, "Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and Leadership"; Lee, "Rallying around the Flag: Foreign Policy Events and Presidential Popularity"; Janis and Mann, "Coping with Decisional Conflict: An Analysis of How Stress Affects Decision-Making Suggests Interventions to Improve the Process"; Burke, "Identity Processes and Social Stress."

I will now unpack some of these contrasting arguments in order to outline that identifications are, theoretically, affected in the short term both by forces that make them persistent and forces that make them changeable. This outlining will be by no means comprehensive. It serves merely to highlight that there is currently differing information regarding whether identifications are generally strong or weak and regarding whether or not securitizations affect identifications. This debate has two consequences. Firstly, I cannot use theory to assume identification strength or weakness in my cases; instead I must incorporate the possibility of both. Secondly, the data regarding identification strength outside of and during securitizations which my empirical identification tracking study has unearthed can contribute to scholarship surrounding this debate regarding identification strength. On this point, I must emphasise that my study has only unearthed data from one highly modern context. I do not claim to have definitively shown whether or not identifications are generally strong or weak, or whether or not securitizations do affect their strength. Nonetheless, the data I have unearthed is noteworthy and can be taken up, built on, or challenged by scholars elsewhere engaged in the debate regarding identification strength in the face of larger forces such as securitizations.

Forces Strengthening Identifications

Physiological studies have provided considerable evidence supporting the idea that humans perceive and categorise themselves in a way that is much more habitual than conscious.[173] These unreflective thoughts form neural pathways in the brain which enable categorisation of events as event-types and of new situations as the latest version of old ones.[174] This gives our identifications a cognitive stickiness that makes it very difficult for us to re-evaluate them in the light of new evidence or even to recognise new situations as truly new.[175] This habitual thinking is not only how we go through our day-to-day lives, but also (and even more so) how we deal with stressful decisions, as habituation is in fact a form of cognitive simplification for coping with mental overloads.[176] Habits can therefore deeply hardwire the visions that come with our identifications into our cognitive conceptual landscape. This would seem to make identifications more persistent and difficult to ignore than changeable.

Psychological studies have further shown that rethinking, ignoring or changing our identifications can come at a significant cost to mental well-being (although this rethinking can also enhance mental well-being in certain situations which will be outlined below). Stable identifications enable group membership,[177] through which one receives self-esteem, a relative sense of security, as well as material benefits emerging from stable modes of interaction.[178] Changing one's identifications in such a way that might result in ejection from the group

[173] Snow, "Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity"; Lieberman and I. Eisenberger, *Conflict and Habit: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to the Self*; Lieberman, "Intuition."
[174] Aarts and Dijksterhuis, *Habits as Knowledge Structures: Automaticity in Goal-Directed Behavior*; Wegner and Bargh, *Control and Automaticity in Social Life*; Evans, "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition."
[175] Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, "The Knife That Cuts Both Ways"; Lieberman and I. Eisenberger, *Conflict and Habit: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to the Self*.
[176] Evans, "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition"; Lieberman, "Intuition."
[177] Hogg, "Social Identity and the Sovereignty of the Group: A Psychology of Belonging."
[178] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.

consequently engenders psychological resistance, although one could change identifications in order to ensure group membership is maintained or solidified.[179] Some studies have even shown that humans have evolved in such a way that we process sudden breaks in sensations of group belonging with the same part of the brain that processes actual physical pain.[180] We therefore tend to resist this change, initially at least. The psychological cost of breaking with our pre-existing group identifications would therefore also seem to contribute to national identifications being persistent and difficult to ignore.

Indeed, both theoretical and empirical work has asserted and evidenced that psychological motivations can bring identity groups to often forego material benefits or more traditional notions of security (defined in terms of physical safety and quality of life) in order to maintain or even manufacture conflicts geared primarily towards identity maintenance. Ontological security theorists in particular[181] argue that group members can become so psychologically dependent on their conceptions of their group's character and of their place within the group that giving up these conceptions becomes all but impossible. Such group members can actually generate and uphold conflicts with other groups as a means of maintaining their group identity, even if these conflicts cause their own group significant material harm, a primary example being the Troubles in Northern Ireland[182]. This would mean that identification strength can be so high that identifications do not simply modulate securitizations but can actually generate and maintain them.

Political practices provide similar barriers to identification change. Practices, like discourses, often act as information points for the "negotiation of meaning" in a community. As a result of communal repeating of acts, the meanings of these acts appear to be natural by virtue of their common adherence and persistence. Practices therefore exemplify much of what the group sees itself as being and how it derives meaning in itself.[183] As such, although slow and gradual change is always going on, a sudden large change to the established practices can be seen as a threat to the group's existence. Practices are therefore limited out of loyalty to the group, fear of the breaking of solidarity, and hope of gaining benefits from acting as group champion. All of these forces can combine to create dynamics of groupthink, whereby practices are rarely deviated from or questioned. This leads to sensations of invulnerability, moral high-grounds, and ultimately a persistence of positive self-image.[184] As practices, like discourses, "educate" the group members as to what is possible and what is legitimate, this limitation on practice significantly reduces the potential for identifications to change, as it reduces the group's information about viable alternatives or about the unviability of their current beliefs.

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[179] Eidelman and Crandall, "Bias in Favor of the Status Quo"; Moshinsky and Bar-Hillel, "Loss Aversion and Status Quo Label Bias"; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making."

[180] Eisenberger, "Does Rejection Hurt?"

[181] Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics"; Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*; Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security"; Kay, "Ontological Security and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland"; Steele, "Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War". For a summary and critique of the ontological security field see Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.

[182] Kay, "Ontological Security and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland".

[183] Wenger, *Communities of Practice*.

[184] Janis, "Groupthink: The Desperate Drive for Consensus at Any Cost."

The key ingredient to this mix is *repetition over time*. With repetition, identity practices and discourses become more engrained into the habitual systems of the brain and the individual becomes more psychologically and materially dependent on them.[185] This in turn leads them to externalise these practices and discourses again and again in a reinforcing circle of sorts which leads to increasing strength of identifications over time. Overall, this engenders a deeply hardwired tendency in individuals to maintain preconceived ideas about identity. This acts to suppress the ability of interruptive securitizing rhetoric to generate newly perceived and acted-upon realities that are incongruous with previous identifications.

Forces Weakening Identifications

On the other hand, much research has been done into identification shifts. Socialisation is an ongoing process which, when viewed over macro-historical periods, produces substantial changes in identifications.[186] However, this thesis, which is looking at securitization attempts that took place over several weeks and months, is more concerned with short time frames in which conditions or events allow for a manifestation of latent change potential.

One such condition/event is when the multiplicity of identifications present in a nation becomes too apparent and conflictual to sustain itself. Within a single nation there will be very different conceptualisations of what the nation is. These multiple identifications may rarely come in contact with each other, instead being shielded from mutual criticism by virtue of the self-segregation of different groups. However, in times of national debate about extreme issues such as security (including the question of war) previously self-segregated groups come into frequent discursive contact as a result of the search for national consensus. This contact can allow for the multiplicity of identifications to become highlighted, and consequently individuals can be explicitly asked to think about what the nation is and stands for (whereas usually one's ideas of the nation will not be directly challenged or will simply be considered to be self-evident)[187].

Additionally, the dynamics of such inter-group debate can force different groups to hear each other, which can lead to a highlighting of the incoherence of identifications held by either side.[188] This undermines the stability of pre-existing discourses, a destabilisation which makes each identification easier to change and creates an environment conducive to identification manipulation by elites.[189] This manipulation becomes possible because in times when schemata – which allow us to operate habitually in order to consume little cognitive energy – are destabilised, cognitive simplicity is also under threat.[190] Consequently, cognitive simplification is sought for. One way this simplification can be rebuilt is via adherence to a new direction given by the environment, possibly an authority figure. People consequently open up to new possibilities without overly reflecting on them or their implications. This is a common coping

[185] Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations"; Lieberman, "Intuition."
[186] Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*.
[187] Brown, "A Narrative Approach to Collective Identities*."
[188] Lenart, *Shaping Political Attitudes*.
[189] Burke, "Identity Processes and Social Stress"; Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.
[190] Evans, "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition."

strategy of decision-makers in times of significant stress accompanied by (and possibly resulting from) important beliefs being challenged.[191]

A further, and linked, condition/event leading to identifications being changed or ignored is when widespread loyalty to a leader results in that leader being seen to embody, represent, or be prototypical of the group itself. In this case, the very forces that usually work to deter deviation from the group – loyalty to the group, fear of group disintegration, opportunities presented by supporting the group, etc. – can actually work to promote even further loyalty to a leader. This affords the leader leeway to deviate from standard norms without being labelled as a deviant, and subsequently for the group's norms to change to accommodate the leader.[192] The issue of securitization is particularly pertinent here, as in times of perceived national threat the "rally around the flag" effect can, for a limited time,[193] bolster the amount of authority given to a leader and consequently their scope to deviate in this manner. Group members may defer to leaders out of fear of being labelled as traitorous if they do not, out of unwillingness to abandon their side and give power to their traditional opponents, and also as a coping mechanism for the unsettling time that is insecurity. Either way, what is highly important here is that after individuals defer superficially for long enough, new identity practices and discourses may be allowed to develop, gain frequency, and take on a life of their own. This is particularly so if the course of action deviant leaders take proves to be successful, which can engender an "in hindsight this was right" manner of thinking and an adherence to the new mode of operation.

Not just well-established leaders, but also popular *new* leaders can gain substantial leeway to deviate (and with it the ability to shift identifications), as their deviances tend to be treated as more situational rather than attributional given their lack of history.[194] In times when the policies initiated by old leaders – who the people handed agency and responsibility to – fail, new and emerging leaders can gain significant authority (and old leaders lose it). Repeated failures of policies force the nation to experience losses of some kind. This can be particularly painful and emotionally stressful if the failure was a failure of security policy, or one that seemingly led to a new security threat developing. Realising that the losses are too painful to sustain, the individual will seek ways out of the interaction that is causing the pain. In this case, the individual may change their world view if they are informed that this world view is the root of their pain.[195] Such instances of identification reworking can be led by new authorities who seek to take advantage of prolonged failures, but can also happen organically.[196]

A Framework For Strength and Its Use

Overall, heightened loyalty to new or established leaders and periods of significant stress, including perceived incoming threats, failed security policies, and a highlighted

[191] Janis and Mann, "Coping with Decisional Conflict: An Analysis of How Stress Affects Decision-Making Suggests Interventions to Improve the Process."
[192] Fielding and Hogg, "Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and Leadership."
[193] Lee, "Rallying around the Flag: Foreign Policy Events and Presidential Popularity."
[194] Abrams et al., "Innovation Credit."
[195] Janis and Mann, "Coping with Decisional Conflict: An Analysis of How Stress Affects Decision-Making Suggests Interventions to Improve the Process"; Burke, "Identity Processes and Social Stress."
[196] Burke, "Identity Processes and Social Stress."

multiplicity of identifications, all have the potential to weaken identifications, which physiological and psychological research would suggest have otherwise ever-growing strength. What is important to note is that these weakening conditions are those that are very likely to accompany a securitization attempt, although sometimes they are precisely what a securitization attempt is trying to (possibly unsuccessfully) generate. A theoretical framework for incorporating identification strength into my research should therefore allow for the possibility of securitizations to weaken identifications while not guaranteeing this outcome.

As such, synthesising and building on the research outlined in these sections, *I adopt and forward a theoretical framework that conceptualises identifications as existing along a continuum of strength*. Their place on this continuum is not set in stone, but with time uninterrupted by destabilizing forces they gravitate to the strong (or self-schemata) end of the continuum. It is also possible that they could be destabilized so far to the weak end of the continuum that they cease to be schemata-like at all, instead simply being weak identifications. These forces include but are not limited to periods of heightened stress that may accompany certain securitization attempts, but that are not necessarily encapsulated or triggered by the act of saying "security." This framework therefore facilitates and encourages an empirical tracking study of identification strength in different periods by allowing me to incorporate varying identification strength into my research.

As such, I do not seek to provide a "universal" answer to the questions of how often identifications are strong/weak or whether or not securitizations affect identification strength. As I lay out in more detail in my Methodology Chapter, trends of identifications' strength will be different in different contexts. Rather, my empirical tracking study – which is necessary for answering my research question – simply provides data that is noteworthy for and contributes to the above outlined research concerning identifications' changeability and manageability in two meaningful ways. The first is by providing empirical data regarding identifications' strength (and how this strength is affected by securitizations) in a specific and important context. The second is by providing a continuum perspective on identification strength which can be used to track identification strength in other contexts as well and consequently bolster this dataset.

Additionally, my empirical study has traced both the detail and the prevalence of the national identifications of the modern British public during recent securitizations. *In and of itself, this research has provided a vast swathe of data regarding the content and trajectory of modern British national identifications, data which is highly informative for scholars of identity and international relations who are concerned with Britain's current direction*. If similar identification tracking studies utilising my framework were to be conducted in other contexts then multiple context-specific trends and tendencies concerning identification strength during securitizations could be established. As such, my work provides specific empirical data contributing to our understanding of identification strength, while also providing a continuum framework for identity and social psychology scholars to further contribute to this research.

Research Aims, Implications, and Hypothesis Summarised

Overall then, the direct aim of this thesis is to illuminate how public audiences' identifications affect securitization processes, and consequently to illuminate how these identifications bring different securitizations to different outcomes and consequences. This aim

is embodied in the research question "How do the public audience's identifications influence the success and failure of securitizations?" Additionally, although not a core aim, the empirical research I have done has produced a dataset which contributes to the debate on identification changeability and manageability.

By combining the theoretical and empirical research that this work requires, I have produced evidence for a hypothesis on how public audience identifications affect securitizations. This can provide information of use to both modern theorists and policymakers concerned with (the deterrence of) securitizations – which are of ever-increasing significance for broader societies – not least by providing a clearer and more holistic picture of why different securitizations play out in different ways. My hypothesis holds that the receptivity of the public audience to securitizing arguments will be strongly influenced by the character of that audience's identifications. These identifications can be strong or weak, thick or (usually) thin, and aligned or non-aligned to the securitizing argument. Depending on the status of these identifications, the audience will either be receptive or unreceptive to the securitizing argument. Low receptivity prevents the securitization by having the audience reject the securitizing argument outright, while high receptivity results in audience deliberation and consequently the possibility but not the certainty of a successful securitization. Identifications therefore provide permissive/preventive conditions for securitization success.

By focusing on identifications, and by not assuming the strength or content of identifications in any particular context, this hypothesis provides access to and maintains a general applicability across disparate and unique case studies. It does so, firstly, because by not assuming identification strength or content it *guides* an examination of specific elements of a local situation, rather than imposing predetermined configurations onto particular cases. While the specific manifestation of the elements in the framework (identification density, strength, normative content, perceptions of estrangement, etc.) will vary from case to case, the relevance of these elements to securitization processes is maintained across cases. Secondly, by focusing on the components of identifications, which are in the modern era increasingly prolific (whereas securitizing rhetoric is temporary, particularly cases of failed securitization), we gain access to widely present elements of the psycho-cultural orientations and sociopolitical/ sociolinguistic environments that regulate securitization attempts. This produces a more broadly applicable theory that takes theoretical understandings of the role of context in securitizations and enhances their practical edge.

Additionally, beyond both the fields of securitization and identification research, my work can also have broader implications for the study and practice of the formation and public communication of any international policy that seemingly reflects the character of the nation. In my proposed hypothesis, national identifications modulate public audiences' receptivity to securitizing arguments because securitizing arguments contain information or assertions that directly relate to the character of the nation. Consequently, these assertions are filtered in and out by public audiences' self-schemata or strong identifications, specifically their national identifications. This same dynamic would therefore apply to arguments made by elites regarding any policy that reflects the character of the nation. This would include commitments to international institutions, normative frameworks underpinning international affiliations, and varying sides of moral debates such as migration and interventionism. Specifically, this dynamic's direct implications concern the strategic communications of these policies and

rationales by elites to public audiences. An enhanced understanding of this dynamic could therefore allow for more effective strategic communications of such policies to the public. This could in turn make these policies more sustainable in the long term or deter the formation of these policies altogether by highlighting the potential for their communication to be quickly rejected by the public. As such, these insights into the relationship between public audiences and security policies/rationales can enhance the study and practice of strategic communications of policies beyond the security realm. This enhancement can directly produce more politically feasible, and hence sustainable, policy output.

In sum, my thesis aims to produce an evidenced hypothesis of how the public audience's identifications affect securitizations. This hypothesis can enhance modern theorists' and policymakers' understanding of what brings different securitizations to different outcomes, address shortcomings in the securitization field, contribute to existing research on identifications' strength, and is applicable in disparate and unique cases. My research builds from and contributes to the study of securitization and identifications, has provided extensive data on the status and trajectory of modern British national identifications, and holds implications for the field of identity studies, the formation of policies that seemingly reflect the character of the nation, and the strategic communications of such policies.

Next Steps

Overall then, in this chapter I have attempted to outline my hypothesis and to show how my work builds from existing research in the fields of identity, cognitive studies, and social psychology, how it accounts for tensions in these fields, and how it aims to contribute to both these and wider areas of study. In the next chapter I will outline the methodology that guided the empirical investigation that tested this hypothesis.

CHAPTER THREE
Methodology

Chapter Abstract

In this chapter I lay out my methodology and provide examples of how my research exercises have worked. I begin this chapter by outlining my case study method and its underpinnings. I then go through my case selection criteria and subsequently outline my research activities, which were divided into two phases. The first phase involved tracking identifications across my two cases via an interpretive analysis of discourse. In the second phase I ascertained the alignment of identifications to securitization rhetoric, which then enabled me to evaluate my hypothesis regarding how identifications affect securitizations. My primary aim in this chapter is to show how these methodological choices are both epistemologically sound and geared towards the realisation of my research aims.

Case Selection

To begin, I will outline which cases I have examined and why. I take the identifications of the British public as units of analysis. As this public is not unitary but rather internally divided, my units of analysis are more properly described as the multiple identifications of the citizens of Britain. I have examined these units in two separate and vertically (temporally) comparative cases, which are the British securitization phases during and preceding the Syrian Crisis in the summer of 2013 and the Syrian Crisis in autumn/winter 2015 (precise dates and the reasons for my case limits are outlined later in this chapter). For reasons outlined below, I consider the two cases to form a series, with the first having had direct consequences for the second. As such, what we essentially have is a series concerning a single set of units, as is represented in the following table.

Table 3.1

Units of Analysis	**Cases in Which These Units Were Studied**	
Identifications Widespread among British Citizens	2013 Securitization Phase Proposing Airstrikes in Syria	2015 Securitization Phase Proposing Airstrikes in Syria

I now address the logic behind this choice of method, which stems from a specific set of case selection criteria.

Individual Understanding, Context, and Causation

I aimed to ensure that these criteria emerged from an explicit, coherent, and developed perspective on how individuals understand their environment, and what implications this has for context and causation. This perspective is, in brief, that individuals interpret environments in an infinitude of shifting ways, which means events are caused by interacting causal chains consisting of a wide-range of contextual factors.

To elaborate, I take individuals as generators and interpreters of meaning. People can ascribe meaning in an infinite variety of ways through varying modes of interpretation and

conceptual boundary drawing. The modes they use are both agency-based and culturally-dependant/learned. Consequently, agents are sitting within, interpreting and simultaneously creating environments and communal norms. These environments are subsequently affecting the development of these agents' modes of interpreting these environments.[197] As a result of this two-way dynamic, modes of interpretation can fluctuate in response to changes in communal norms, which are non-linear and lacking in stable development,[198] but agents may or may not change with these developments.[199] Overall, this means that neither environments nor individuals' modes of interpreting these environments are fixed or universal. Individuals are essentially *developing or adopting an existing but shifting set of lenses, which rise and fall in relevance as a function of context and priming*.[200] What they are going to see in the world (and how they are going to react) is, therefore, dependent on a very large number of contextual factors, which include not only their present environments but also those they have historically passed through and developed within (hence engendering a degree of path-dependency).

Consider what this means for the importance of context in all its forms. As "events" in the social sciences are dependent on a very large number of contextual factors, and all aspects of all social contexts are unfixed, this makes it likely that events are not the result of single efficient causes, but rather events are the result of the convergence of several lines of causation.[201] Additionally, once an event comes about via the convergence of several lines of causation, it then results in the divergence of several more lines of causation which we call consequences. The overall dynamic of causation is therefore of interacting causal chains which are non-linear, unstable, and diverse, yet which holds a flow and trajectory that moves "forward" in time[202] through which each event has a consequence for another event. Having said this, I accept that causation itself is an artificially constructed concept that may not mirror anything "real" in nature. Nonetheless, causation is a useful tool with which to analyse certain events and extract from them observations that may assist us in understanding our contemporary world. This is so long as we do not seek to create any law-like or general statements but instead limit social "rules" as applying only to specific developments in specific contexts.

As I will now detail, this view of causation, context, and individual understanding produces two significant criteria for my case selection: a low-N case study with cases from a similar setting, and a temporally comparative case study of stretched cases in a series.

Low-N Case Study with Cases from a Similar Setting

First, as events are the result of the convergence of several lines of causation (as I outlined in the last section) I am highly sensitive to the problem of case comparability. The more cases we have, the more context variables are likely to be different between the cases.

[197] Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *False Necessity--Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy: From Politics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory*.
[198] Jamie C Allinson and Alexander Anievas, "The Uses and Misuses of Uneven and Combined Development: An Anatomy of a Concept".
[199] Unger, *False Necessity--Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy*.
[200] Richard Ned Lebow, *Constructing Cause in International Relations*.
[201] Lebow.
[202] The alternative to flow is staticity, which is not a feature of history.

Additionally, the more different the cases in terms of general context, the more our ability to highlight the impact of any one change within the cases becomes impeded. As such, due to the heavily context-dependent nature of social processes, I have not aimed to examine several fundamentally different and hence less comparable settings, instead choosing to use a low-N case study method focusing on cases from a highly similar setting.

The cases I have examined therefore needed to be aligned in terms of culture, political system and other important contextual aspects outlined below. Aside from aiding comparability, minimising broader contextual differences was necessary for a further very important reason. As I outlined in Chapter One, existing research on the causes of securitization success have focused heavily on the influence of the securitizing move and the securitizing actor. While I accept that these factors no doubt influence the success of securitizations, my aim is to highlight the influence of the audience and their characteristics, specifically their identifications. In order to focus on the impact of audience identifications, I needed to reduce as many variations in the securitizing move and the securitizing actors between my cases as possible. Doing so left me with cases in which the securitizing actors and the securitizing moves (along with the broader contexts of culture, political system, and media landscapes) were broadly the same, and what was fundamentally different between the cases was the audience's identifications. This much better highlighted the impact of audience identifications on securitization success.[203]

Stretched Cases In A Series

Second, as the interacting causal chains described above have trajectory, attempting to isolate and examine a "freeze-frame" of a certain time period would inevitably lead to something being missed (for instance, there is a significant difference between a politician whose approval rating is at 60% and falling rapidly and another whose rating is at 60% and rising rapidly). Admittedly, it is almost methodologically impossible, particularly in a case study methodology, not to place chronological and conceptual boundaries around a situation in order to call it an "event" and hence freeze-frame things to an extent.[204] However, ideas of trajectory can still be developed somewhat if one studies a unit of analysis as it evolved over a period of time. To do this, I engaged in a temporally (vertically) comparative case study involving cases that are stretched so as to encapsulate a time period broader than just the core securitization moment in question. Aiming to capture an idea of trajectory through this method aided my study in two important ways.

Firstly, engaging in a temporally comparative case study meant that I studied connected cases, without significant time gaps between them, which occurred in a series. Doing so allowed the identification tracking I conducted for my cases (described below) *to produce an idea of longer-term identification trajectories between cases*. By "in a series" I am referring to events that were not only chronologically subsequent to each other but that also can be said to have had direct consequences for each other. By comparing the differences between the events in the series we can get an idea of where things were going and indeed where they might go

[203] Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds., *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*.
[204] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.

after the last case. This can aid our understanding of certain events' development and can be informative for short-term forecasting. Essentially, my findings will serve as a starting point for telling narratives of how things played out and where they may be headed within a certain context. Seeing as my specific series ends right at the present day (or what was the present day when I began this thesis) understanding where this series may be headed will be directly relevant to modern theorists and policymakers (more on this below).

Secondly, stretching my cases meant that I set the limits of my cases beyond what would be the beginning and end of the period in which the securitization in question occurred "in earnest". By the "securitization taking place in earnest" I refer to the period in which a "full" securitizing argument was deployed almost on a daily basis. Before and after this period, preliminary and partial securitizing arguments may still have been made irregularly, as I will detail later in the Research Data Chapter. Doing so allowed my identification tracking to monitor the direction of identifications over broader periods and consequently provide an idea of identification trajectory within cases. Very importantly, *this allowed me to compare the trajectories of identifications both during and outside of core securitization periods*. This provided "control" data on identification weakness outside of securitizations, which significantly aided my investigation of whether or not securitization processes can be seen to weaken identifications.

Cases of Securitization Success and Failure

A further criterion for my case selection is to examine both cases of securitization success and failure. This criterion emerges from two separate concerns. The first is the need to illustrate how a change in the relationship between identifications and securitization rhetoric can actually contribute to the difference between a successful and a failed securitization. Comparing two cases of securitization which occurred in very similar settings yet which produced both success and failure is clearly more favourable in this regard than only studying either securitization success or failure. The second is to contribute to broader securitization scholarship. Studying failed securitization can address this concern because, as is outlined in detail by Jan Ruzicka[205], an empirical bias towards cases of successful securitization has for some time impacted not only the field's empirical findings but also its theoretical frameworks.[206]

This bias is not simply accidental; it emerges from an explicit focus on cases of successful securitization set out in the theory's original formulation by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde. These scholars stated that "security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of securitization…[because such cases] constitute the currently valid specific meaning of security". They emphasised that studying what "security" does requires looking at instances in which it is doing something.[207] Consequently, studies of failed securitizations have been few and far between. Notable exceptions to this, such as Salter's look at the attempted securitization

[205] Jan Ruzicka, "Failed Securitization: Why It Matters".
[206] Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Leonard, and Jan Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited: Theory and Cases".
[207] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security,* p39.

of counter-terrorism and McDonald's examination of an attempted climate change securitization, have made their outlier status explicit.[208]

However, if we look at securitizations as processes we can see the problem with ignoring instances in which these processes stop short. Ruzicka[209] outlines that investigating when and how certain securitizations fail allows us to understand not only why others succeed but also of how often they actually do so. Furthermore, the performative power of securitizing rhetoric cannot be understood – and indeed is likely to be exaggerated – until we correct the current empirical bias towards securitization success. A range of complicating factors (including and beyond the social capital of securitizing actors) which render securitizing actors rather impotent could be uncovered via investigations of failed securitizations. The examination of these factors could be utilised not only to fundamentally challenge securitization theory, but also to speak broader studies of international relations concerning the (low) ability of high-level "elites" to control and direct events of major concern. By concentrating on failed securitization, my research contributes to this examination.

Further Criteria

Four further criteria for case selection emerge upon inspection. First, as I will outline in more detail below, my research has involved directly engaging with securitizing arguments in order to examine the potentially interpretable meaning within these speeches. Essentially, this involved conducting an interpretive analysis of discourse, and as such it meant that I required cases that are conducive to an interpretive discourse analysis. Second, as noted in previous chapters, among the intended contributions of my thesis is the provision of findings that will be directly relevant to modern theorists and policymakers, and consequently I required cases that could provide such findings. Third, for reasons of feasibility I required cases in which the relevant data was readily accessible. Finally, as this thesis focuses on the role of public identifications in securitizations, I required cases in which the public was a relevant audience for the securitization.

My seven criteria for case selection are therefore (i) cases that are conducive to an interpretive discourse analysis, (ii) cases in a similar setting, and (iii) a temporally comparative study of stretched cases in a series, (iv) cases directly relevant to modern theorists and policymakers, (v) cases in which the public was a relevant audience for the securitization, (vi) cases that can provide me with instances of both securitization success and failure, and finally (vii) cases in which the relevant data is readily accessible. How did these seven criteria lead me to select the above-mentioned cases?

Criterion I: Cases Conducive to Interpretive Discourse Analysis

As my research entailed in-depth analysis of discourse, which will be more fully outlined below, the subtle and precise use of language in the texts I examined was exceedingly

[208] Mark B. Salter, "When Securitization Fails: The Hard Case of Counter-Terrorism Programmes," in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Thierry Balzacq; Matt McDonald, "The Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia".
[209] Ruzicka, "Failed Securitization: Why It Matters."

important. This meant that I needed the documents I analysed to have been written in a language in which I am fluent. I accordingly chose to focus on English-speaking countries.

Criterion II: A Comparative Study Across Cases in a Similar Setting

The first part of this criterion – the "comparative" component – meant that I required multiple cases, but in an effort to prevent the data under study from becoming unmanageably large I restricted the study to two cases. Next there is the "in a similar setting" component. As I outlined above, the key condition under study here is audience identifications. One of my aims in using a most similar setting design is to allow variation in this condition while reducing the variation in other conditions I am not studying, particularly securitizing move and securitizing actor conditions. This better highlighted the effect differing identifications had on securitization processes.

Opting to study two British cases without large time gaps between them significantly reduces variation in several contextual conditions, given the cultural, economic and political continuity that these two cases offer. Additionally, both of my cases involve the same political regime and broadly the same securitizing actors (in both cases Prime Minister David Cameron and the Conservative party were the main securitizing actors). Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter One a major factor affecting securitization processes that other securitization scholars have studied is the social authority or favourability of the securitizing actor.[210] As the same securitizing actor may have different levels of approval or authority at different times, maximising the most similar setting element of my study required two cases in which we had not only the same securitizing actors but also in which these actors' had similar approval ratings. My two cases satisfy this criterion, as Cameron held a 39% approval rating during the first case and a 43% approval rating during the second, while the Conservative Party held an approval rating of 29% during the first case and a 35% rating during the second[211]. Finally, the securitizations I studied not only took place in highly similar environments with the same securitizing actors, but also consisted of highly similar securitizing moves. In both cases, the securitizing move portrayed Syria in the midst of a civil war as the location of the purported threat being securitized and proposed to solve the purported threat in Syria via targeted airstrikes without the commitment of ground troops.

While there are of course key differences in the conditions in Syria between 2013 and 2015, pairing two cases in which the same government with the same approval ratings in the same country is proposing the same mission type to solve a securitized issue in the same country in a state of crisis leaves us with a very similar setting for both cases. This greatly

[210] Theiler, "Societal Security," in *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, ed. Myriam Cavulty and Victor Mauer; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*.

[211] Source YouGov Polls –
Cameron and Conservative Party 2013:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/tre1r35zar/YG-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-160813.pdf
Cameron 2015: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/z5m43tlvmq/YG-Archive-151026-%20Leader'sRatings.pdf
Conservative Party 2015:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/82cc6m777i/Eurotrack_October_Trackers_website.pdf

reduces variation in securitizing actors and securitizing moves, and thus much better highlights the impact of varying audience identifications. Indeed, it is difficult to think of two international securitizations conducted by an English-speaking country in the 21st century that are as similar to each other as these two cases are. This allowed my work *to more closely examine the effect that audience identifications may have had on these securitization processes*.

Criterion III: A Comparative Study Across Stretched Cases in a Series

"Cases in a series" refers to events that were not only chronologically subsequent to each other but that can also be said, to a reasonable degree of certainty, to have had direct consequences for each other, or to have been stages in the development of a single unit. The unit is, in this instance, the identifications of certain groups of people. This criterion is satisfied by the fact that the events I have chosen can be seen to have fed into each other, with the first case and its outcome being highly influential for the development of the second. In the aftermath of the failure of the first securitization, which resulted in Britain declining participation in a seemingly imminent airstrike on Syria, a heightened national discussion evolved in the British media regarding Britain's role in the world. While contributions to this discussion ranged from lamenting Britain's retreat from world affairs, to celebrating Britain's new found international caution, to reflections on what the legacy of the Iraq War had done to Britain's place in the world,[212] the debate regularly concerned and indeed affected imagery of Britain's international character. In other words, the first case was a stage in the development of British identifications, identifications which went on to influence the second case.

Moreover, when the second securitization took place in 2015 both securitizing and anti-securitizing actors extensively referenced the first case in order to support their own arguments. Securitizing actors repeatedly argued that Britain's refusal to get involved in the Syrian crisis in 2013 had directly contributed to the subsequent deterioration of the Syrian crisis and the rise of ISIS, as summarised in the following quote from MP McCreagh[213]:

> "*We voted against action in 2013, after the sarin gas attacks—a vote I regret and now believe to be wrong. We now have the largest refugee crisis since World War Two. The war in Syria has no end and no laws, and ISIL is expanding its caliphate there. We have had no strategy for Syria, and now we have no easy choices.*"

Meanwhile anti-securitizing actors regularly appealed to the idea that the securitizing actors were simply embarrassed by the outcome of the 2013 securitization and were seeking to

[212] For some examples, see "Are We Entering a New Age of British Isolationism?," John Bew, https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2013/09/are-we-entering-new-age-british-isolationism; Robert Winnett, "Syria Crisis: No to War, Blow to Cameron," http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10275158/Syria-crisis-No-to-war-blow-to-Cameron.html; Max Hastings, "A Savage Defeat for Cameron... and He Brought It on Himself," http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2406132/Syria-vote-A-savage-defeat-David-Cameron--brought-himself.html.

[213] "ISIL in Syria: 2 Dec 2015: House of Commons Debates," TheyWorkForYou, https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2015-12-02d.323.0&s=section%3Adebates+section%3Awhall+section%3Alords+section%3Ani+%22syria%22+2015-11-30..2015-12-02+section%3Auk+speaker%3A10777.

get back to the "big boys table" by getting involved in a major international military operation, a view summed up by MP O'Hara[214]:

> "*Let us be honest, Mr. Speaker. The UK Government's desire to take part in the bombing of Syria is less a military contribution than a political statement. Since 2013, the Government have felt that they have been left on the sidelines, and have been itching for a piece of the action. As with so much of the UK's thinking, this has more to do with how the UK will look to others than with our asking what good we can do.*"

Additionally, in the aftermath of the second case (which resulted in Britain joining an international airstrike campaign in Syria) a further discussion of Britain's international role developed. This can be seen as another stage in the development of these identifications, with the series therefore stretching into the present day. As the first case had clear effects and influence on the second, and as these events taken together can be seen as stages in the development of these publics' identifications, these cases satisfy the criterion of being "cases in a series."

I then stretched these cases' limits so as to capture the trajectory of identifications both before, during, and after the securitizations occurred in earnest, and to allow me to compare how weak identifications were both during and outside of these securitizations. While the securitization in the 2015 case can be said to have happened in earnest between the 14th of November and the 2nd of December, I have tracked the surrounding identifications and securitizing rhetoric from the 1st of October to the 18th of December. This makes the case 78 days long in total, and captures six weeks of identifications developing (and strengthening/weakening) without the influence of concerted securitizations. To keep my two cases comparable, the 2013 case is also 78 days in length. The 2013 securitization took place in earnest between the 21st and 29th of August, and I have tracked both the identifications and securitizing rhetoric surrounding this case from the 27th of June to the 13th of September. This provides sufficient "control" data on identification weakness outside of securitizations to then gauge whether or not short securitizations (lasting roughly two weeks in each case) can be seen to shift identifications more than these identifications normally fluctuate outside of securitizations.

Criterion IV: Cases Relevant to Modern Theorists and Policymakers

While several reasons for why my overall work is relevant to modern theorists and policymakers are outlined in previous chapters (and will be discussed further in the Conclusions Chapter), my case selection can also assist my thesis in this regard. This criterion is satisfied by my case selection because the highly recent and indeed ongoing nature of my cases means that my identification tracking study over these periods (described below) can have implications for our contemporary era. As stated above, examining cases that occurred in a series can provide an idea of where things were going after the last case. This allows us to develop short term forecasting, or at least provide theorists and policymakers in the near future with a reference point for the recent status and trajectory of public British identifications. By

[214] "ISIL in Syria."

taking cases that are this recent and indeed ongoing (with the question of British military involvement in the Middle East unlikely to be over), the resultant short-term forecasting and reference points pertain to our contemporary concerns and are directly relevant for modern theorists and policymakers. As such, by studying this series of events which encapsulate the development of British identifications (and the relationship of these identifications to the securitization of Syrian developments) up to the modern day, I am able to provide modern theorists and policymakers with information directly relevant to their ongoing efforts to study/produce the highly consequential policies in this arena.

Criterion V: Cases Where the Public Was A Relevant Audience

Recall that in Chapter One I laid out that I am following Côté's definition of the audience ("those with the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice"), and I outlined my criteria for when the public meet this condition. These criteria are (i) securitizations which are publicly visible and provocative, and (ii) securitizations that require the approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can come into effect. These criteria are satisfied in both of my cases, as in both cases securitizing actors were appealing for parliamentary permission to authorise high profile military activities, an appeal which dominated the news cycle for prolonged periods and generated widespread and impassioned societal debate (as is outlined in depth in Chapter Four).

As I outlined in Chapter One, in such a scenario where the securitization is publicly visible the public can play a direct role in influencing parliamentarians to vote one way or another. This is because the public's perception of the justifiability of a politicians' pro/anti-securitization stance (particularly post-Iraq) can come with an emotional charge and a prolonged news coverage that can significantly affect a parliamentarian's popularity. Parliamentarians who have to decide to authorise security policies are aware that authorising them against their constituents' will can make their future positions less tenable, which assigns the capability to authorise the action partly with the public. They furthermore understand that the action will not be seen as legitimate if it goes against the public will. Consequently, in both 2013 and 2015 we see securitizing actors making numerous public securitizing arguments, parliamentarians extensively referencing the opinions of the public when justifying their stance on the issue, and in 2013 a significant portion of the overall anti-securitizing argument was that the British people were against the action (as is detailed in the Research Data Chapter). While the public was certainly not the only relevant audience of these securitizations, to say that they were not a relevant audience would be to ignore specific and significant concerns of both the British government and parliamentarians.

Criteria VI and VII: Cases of Securitization Success and Failure with Available Data

My cases satisfy criterion (vi), *cases that provide instances of both securitization success and failure*, as in 2013 the securitization failed with only 22% of the public accepting the securitization proposition and 61% believing that if the proposition was authorised and

acted upon the situation would actually worsen.[215] Meanwhile, in 2015 the securitization succeeded with 59%[216] of the British public endorsing the securitization proposition. Finally, criterion (vii), *cases in which the relevant data is readily accessible*, was satisfied by the fact that these are cases that concern public speech acts and public responses to these acts in English-speaking countries during the internet age. Consequently, the relevant documents (which I detail below) were not only in the public domain but were also accessible online.

To summarise, by studying these cases from a highly similar setting I have highlighted the relationship between identifications and securitization processes by reducing variation in other conditions such as cultural context and securitizing actors. Additionally, by studying a highly modern series of events I have produced findings that modern theorists and policymakers could utilise in the study of modern identifications and their implications for policies. The cases under study also provided instances where the public was a relevant audience, instances of both securitization success and failure, and data that was readily accessible and conducive to interpretive study.

Research Phases

Having selected cases for study, I then extracted and analysed specific data within each case. This research was divided into two phases.

In the first phase the aim was to track identifications across each case. As outlined in Chapter Two, tracking identifications over time was necessary for me to gather the data I required to test my hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that the strength, density, and (mis)alignment of identifications' content to securitizing rhetoric determines what kind of securitizing rhetoric is filtered in or automatically rejected by the audience. As such, I needed to track identifications over time in order to ascertain their strength, density, and content. This research phase also provided data on identification strength (particularly during securitizations) that is noteworthy for broader fields, as outlined in Chapter Two. In the second research phase I began by tracking securitizing rhetoric in both my cases and then combining it with the identification data gathered in the first phase. This allowed me to gauge the (mis)alignment between securitizing rhetoric and identifications during my cases. At that point I had enough data to test my hypothesis. I will now detail these two research phases.

Phase One: Tracking Identifications

When uncovering and tracking identifications, what exactly was I looking for? As outlined in previous chapters, identifications are schemata, specifically self-schemata. They have three major characteristics relevant to this study: strength, density, and content[217]. Thick national identifications typically consist of certain content categories/schema types, namely

[215] Source YouGov Polls – Syria 2013: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/jeg8gvexyy/YG-Archive-Times-results-280813-Syria.pdf

[216] Source YouGov Polls – Syria 2015: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6j3n6x9dvb/TimesResults_151201_Syria_W1.pdf

[217] I researched a fourth characteristic (group orientation) through a different and much simpler research activity, which is detailed below.

norms, influence, affiliations, and perception in the eyes of others.[218] The objective of this research phase was, therefore, to ascertain the strength, density, and content of public British identifications over time in terms of norms, influence, affiliations, and perception in the eyes of others. These were the only pre-conceived content categories/schema types that I commenced this identification tracking study with. Beyond these, I used an open coding method which allowed data types to emerge from the data I analysed.

Schemata and Articulations

How can a person's schemata be ascertained? Recall from previous chapters that schemata are an individual's organised and organising structures of knowledge that take the form of laws which relate signifier X to signifier Y via an associative linkage (e.g. "X is Y" relations such as "killing is wrong"). These linkages are fundamental and operative – fundamental in the sense that they are deeply embedded in the individual and often appear to be natural or undeniably true to them, and operative in the sense that they will organise the structures of knowledge that the individual develops and holds. I posit that *an individual's internally operating schemata can be detected in their discourses*, for the following reasons.

I hold that when authors speak they can only do so via the use of a signifying symbol, but signifiers are always imperfect tools for communication. Their imperfection arises because signifiers link to other signifiers, which results in a network of extended linkages between signifiers. This network is neither natural nor stable, but rather historically constructed through discourse, socially contingent, and constantly shifting. It can never serve as a perfect means of communicating due to the multiple and shifting possible linkages between different signifiers.[219] However, by engaging in common discourse, communities develop approximate mutual understandings of how this network and its linkages look; indeed, this shared understanding is one of the bases of their community status. Despite being merely a perception, the arrangement of linkages in this network appears natural and undeniably true to the individuals in the community.[220] The shared understanding of this network enables communication between community members by providing common access to signifiers whose linkages to other signifiers are roughly communally agreed upon. These linkages can consequently act as pillars, on which ideas of the meaning of words can be developed and organised.[221]

As such, the communally perceived linkages in this communicative network serve as fundamental and operative organisers of what appear to community members to be structures of meaning communicators. I call these linkages "articulations," which I define as *fundamental, operative, communally shared, explicit or implicit statements of laws in the form of linkages relating signifiers to each other.* I use the term "articulations" because a major component of

[218] They also consist of schemata concerning the nation's history, but for the purpose of this study I see these historical schemata as simply feeding into/reinforcing the other content categories listed here.
[219] Sweetman, "Postmodernism, Derrida, and Différance"; Sturrock, *Structuralism and Since*; Hall, "Signification, Representation, Ideology."
[220] Hall, "Signification, Representation, Ideology."
[221] Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*; Joseph P. Natoli and Linda Hutcheon, eds., *A Postmodern Reader*; Steven Seidman, ed., *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory*.

the concept of articulation refers to "the practice of creating and temporarily fixing meaning through the contingent connection of signifying elements."[222]

To return to schemata, if individuals order their conception of the world in terms of the associative linkages between signifiers contained in their internal schemata, then they would not subscribe to a communicative network that consists of linkages between signifiers which are contrary to the linkages in their schemata. Therefore, the associative linkages in the network that individuals in a community communicate through (i.e. an individual's articulations) must mimic or closely approximate the linkages these individuals hold internally (i.e. their schemata). They may come to mimic each other as such because the individual consumes and internalises the communicative network and consequently builds their schemata around it, or because the individuals simply reject networks that do not match their pre-existing schemata, or through other mechanisms. Regardless of the mechanisms building this mimicry, the individual's internal schemata should consist of associative linkages between signifiers that mimic the linkages in their articulations. As such, *ascertaining an individual's schemata can be done via an interpretive analysis of discourse specifically aimed at uncovering articulations*.

Keeping in mind that such an approach has inherent trade-offs which I will outline below, how would such an analysis of discourse work? Essentially, I identified articulations by noting *conjoiners* which link signifiers to each other, and then checking if these linkages were *operative and fundamental* by seeing if they were frequent, rarely contradicted, generally implicit, and passionate when explicit.

Conjoiners

To elaborate, I examined certain texts (which texts and why will be detailed below) for articulations pertaining to the relevant schema types listed above. This was an interpretive exercise which did not search for a pre-conceived list of articulations, instead allowing articulations to arise from the texts.[223] It also did not assume any inherent or natural meaning in words, instead seeing the meaning of words as socially and contextually contingent.[224] This stance made more quantitative approaches such as computer-aided content analysis inapplicable to my study.[225]

It should be noted that I do not believe I can ever know what the author intended by their iterations. The exercise of finding articulations is simply based on the idea that the associative linkages between signifiers can be spotted by (firstly) noting conjoining signifiers (e.g. "X *is* Y," "X *produces* Y," "X *and* Y," "X *does not accompany* Y", etc.).[226] Once spotted, these linkages can be interpreted/rephrased into simpler forms which still approximate the original linkage. However, this interpretation is still an operation in which something will be

[222] Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, *Methodological Reflections on Discourse Analysis*; Hall, "Signification, Representation, Ideology."
[223] Ted Hopf, "Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis".
[224] Cynthia Hardy, Bill Harley, and Nelson Phillips, *Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?*.
[225] David Dessler, "The Positivist-Interpretivist Controversy"; Hardy, Harley, and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?*; Hopf, "Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis."
[226] Laffey and Weldes, *Methodological Reflections on Discourse Analysis*; Hall, "Signification, Representation, Ideology."

lost and which requires the interpreter to have a strong understanding of the sociolinguistic context in which the articulation was made.[227]

How did I identify articulations that were signalling certain schemata? Articulations indicative of normative schemata linked a certain national activity type[228] or institution to a value (for instance, positive, or negative, or conditionally positive). Articulations indicative of influence schemata linked a national activity type or institution to a likelihood of its ability to affect an entity as it intends (likely, unlikely, or conditionally likely). Articulations indicative of affiliation schemata linked the relationship between the nation and another nation to a value. Finally, articulations indicative of perception schemata linked the perception of the nation in the eyes of others to a value.

An example of how this worked is in order. A simple example of a sentence that could be interrogated for articulation content would be "our country's military is a force for good," although it should be noted that articulations may not just appear in closed sentences but also across paragraphs or whole texts.[229] Articulations can link signifiers through simple synonymising, but also through the use of analogies, metaphors, or causal inferences. This example sentence consists of several relational linkages between concepts, which signal a set of schema types and arrangements. Firstly, linking "our" and "country" is a linkage of members of a country into a single shared space. This is an explicit statement of a relationship between subjects and a nationwide group. It also attaches a positive value to this relationship, detectable in the *possible* (see next paragraph) positive connotations in the use of the word "our" which invokes imagery of joint ownership and community. As such, it is a linkage that signals a group orientation schema which is national. We can also detect, through the linkage of "good" and "military," a normative schema that attaches positivity to the use of military force. The statement also implies a schema pertaining to national influence via a linkage of "is" and "force" which reifies and affirms the power of the nation's military.

It should be noted that the power I attribute to the imagery in the word "force," along with the positivity I attribute to "our" may well be shown to be inappropriate attributions upon reading the rest of the text or further texts. As such, this interpretive exercise involved reading back and forth between texts as I ascertained a clearer idea of this discourse's set of rules and consequently its attribution of imagery/value to certain words.[230] Consequently, both cases were given two full sweeps of articulation examination in order to fully utilise the clearer idea of these discourses' rules as I developed this understanding over time, with each individual sweep consisting of several back and forth readings of different texts.

Operative and Fundamental

However, these linkages might just signal highly transitory and inactive opinions, rather than the more persistent principles of knowledge that are schemata. To distinguish whether we

[227] David Laitlin, "Interpretation"; Srikant Sarangi and Malcolm Coulthard, eds., *Discourse and Social Life*; Mark Bevir, "Interpretivism: Family Resemblances and Quarrels".
[228] Sarangi and Coulthard, *Discourse and Social Life*.
[229] Norman Fairclough, "Intertextuality in Critical Discourse Analysis"; Hopf, "Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis."
[230] Laffey and Weldes, *Methodological Reflections on Discourse Analysis*; Fairclough, "Intertextuality in Critical Discourse Analysis."

have found an opinion or a schema, we need to see if this set of relational laws is not just transitory but *operative*. We could see this if it were sticky and actively organising, which would be indicated if it frequently appeared and was rarely contradicted, with all other information assertions building from these laws rather than competing with them. More importantly, however, we need to see if it acts as a *fundamental* principle of knowledge. Fundamental principles have a sense of undeniability for the individual that holds them, and this sense could be identified via two indicators: firstly, a passion or emphasis attached to these principles when they are used explicitly, and secondly, a general tendency to use these principles implicitly.

The implicit or assumptive use of articulations indicates their place in the unchallenged communicative network shared between author and reader, or barely even acknowledged by either. For instance, the articulation "if we increase military activity, we could achieve democratisation" contains the implicit statement that it goes without saying that "democracy is good." However, there is a problem with analysing implicit statements in that their lack of explicit outlining can render them particularly ambiguous. In order to deal with ambiguity, I analysed particularly ambiguous explicit or implicit statements through multiple possible interpretations. As I continued through the texts, I eliminated those interpretations that hardly appeared at all in the rest of the text or that were directly and repeatedly contradicted by the rest of the text. This further contributed to the back and forth nature of the interpretive analysis and the utility of the double sweep through both cases. As for spotting passion or emphasis in articulations' explicit use, this was done by spotting associations between articulations and evocative imagery, emotional language, and explicit highlighting such as "it should be at the forefront of our minds that…".

By detecting these operative and fundamental linkages in the author's structures of communication, I coded them as articulations indicating at least one active set of schemata at work in the text. I acknowledge that the interpretive nature of this articulation analysis lowers the replicability of this study. Despite this, I hold that the interpretive nature of this analysis is necessary to uncover the richness of the shifting sands that are underlying identifications. Familiarising myself with the intertextually developed meanings of specific attributions in this discourse allowed for a much more nuanced insight into the organising principles of knowledge at work here than any computer-generated analysis of specific words could have. In order to provide a richer understanding of securitization that is directly useful to theorists and policymakers, these are approaches I needed to make and consequently I accepted the trade-offs inherent in them.

From Articulations to Identifications

Once these raw articulations were gathered, however, they were too numerous and individually specific to serve as usable data points with which to examine identifications. As organising principles of knowledge, schemata take the form of simple building blocks on which broad swathes of information can be placed and upheld. Articulations, as expressions iterated in individual contexts regarding precise objects, are far more specific. Resolving the overly numerous nature of these articulations and ascertaining the simpler/broader principles of knowledge evoking these specific expressions was done by grouping these articulations under

higher categories, categories which illustrated the underlying *identification point* that these articulations oriented themselves around and expressed.

For instance, an identification point might be "Britain's Deference to International Institutions," which encompasses normative identifications of Britain's position relative to international institutions (should these international institutions supersede British autonomy/sovereignty or not?). All articulations regarding Britain's deference to international institutions (for instance the articulations "Britain must respect UN decisions" and "Britain should disregard international treaties") were grouped under this identification point.[231] These identification points were not pre-conceived but rather emerged from the data based on entities/concepts (such as deference to international institutions) that numerous articulations commonly regarded.

While an identification point only refers to the entity/concept that articulations regard, *identifications* refer to both the entity/concept and how this entity/concept is regarded. For instance, under the identification point "Britain's Deference to International Institutions," we have the associated identifications "Britain should defer to international institutions" (under which all articulations expressing that Britain should defer were grouped) and "Britain should not defer to international institutions" (under which all articulations expressing that Britain should not defer were grouped). This is illustrated in the following table.

Table 3.2

Identification Point "Deference to International Institutions"					
Identification "Britain should defer to international institutions"			**Identification** "Britain should not defer to international institutions"		
Articulation "Britain should abide by UN decisions"	**Articulation** "Britain should obey international law"	**Articulation** "War can only be authorised by the UN"	**Articulation** "Britain has complete international autonomy"	**Articulation** "International law is a guideline, not a rule"	**Articulation** "Only national parliaments authorise war"

A dominant identification is defined by the *content balance* of articulations grouped under an identification point at a given moment. If, at a certain moment, articulations expressing that Britain should defer to international institutions far outweigh those that express that it should not, then this reflects that the dominant identification for this identification point in this moment is that Britain should defer to international institutions.

This brings me to how I ascertained identification strength and density. An identification's strength is defined by how changeable this content balance is over time. If this balance never wavers or changes (i.e. if the "should defer" articulations steadily outweigh the "should not defer" articulations) then we have one dominant identification (the "Britain should defer to international institutions" identification) and it is deemed very strong. If the content balance wavers but does not change (i.e. if the "should defer" articulations always outweigh

[231] Note that one articulation can be grouped under several different identification points simultaneously.

the "should not defer" articulations but the extent to which they do so shifts noticeably over time), then we still have only one dominant identification and it is still strong but not very strong. On the other hand, if this content balance changes sides over time (i.e. if at one point the "should defer" side outweighs the "should not defer" side, but at another this is not the case) then this would indicate that at different times we have dominant "should defer" and "should not defer" identifications, but they are both weak identifications. Finally, if the balance changes more than once then at different times we have dominant "should defer" and "should not defer" identifications, but they would both be very weak identifications. Meanwhile, as identification density concerns how often an identification is expressed or primed (as was outlined in Chapter Two), I ascertained identification density by examining the *amount* of articulations that oriented themselves around a common identification point in different periods. The details and reasoning behind these analytical processes, along with the resulting identification data, are fully laid out in the Research Data Chapter.

Finally, so as not to lose the raw articulations that, once analysed and grouped, revealed identifications content, strength, and density, I have included Articulation Graphs in my Research Data Chapter that display the exact articulations from which each identification point was extracted. By doing so I have simplified the data we are working with at the higher levels of identifications while preserving and illustrating the raw data underlying these higher points.

Text Type Selection

Before conducting this analysis, I needed to decide which texts I would apply it to. Part of my text selection criteria was to ensure that the articulations I uncovered in my texts were as *representative* as possible of wider British public discourse and articulations. Furthermore, as I aimed to gather data concerning the wide-ranging content of identifications, I also needed to examine discourses that were *rich* with articulation content. Additionally, as this was a study of cases in recent history, I could not interview modern subjects as a means of gauging their previously held identifications (due to problems of hindsight and memory). Rather, I needed *readily accessible historic documents*. As I was conducting an identification tracking study, I required texts that steadily encapsulated identifications concerning the British nation during and across very specific time periods. This meant that I required texts that *frequently discussed "the nation,"* whose *readership remained largely steady*, and whose audience were likely to receive them quite *quickly after they were published*.

These requirements immediately disqualified the use of polls. Polls simply lack the richness and range required to reveal the spread of articulations that come naturally to people as they discuss themselves and their nation in an open-ended way. Instead, polls often (though not always) direct their respondents towards simple yes or no answers, or ask them to agree or disagree with statements that prime specific elements of a person's identifications. As such, at best they can only reveal the identifications that they prime. The only identification characteristic that polls were able to illuminate for my study was the group orientation of the British public, with the British Social Attitudes [BSA] survey conducted by the NatCen Social Research institute having consistently asked the British public each year whether they felt primarily British, jointly British and something else, or exclusively/primarily something else. The BSA survey revealed that as my cases began the vast majority of British people held British identifications, with 83% of British citizens resident in England and 77% of British citizens

resident in Scotland (who combined make up 73% of the UK population) holding a British identification either exclusively or in conjunction with a more local identification.[232] For more specific identification content I instead required open-ended texts, which tend to have richer content and are more likely to reveal the dialogical self.[233] While micro-level diaries or primary accounts from ordinary citizens would have satisfied this richness requirement, the extent to which they would have been representative of the broader public would have been too low.

To balance these requirements, I opted to study all discourse concerning Britain's character and place on the international stage that was published in newspapers read by 0.1% of the British public or more during my cases. This methodological decision builds on and closely approximates Ted Hopf's methodological outlining of how to operationalise identity. In *Making Identity Count*, Hopf addressed the question of how to make constructivist research robust, replicable, and numbers oriented (how to quantify, as much as is possible, identity)[234]. Here, Hopf argues that the best way to operationalise and gauge national identity is through "discourse analysis of a broad range of relevant texts"[235] which he lists as being newspapers, novels, textbooks, and movies.[236] Hopf argues that analysing these texts is a strong way of gauging mass identities because through these texts we "let the subjects speak" and observe the identities that guide their information consumption and make up their everyday, habitual, all-pervasive social landscape.[237] Allan, a co-author of the volume, explicitly justifies this move by arguing that "the theoretical warrant for this is that the categories which people use to make sense of both themselves and the world are drawn from intersubjectively shared stocks of knowledge."[238] Under this justification, Hopf and other authors who contributed to the volume then use this method of "inductively recovering"[239] identities from newspapers, novels, textbooks, and movies through open coding. Hopf then adopts an "interpretivist epistemology"[240] and reconstructs identities by "contextualising them within the texts and relating them intertextually to the vast variety of other texts"[241] from that period, before finally combining them into discursive formations. This is an almost identical methodological process to the one I adopted in my research (which I have outlined over the last seven pages since the section title "**Phase One**", and, to briefly recap, involved me searching newspaper texts for articulations via an interpretive and open coding, the interpretation of which was guided by

[232] Source British Social Attitudes, http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-30/devolution/trends-in-national-identity.aspx. Data for the group orientation of residents of Northern Ireland is more complex as a result of the many different group identities salient to the population there, and data for the group orientation of residents in Wales was not included in the BSA survey. However, given that the total population of Northern Ireland and Wales combined is only 10% of the population of the UK as a whole this does not undermine the overall finding that the vast majority (at least 73%) of British citizens resident in the UK held British identifications during my cases.
[233] Hubert J.M. Hermans, "The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning"; Laura Stoker, "Is It Possible To Do Quantitative Survey Research In An Interpretive Way?".
[234] Hopf and Allan, *Making Identity Count*, 7
[235] Hopf and Allan, 15.
[236] Hopf and Allan, 4.
[237] Hopf and Allan, 7, 32; Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, 23.
[238] Hopf and Allan, 32
[239] Hopf and Allan, 16.
[240] Hopf, 23.
[241] Hopf, 24.

intra- and inter-textual considerations of context, and then combining these articulations into higher categories which I termed identifications and identification points).

As such, my methodology closely reflects Hopf's outline of how to operationalise and track mass identity. This decision to track identity via newspapers (as opposed to Hopf's broader tracking of newspapers, movies, textbooks, and novels) was born mainly out of necessity. As I outlined above, one of my criterion for text selection was "texts whose audience were likely to receive them quite quickly after they were published". Textbooks and novels did not meet this criterion, as both may be on the shelf/available for quite a while before they become widely read. Additionally, visual analysis of movies was beyond the scope of my research. However, this drawback is compensated for in two ways. Firstly, as is outlined in the "**Text Selection**" section below, I analysed a very broad range of newspapers (every paper read by 0.1% of the British public or more), and in doing so generated extremely detailed and extensive data on identities on a very large scale. This goes some way towards making up for the lack of other text types. Secondly, modern newspaper articles provide an even nicer middle ground in terms of representativeness and richness of content than Hopf's older newspapers may have (almost all of Hopf's research came from sources from the 20th century). This is because extensive research into the role and increasing ubiquity of narrowcasting in the 21st century holds that the conceptual framework of modern media articles is more and more likely to mirror the conceptual framework of that publication's audience.

This is the result of several mechanisms. Firstly, news publications in the 21st century are increasingly internet-based. This affords them with a growing ability to keep track of precisely what types of articles and authors are popular amongst their readers via click-through rate and retention tracking of their online users. This much-enhanced market data allows these newspapers to produced highly tailored content that mirrors the content they know their users already like (a trend exacerbated by social media)[242]. Furthermore, the media landscape has self-segregated into separate "mini-markets" of news consumers. This, accompanied with the decline of the news readership generally and in younger markets especially, is creating a narrowcasting environment where (instead of broad ranges of people receiving the same news relatively simultaneously) small markets are targeted with individual news catered just to them.[243] Modern newspaper articles, particularly editorials and opinion pieces, are therefore quite representative of their audiences, while still being content rich and open-ended. They also qualify as readily accessible historic documents which frequently discuss "the nation" with a steady audience who received them quickly after they were published.[244] As such, examining

[242] Matthew Mendelsohn and Richard Nadeau, "The Magnfication and Minimization of Social Cleavages By The Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media"; Beretta E. Smith-Shomade, "Narrowcasting in the New World Information Order: A Space for the Audience?"; Lincoln Geraghty, *Popular Media Cultures Fans, Audiences and Paratexts.* http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=2057777.

[243] Beretta E. Smith-Shomade, "Narrowcasting in the New World Information Order: A Space for the Audience?"; Scott H. Clarke, "Created in Whose Image? Religious Characters on Network Television"; Lincoln Geraghty, *Popular Media Cultures Fans, Audiences and Paratexts.* http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=2057777; Matthew Mendelsohn and Richard Nadeau, "The Magnfication and Minimization of Social Cleavages By The Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media"; Silvo Lenart, *Shaping Political Attitudes: The Impact of Interpersonal Communication and Mass Media*.

[244] Having an audience that received the text quickly after they were published also disqualified bestselling books from this study, as the extended time period it can take for books to become bestsellers would make it

the articulations therein provides access to specific aspects of modern British discourse relevant to my study- to a similar if not even greater extent than it did for Hopf's large scale operationalisation of identity which also centralised media analysis as a means for gauging mass identities.

Text Selection

To maximise the extent to which the articulations I uncovered from this interpretive analysis of media discourse represented British public discourse, I included in my study *all newspapers that were read by 0.1% or more of the British public during my cases*. Note that this meant I was not only including publications based and read in the UK, such as the *Daily Mail*, but also publications read in the UK while based elsewhere, such as *The New York Times*. Consequently, I needed to compile a list of publications read by 0.1% or more of the British public during my cases. I have included this list (which shows each individual publication's UK readership along with this data's sources) as Sheet One in the Appendix, with full links to this data's sources included in Sheet Two in the Appendix. Note that the readership data in Sheet One does not refer to any publications' non-British audience. For instance, in 2015 *The New York Times'* average online readership in the US was 10.23million, but I only took note of its average British online readership, which was 928,714.

The corpus of texts analysed was divided into UK and non-UK based publications, and included national, regional, and local papers (from *The Guardian* and the *Daily Mail* to the *Teeside Evening Gazette* and the *Bristol Post*) as well as specialist magazines such as *The New Statesman* and *The Economist*. Readership data for each publication was divided into online readership and print circulation. This was a result of the true audience number not being available for many of the publications I examined, while the average print readership and the average online readership was available.[245] These two data points (which certainly would have overlapped) could not be de-duplicated in all cases, so I opted to list them separately and rank the publications based on their online readership. This figure was always much higher than the print readership, and likely to be more representative of the true audience figure. This is because a single purchased print edition of a publication is often read by several people, whereas a unique browser hit (which is how online readership is measured) is more likely to reflect one reader. When I analysed articulation data from different newspapers I took this online readership into account and weighted articulations from more widely read newspapers accordingly.

As such, I needed to ascertain the online and print British readership of all UK based publications and the online British readership of all non-UK based publications[246] in order to identify and rank all publications with a readership of 0.1% of the British public or more. For data on UK based publications' print and online readership I went to the Audit Bureau of Circulation [ABC]. ABC provided the names of all UK-based publications available in 2013 and 2015 along with the UK print circulation and online readership for almost all of them (I

difficult to use them as gauges for widespread identifications developing during and across specific time frames.

[245] For all non-UK-based publications the online British readership was available, but in most cases their British print circulation numbers were unavailable and likely very low given that they were published abroad.

[246] As their print readership in the UK would have been either very low or not available.

had to go to Quantcast for data on some publications' web traffic). For a full and precise list of sources on readership data, see Sheets One and Two in the Appendix. This data was extensive enough to include publications with too few readers to be included in the study.

For data on non-UK based publications' online readership I first went to SimilarWeb, which had compiled a publicly available list of the 300 news, politics and media websites most accessed from the UK (from mobile or PC) each year. This list was extensive enough to include websites with too few readers to be included in the study. To identify the exact readership for the websites on this list I ran each website individually (eliminating sites irrelevant for my study, such as those exclusively to do with auto news, published exclusively in a foreign language, etc.) through Quantcast and SimilarWeb. The online readership of non-UK publications' in 2013 was not available in precise numbers, but anything indicated as having over 100,000 UK readers was included in the study. A small number of data pieces which were still missing were then filled in via reference to other data sources including the NRS, comScore, and, in one case, PWC.[247] Finally, a small number of publications with inaccessible or non-existent archives had to be eliminated from the study, but none of these had a readership of over 0.2% of the British population.

As the Reuters Digital News Report 2015[248] showed that the one market with a low likelihood of using the internet as a news source was the local newspaper market, I also used the ABC print circulation data to check that I had not missed any local publications with a high print circulation but low online readership. Surprisingly, I had not. Looking at my compiled list of news sources read by 0.1% of the British public or more, the most surprising thing about it is that there are so few surprises. Given that I did not restrict the publications I examined to any category (purely print, purely online, traditional, new, etc.), instead allowing for any newspaper of any age accessed via any platform to emerge as one with a significant British audience, an unexpectedly low proportion of the publications that emerged would be considered non-traditional, and most of these are aimed at a younger market (for instance *Vice*). This is despite the SimilarWeb list being extensive enough to bring up non-UK based websites with audiences of less than 10,000 British people. In the age of social media and the resultant changes in the media landscape, I had expected more lesser-known news sources to emerge.

This is partly explained, however, by the 2015 Reuters Report, which outlines that the rise of social media has engendered a significant shift in *how people get to* the news (a shift which has numerous and far-reaching consequences for the industry as a whole), but not in where they *ultimately* get it. The Report shows that social media is on the rise as a source of news, with 40% of the population using social media as a source of news and 6% using it as their main source of news (although, social media is still the second-least used news source in the UK)[249]. However, this represents a significant shift in the popularity of referral sites, rather than in the popularity of newsbrands; a shift in user journey, rather than a shift in user

[247] For details, see Sheets One and Two in the Appendix.
[248] Available at https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reuters%20Institute%20Digital%20News%20Report%202015_Full%20Report.pdf
[249] See p75 of https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reuters%20Institute%20Digital%20News%20Report%202015_Full%20Report.pdf

destination. Consumers used to read *The Guardian* by buying the paper, then they read it by googling "The Guardian," now they are reading it by following links on their Facebook page or with the "The Guardian" app. To quote the Reuters report, "although audiences still consume the majority of their online news from familiar and trusted brands, the way they access that content is changing."[250]

Article Selection

Having gathered this data on which news sources were commonly read by the UK population, I decided on which articles from these sources I would apply my articulation analysis to. The number of news sources in this list and the very low market share of many of them indicated that the total amount of content these publications produced during my case studies was, firstly, too high to analyse, and, secondly, unnecessary to analyse. As such, I analysed every second historic day of content from daily publications with an online readership of more than 640,000 (1% of the UK population) and every historic day of content for publications only published on a weekly/monthly basis. As for publications with a smaller online readership, I analysed a random 25% of these publications on each given historic day being analysed, changing the sample each day. I ensured that the random sample proportionately contained publications from each publication category (i.e. some regional UK-based newspapers, some national UK-based papers, some non-UK publications, etc.) For each source I analysed, I selected a random 100 articles published by that source on the historic day in question and coded relevant material from relevant articles in that sample, along with every relevant article appearing on the front page (as identified through Kiosko[251]).

To ensure efficiency of time spent, relevant articles were considered to be articles discussing or reflecting an idea of Britain's character and place on the international stage. Such articles were more likely to include articulations which reflected the identifications regarding Britain's national norms, influence, relationships, and perceptions in the eyes of others that I needed to track in order to test my hypothesis. They would also exclude such schema that would be irrelevant for my cases due to being unlikely to align or misalign with securitizing rhetoric that regarded international issues, international actors, and purported international threats, and was ultimately concerned with international action on the international stage. Consequently, British identifications that were more domestically focused, such as Britain as the country of the NHS or the royal family, were not relevant for this study. For instance, articles discussing Britain's character as reflected in British minimum wages or British film culture (excluding films about international issues) were excluded, while articles regarding Britain's character as reflected in duties to migrants or relationships with the EU or Russia were included. To additionally enhance efficiency, I would eliminate articles that only glancingly or overly vaguely discussed such national identifications, instead only including articles that discussed these identifications in a codable way. This made the coding work more manageable and dealt with issues of data saturation.

[250] See p75 of https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reuters%20Institute%20Digital%20News%20Report%202015_Full%20Report.pdf

[251] Kiosko.Net, http://en.kiosko.net/uk/2013-05-22/.

Over the course of this thesis, I analysed 1749 articles which totalled 1,303,191 words. Each of these articles can be found in their original raw form, along with links to their sources, via Sheet Three in the Appendix. Due to the volume of articles and words, it is not feasible to attach the articles themselves to this Appendix. Consequently, I have collected these articles in two documents (one for each case) which I have uploaded to an opensource website. Links to these documents can be found in Sheet Three in the Appendix.

Data on Identification Strength

At this point, having tracked identifications across stretched cases that included time periods both before, during, and after securitizations, I had data regarding public British identifications' strength/weakness over time. This data was necessary for answering my research question, but was also noteworthy for the wider debate regarding identification strength over time and particularly during securitizations. This is not a core finding of my thesis, but remains a noteworthy dataset that can be taken up and utilised elsewhere by scholars examining identifications' persistence/changeability in the face of broader forces.

To make this dataset clearer and of higher value for wider scholarship, I then collated information on various identifications' strength and mapped this data onto a continuum, highlighting which (and what proportion of) identifications approached the strong and weak ends of this continuum. While the identification analysis within cases provided a picture of identification weakness over shorter periods of time, I also highlighted cross-case comparisons. Through this analysis, I noted which identifications were so strong as to be present in both cases, and additionally noted the differences in the strength of these identifications between cases. Furthermore, by analysing the direction of shifts in identifications between cases I was able to gain an idea of their broader trajectory, noting which displayed a solid strength over long periods and which seemed to change (and how they were changing). This provided data on the status and trajectory of modern British identifications, a further datapoint of note to wider scholars.

In addition to highlighting certain potential trends of identification weakness, I made modest attempts to explain these trends and to provide the basis for future study into the explanation of such trends. It was not my aim to conduct in-depth analyses into causal mechanisms linking specific trends of identification weakness to specific events, as causal networks are likely to be highly complex, non-linear, and (if possible to reveal at all) beyond the scope of this study. Instead, in accordance with what was outlined previously about the importance of context, I have sought to provide a practical understanding of identification weakness in this setting in the form of empirically derived historic trends and to examine possible contextual influences on these trends. These examinations are discussed in the Research Data Chapter.

The result of this phase was the production of a very broad swathe of identification data on modern British identifications regarding Britain's place on the international stage in terms of strength, density, norms, influence, relationships, and perceptions in the eyes of others over two recent periods of time. This provided a picture not only of modern British identifications, but also of how these identifications seem to be shifting, particularly during securitizations. In and of itself, this data – which is laid out in the Research Data Chapter later in this thesis – is

highly informative for researchers and policymakers looking at British identity and concerned with Britain's future international direction. This data also paved the way for Phase Two of my research.

Phase Two: Evaluating the Hypothesis

Having tracked identifications, I began evaluating my hypothesis – which I laid out in Chapter Two – regarding how identifications affect securitization success. Before detailing how I completed this phase, I will here provide a quick overview of it. In this phase, I gathered texts in which the key securitizing and anti-securitizing actors publicly outlined their arguments. Key (anti-)securitizing actors were taken to be high level government officials, including technocrats, executive figures, and elected officials, arguing for or against securitization. Securitizing texts could range from press releases, parliamentary debates, manifestos, party rally speeches, to any manner of public discussion. These texts are fully listed and links to each of the original texts can be found in the Research Data Chapter later in this thesis. I then analysed these texts to see if they would have been filtered in or rejected by audiences holding the identifications found to be widespread in Phase One, under the assumption that these audiences were operating under the rules posited in my hypothesis. Then, recalling that in 2013 the securitization failed while in 2015 it succeeded, I noted if the reactions of my hypothesised audiences in these cases (filtering in or rejecting securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments) would have been conducive to a failed securitization in 2013 and a successful one in 2015. In doing so I evaluated the validity of my hypothesis and addressed my research question, which was "How do the public audience's identifications influence the success and failure of securitizations?" I will now elaborate on and clarify this overview.

Alignment

I began Phase Two by ascertaining whether or not the audiences' identifications revealed in Phase One *aligned* with the (anti-)securitizing arguments. This needed to be done because my hypothesis asserts that three components of identifications will contribute to the success of securitization attempts: strength, density, and content alignment to the (anti-)securitizing argument. While the findings from Phase One will clearly show the strength, density, and even the content of the identifications at play, they have not yet revealed the alignment of this content to the securitizing argument. In order to evaluate my hypothesis, I needed to fill in this piece of information.

By "alignment to the argument" I am referring to the extent to which the identifications do not contradict the information being presented in the argument and consequently filter it out. In order to ascertain alignment, I first gathered the (anti-)securitizing arguments made, all of which were available via publicly accessible government records, primarily Hansard and gov.uk (these sources are also detailed in the Securitization and Identifications Data Chapter). Dividing these arguments chronologically, I examined each text to see how it would have been interpreted by someone holding the identifications tracked in Phase One.

To do this, I kept in mind the relevant Claim-Identification co-locations outlined in Fig. 2 in Chapter Two. Recall from Chapter Two that securitizing arguments make four core claims: that there is (i) an object of worth, (ii) a threat to this object, and a means of dealing with this threat that is (iii) appropriate and (iv) feasible. Anti-securitizing arguments attempt to discredit

these claims. Also outlined in Chapter Two was that claims about objects of worth need to align with normative identifications in order for receptivity to increase. Similarly, claims about threats need to align with influence, affiliation, and perception identifications. Feasibility claims need to align with influence identifications. Appropriateness claims need to align with normative identifications.

With this in mind, I coded the claims made in each (anti-)securitizing text, searching for assertions (which were made across paragraphs, whole texts, or simply implicitly) that argued as to what the proposed object of worth was and why, what the threat was and why, what the means of dealing with this threat were and why they were appropriate and feasible. I then asked whether or not these assertions would have aligned or misaligned with the public identifications uncovered in Phase One. This resulted in a series of data points encompassing the (anti-)securitizing arguments made and whether or not they would have aligned or misaligned with the public audience's identifications.

For instance, suppose a securitizing actor made the statement "we need to join this conflict in order to defend political freedom." One of the claims being made here refers to the proposed object of worth that is under threat, which is explicitly "political freedom." I would then check what widespread normative identifications were at play at the time (as objects of worth need to align with norms). If I found that the widespread normative identifications included "political freedom is a human right" and "our responsibility is to defend human rights," then I could make certain inferences. I could firstly infer that this audience would have interpreted this statement as a statement about defending human rights. Then I could infer that the statement that the nation must defend human rights would have aligned with the audience's identifications. As such, this would signal alignment of identifications *to this claim* of the securitizing argument. This is not to exclude the possibility that the same securitizing actor may have also made claims about threats, appropriateness and feasibility which the audiences' identifications may not have aligned with. Alignment was therefore measured on a scale; the more claims that the identifications aligned with, the greater the alignment.

Note that I conducted all of these exercises for anti-securitizing rhetoric as well. I coded the anti-securitizing rhetoric that emerged in the cases in terms of why the anti-securitizing actors thought the object of worth and/or threat had been misrecognised, and/or why the proposed mission was not feasible and/or appropriate. I then examined if these anti-securitizing arguments aligned or misaligned with the identifications ascertained in Phase One. Overall, this showed me the receptivity of public audiences to both the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments during my cases.

I took this route (looking at securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments and comparing the receptivity they would have garnered if they were subject to the dynamics I have hypothesised) for two reasons. First, to say that a securitizing argument succeeded/failed is also to say that it was more/less effective than the anti-securitizing argument with which it contended. Second, the dynamics governing audience receptivity to securitizing arguments should apply in equal measure to the dynamics governing audience receptivity to anti-securitizing arguments. Combining these two premises, it would seem that testing if the winning argument in a securitization would have garnered *higher* receptivity than its opposing argument if audience receptivity is subject to the dynamics I have hypothesised, is a more

robust means of empirically validating my hypothesis than simply testing if the winning argument would have garnered *high* audience receptivity.

Essentially then, what I seek to test here is whether or not the dynamics I have hypothesised would indicate that the failed securitizing argument of 2013 would have suffered from lower audience receptivity than the successful anti-securitizing argument of 2013. I additionally seek to test if the successful securitizing argument of 2015 would have enjoyed higher audience receptivity than the unsuccessful anti-securitizing argument of 2015. If this is the case, then it would show that my hypothesis can help explain real-world phenomena of securitization success and failure. It would do so because it would show that, in two securitization attempts that were highly similar in most basic characteristics[252], my hypothesis can explain how different identifications can generate higher/lower audience receptivities to (anti-)securitizing arguments, and that these relative levels of receptivity explain different outcomes of securitization success and failure.

As such, if my hypothesis holds true and encapsulates influential real-world processes, then we should see the cross-case differences in British identifications being less conducive to a successful securitization in 2013 than in 2015. Specifically, by applying my hypothesis (as illustrated in Fig. 1 in Chapter Two) to my identification data we should see that the 2013 identifications should have resulted in a much lower receptivity to the securitizing rhetoric than to the anti-securitizing rhetoric (hence being conducive to a failed securitization). Meanwhile, in 2015 the identifications should have resulted in a much lower receptivity to the anti-securitizing rhetoric than to the securitizing rhetoric (hence being conducive to a successful securitization).

Summary

To summarise, by studying these cases I produced evidence with which I could empirically test my previously outlined hypothesis, and consequently address my research question. In addition, although this was not a core aim of my thesis, my research produced a broad swathe of data on modern British identifications, along with data on identifications' strength over time and during securitizations. I do not claim that this data definitively captures identification strength in general or during securitizations, but I include this data in this thesis as it remains a valuable dataset of note for researchers and policymakers looking at identification strength and at modern British identity. Overall, my research produced empirical data of direct use for answering my research question, and of note for wider fields.

[252] With the same securitizing actors in the same countries offering very similar securitizing propositions regarding the same country.

CHAPTER FOUR
Environment

Chapter Abstract

In this chapter I detail the major news stories that dominated the media discourse I have analysed and lay out the rationale for doing so. I quantitatively demonstrate which stories received prolonged media coverage in each of my cases before unpacking this data and detailing how each story was covered by different groups of newspapers. These major stories include the 2013 uprisings in Egypt and the progress/failure of Arab Spring more widely, the NSA spying scandal, the 2015 refugee crisis, Britain's relationships with Russia and the EU, the Syrian civil war, chemical weapons usage in Syria, and ISIS. I focus on the broad points of agreement and disagreement of different media outlets' coverage of these stories so as to highlight the broad discussions that the British public were immersed in during my cases. Doing so grounds the identification data I later lay out in the Research Data Chapter in its tangible and relevant historic discursive context.

Introduction

In this chapter I detail the major news stories that dominated the media discourse I have analysed. Why do this? As I outlined previously, it is from these news stories that I have extracted articulations and identifications. In the next chapter (the Research Data Chapter) I will present my precise data on these articulations and identifications. However, these articulations and identifications sat within and co-constituted specific historic discursive contexts. It is within these discursive contexts that these identifications held meaning in relation to the wider world and were invoked in relation to specific objects. To present the identifications without presenting these broader discursive contexts which they cannot exist independently of would be like analysing the ingredients of a cake without looking at the cake itself.

Consequently, by overviewing these news stories here, the subsequent Research Data Chapter in which I present the extracted identifications will be grounded in the tangible and relevant discursive contexts from which these identifications were extracted. Essentially, this chapter presents the relevant environments in which the later outlined identifications held meaning and gained salience. By presenting this environment here, I place the data outlined in the next chapter in relation to the wider world, rather than leaving it floating in a vacuum. Furthermore, by outlining the major elements of these news stories here I show the broad discussions that the British public were immersed in for the duration of my cases. This highlights a major contextual influence on the changing content of British identifications during my cases.

As such, my overview of these news stories aims at highlighting the relevant discursive or textual context in which my articulations and identifications emerge and sit. This discursive context does not consist of "realities" or historical events. Rather, it consists of visions and constructions, manifested specifically in the textual form of media reports and commentary supposedly regarding events in the real international world. My recounting of these reports is not intended in any way to represent an accurate history of what "really" happened in, say, the

Egyptian uprisings of 2013 or the refugee crisis of 2015, but simply to show how these events were reported. Additionally, for reasons of space and efficiency, I will not be describing every news story that I analysed but simply the major ones that gained prolonged coverage from a broad swathe of papers. I quantitatively justify my selection of "major" news stories in tables below.

As for the stories that I do detail, note that I am highlighting the points of focus and the themes of commentary that were overarchingly common between various groups of newspapers' takes on these events. Within these broad strokes – under which several different papers' takes on events were grouped and between which they were divided – there were of course still several smaller differences in how different events were reported. For instance, reporting in both *The Daily Mail* and *The Daily Express* would broadly warn that mass migration was likely to cause a reduction in social cohesion. As such these papers were grouped in a fundamentally different camp than say *The Herald Scotland* and *The Independent*. However, this warning would tend to appear in *The Daily Mail* via highlights of the seemingly extensive but generally unspecified "cultural and social differences"[253] between Britain and migrants' home countries, while *The Daily Express* would more often focus explicitly on the idea that migrants tended not to be Christian.[254] For reasons of space I do not cover such smaller distinctions in this chapter. Instead, through overviews of persistent general commentary and specific illustrative quotes typifying this commentary, *I highlight the major points of focus around which media discourse gathered*. This reveals the broad discussions in which the British public were immersed during my cases, while the minute details of this discourse where they relate to British character are presented in the Research Data Chapter.

Finally, a quick note on referencing. As I analysed over 1,300,000 words of newspapers articles, it is not possible to include those articles here in their raw form. As such, to make it possible to overview these articles, in Sheet Three of the Appendix I have included links to opensource documents which contain each of these articles in their original full form. Consequently, in this chapter I reference these original articles in terms of their location in Sheet Three of the Appendix. These articles are filed firstly chronologically and secondly by publication. For instance, to find an article referenced in this chapter as "11-07-2013: The Guardian" you should go to Sheet Three in the Appendix, use the link to the 2013 articles, use Ctrl F or Command F to jump to the section labelled "11-07-2013", and then within this section see the "The Guardian" sub-section, which includes all the articles published in *The Guardian* on the 11th of July 2013 which I have analysed.

2013

In this section I will detail the persistent news stories that arose during the 2013 case. During this case, which stretched from the 27th of June to the 13th of September 2013, five major stories received persistent media coverage. These were the uprisings in Egypt and the progress/failure of Arab Spring more widely, the NSA spying scandal, Britain's relationships with Russia and the EU, and the civil war and chemical weapons usage in Syria.

[253] *For referencing instructions see next paragraph*. This quote is from 17-10-2015: The Daily Mail. For other examples see 07-10-2015: The Daily Mail; 28-11-2015: The Daily Mail; 27-10-2015: The Daily Mail

[254] *For referencing instructions see next paragraph*. For examples see 05-10-2015: The Daily Express; 07-10-2015: The Daily Express; 20-11-2015: The Daily Express

Coverage Data

The following data outlines which stories were covered to what extents in 2013, hence revealing which broad news foci the British public was most exposed to in this period. In Table 4.1 below succinctly I lay out and rank the number of days and documents in which different stories were covered, while in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 I provide more detailed coverage data. These tables also include coverage data for every other story that received more than three days of coverage during the 2013 case, but which were still too infrequent to be detailed in this chapter. This quantitatively justifies why I categorised some stories as "major" (as they received persistent coverage) and others as minor (as they received infrequent coverage). These more minor stories include coverage of Iran's potential nuclear capabilities and what to do about this development, Britain's relationship with China, British tensions with Spain over the status of Gibraltar, Britain's relationship with Germany, and debates over the future of the Trident weapons system.

In Table 4.1 "Number of Documents Covered In" refers to the total amount of outlet issues in which a story was covered during the 2013 case. For instance, if a story appeared in three issues of *The Guardian*, four issues of *The Independent*, and two issues of *The Daily Mail*, the total "Number of Documents Covered In" would be nine. It is by this measure that I ranked the stories in terms of coverage.[255] In Table. 4.1 "Number of Days Covered On" refers to how many days during the 2013 case the story was covered in at least one paper. Table 4.1 also contains two red columns. The red column on the left shows the number of paper issues during the case in which a story was featured on the front page. For instance, if a story appeared on the front page of *The Guardian* two times, the front page of *The Independent* once, and the front page of *The Daily Mail* four times, it would receive a 7 in this column. Meanwhile, the red column on the right shows the number of days on which the story was featured on at least one front page.

Table 4.1 Summary of Coverage 2013

Story	Number of Documents Covered In	(On Front Page)	Number of Days Covered On	(On Front Page)
Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons	248	76	40	15
Egyptian Uprisings and Arab Democracy	197	37	37	16
Russia Relationship	132	7	32	3
EU Relationship	91	14	33	9
NSA Scandal	30	2	22	2
China Relationship	26	0	15	0
Iran Nuclear Capability	23	0	18	0
Gibraltar Tensions	15	0	4	0
Germany Relationship	9	0	7	0
Future of Trident	7	0	6	0

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide more detailed coverage data displaying the number of issues a story appeared in for each day of the 2013 case. For instance, if on the 27-07-2013 a story

[255] However, over the course of this chapter I detail these stories in a different order than their coverage ranking, so as to allow for their clearest explication. For instance, the NSA Scandal story has implications for the Russia Relationship story, so I detail the NSA Scandal story before the Russia Relationship story, even though the Russia Relationship story has a higher ranking in terms of coverage.

appeared in that day's issue of *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, and *The Daily Mail*, the story would be assigned a 3 for that date. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 also show in red the number of paper issues on a specific day in which a story featured on the front page. They also highlight in white days where the story did not appear at all.

Table 4.2 Coverage of Major Stories Each Day 2013

	Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page)									
Date	**Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons**		**Egyptian Uprisings and Arab Democracy**		**Russia Relationship**		**EU Relationship**		**NSA Scandal**	
27-06-2013	4		0		2		4		1	
29-06-2013	3		3	1	1		5	3	0	
01-07-2013	3		5	1	1		8		1	1
03-07-2013	4		7	3	5		2		5	1
05-07-2013	3		8	2	0		5		3	
07-07-2013	4		6	7	3		2	1	3	
09-07-2013	3		10	5	1		3	1	1	
11-07-2013	4	2	6	2	2		4		0	
13-07-2013	9		6		0		3		0	
15-07-2013	6		5		0		2		0	
17-07-2013	4		7		4		2		1	
19-07-2013	7		3	1	8		3		1	
21-07-2013	5		4		2		2		0	
23-07-2013	1		6		1		7		0	
25-07-2013	3	1	7		0		2		0	
27-07-2013	4		8		1		3	1	0	
29-07-2013	4		9	1	1		6		0	
31-07-2013	6		5		0		4	1	1	
02-08-2013	4		7		7		0	3	1	
04-08-2013	2		6		3		1		1	
06-08-2013	7		4		2		0		1	
08-08-2013	2		5	1	4	4	1		1	
10-08-2013	1		2	1	2		5	2	1	
12-08-2013	2	1	3		1		2		1	
14-08-2013	3		13	1	1		1		1	
16-08-2013	4		13	6	0		1	1	1	
18-08-2013	3		5	3	0		0		0	
20-08-2013	3		8	1	0		3		0	
22-08-2013	12	6	3		5		0		1	
24-08-2013	13	3	4		6		1		1	
26-08-2013	14	10	4		9		1		0	
28-08-2013	15	11	1		8		0		1	
30-08-2013	14	13	3		6		0		0	
01-09-2013	10	5	1		7		1		0	
03-09-2013	10	5	3	1	2		1		1	
05-09-2013	10	7	0		9		1		0	
07-09-2013	12	6	2		9		3		0	
09-09-2013	11	3	4		1		0		0	
11-09-2013	8	2	1		9	2	1	1	1	
13-09-2013	11	1	0		9	1	1		0	
SUM	248	76	197	37	132	7	91	14	30	2

Table 4.3 Coverage of Minor Stories Each Day 2013

	Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page)				
	China Relationship	Iran Nuclear Capability	Gibraltar Tensions	Germany Relationship	Future of Trident
27-06-2013	1	0	0	1	0
29-06-2013	0	0	0	1	0
01-07-2013	0	0	0	3	1
03-07-2013	0	0	0	1	0
05-07-2013	0	0	0	0	0
07-07-2013	2	1	0	0	0
09-07-2013	0	0	0	0	0
11-07-2013	1	0	0	0	0
13-07-2013	0	0	0	0	0
15-07-2013	0	0	0	0	1
17-07-2013	2	2	0	0	0
19-07-2013	0	0	0	0	2
21-07-2013	0	1	0	1	1
23-07-2013	0	1	0	1	1
25-07-2013	0	0	0	0	0
27-07-2013	0	1	0	0	0
29-07-2013	1	0	0	0	0
31-07-2013	0	0	0	0	0
02-08-2013	1	0	0	0	0
04-08-2013	0	0	0	0	1
06-08-2013	0	0	0	0	0
08-08-2013	0	2	0	0	0
10-08-2013	0	1	5	0	0
12-08-2013	0	0	6	0	0
14-08-2013	0	0	0	0	0
16-08-2013	0	1	1	0	0
18-08-2013	0	1	0	0	0
20-08-2013	0	0	3	1	0
22-08-2013	1	0	0	0	0
24-08-2013	2	1	0	0	0
26-08-2013	4	4	0	0	0
28-08-2013	2	1	0	0	0
30-08-2013	4	1	0	0	0
01-09-2013	2	1	0	0	0
03-09-2013	1	1	0	0	0
05-09-2013	0	1	0	0	0
07-09-2013	1	1	0	0	0
09-09-2013	0	1	0	0	0
11-09-2013	0	0	0	0	0
13-09-2013	1	0	0	0	0
SUM	26 0	23 0	15 0	9 0	7 0

The above tables show that while the Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons story was by the far the most covered in terms of appearances in different issues, being covered 248 times, both it and the Egyptian Uprisings and Arab Democracy stories received the most persistent coverage over time, with 40 and 37 days of coverage respectively. Table 4.2 shows that the Egyptian Uprisings and Arab Democracy story actually received persistently high coverage for much longer than the Syria story. However, from the 22nd of August onwards the

Syria story received such intense coverage that it overtook the Egyptian story in terms of coverage throughout the case, being covered in over twice as many issues and front pages.

Next in coverage were the Russia Relationship and EU Relationship stories. These were covered almost to the same extent, with 32 and 33 days of coverage respectively. While the Russia story appeared in more issues and the EU story featured on more front pages, both stories received roughly the same coverage over time until the last week in August when the Russia Relationship story, buoyed up by the Syria story, gained extra coverage. The NSA Scandal story was the least covered story that still made front page news. Nonetheless, it was covered persistently in the first and third quarters of the 2013 case, receiving 22 days of coverage overall and appearing in 30 issues. The more minor stories in Table 4.3 were covered far more sporadically, with only the China Relationship story and the Iran Nuclear Capability story receiving steady coverage in certain periods as a result of being buoyed up as side conversations to the Syria story.

Uprisings in Egypt and Arab Democracy

For the majority of the case the Egyptian crisis received coverage from a very broad swathe of papers from every category (tabloids, specialist magazines, local papers, national papers, and publications based outside the UK). Media attention began to focus on the situation in Egypt on the 29th of June, at which time coverage centred around mass protests in Cairo calling for President Morsi's resignation. On the 3rd of July, with reports that the Egyptian military had ousted President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government, the media focus on Egypt became intense, drawing attention from every category of British media. Coverage of the story brought to the surface several arguments and attitudes (from which relevant articulations and identifications could be extracted) regarding Britain's ability to assist Middle Eastern paths to democracy, impressions of the wider Arab Spring's potential to lead to functioning civil states, and British ideas of powerlessness in the face of a complex international environment.

From the day the military took over the government, it was rare to find a single positive or optimistic piece of discourse regarding the implications of these reported events. The overarching tone and analysis was one of worry and pessimism. Across the spectrum of newspapers, it was frequently argued that the situation was likely to deteriorate and that this was not the start of a promising new era for the Egyptian people. As early as the 5th of July Michael Burleigh's report in *The Daily Mail* stated that "Egypt faces a deeply uncertain future and possible civil war as the Brotherhood — which will not easily give up power — plans its next move."[256] On the 7th analysis in *The Economist* stated that "we regard the events of the past few days with trepidation. Mr Morsi's ouster by a combination of street power and soldiers sets a dreadful precedent for the region,"[257] and commentary in *Wales Online* declared that "democracy in Egypt has been at best suspended or at worst abandoned."[258] By the 25th of July Kim Sengupta writing in *The Independent*, one of the most hopeful observers of the Egyptian situation, described the scene in Cairo as one of "broken windows, damaged cars, lumps of

[256] 05-07-2013: The Daily Mail
[257] 07-07-2013: The Economist
[258] 07-07-2013: Wales Online

rocks, abandoned banners: a sign of just how much the vision of a democratic, pluralist post-Mubarak society had faded away."[259] Optimism for the Arab Spring's future in Egypt became increasingly rare as the summer progressed.

This commentary on the future of the Arab Spring and democracy in the Middle East was mirrored when the focus was applied to other Middle Eastern nations. Although focus on Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan (I discuss Syria below) was far more sporadic and drew less newspapers than the focus on Egypt, when discussion did turn to these nations' ability to move towards a democracy (and the international community's ability to help them on this path) the commentary was a widely similar one of dismay and pessimism. *The Economist* featured analysis that "roughly two-and-a-half years after the revolutions in the Arab world, not a single country is yet plainly on course to become a stable, peaceful democracy,"[260] while an editorial in *The Guardian* stated that "with Syria in flames, Egypt deadlocked, and Libya enfeebled, a Tunisian failure would complete the gloom casting a growing shadow over a revolution once so widely welcomed in the region and outside."[261] Reporting on Iraq was almost entirely limited to reports on setbacks to the country's path to peace, such as bombings conducted by insurgent militias.[262] It was not until very late in the 2013 case that coverage of Afghanistan started to cautiously highlight aspects of progress made there, with Thom Shanker reporting in *The New York Times* that "the enemy is now less capable, less popular and less of an existential threat to the Afghan government than in 2011. Even so, insurgents maintained influence in many rural areas that serve as platforms to attack."[263]

However, perhaps the most persistent and widespread undercurrent of the commentary on these issues was a resigned vision of international powerlessness in the face of a complex situation. Across the board, commenters produced an image of a crisis in which there were no good guys and bad guys. The Muslim Brotherhood received almost no positive coverage and no strong recommendations for their reinstatement, despite being repeatedly described as undemocratically deposed by a dangerous military.[264] Christopher Booker writing in *The Telegraph* described how "the Western world gazes baffled and powerless at the ever more tragic mess unfolding across the Middle East"[265] while reporting in *The Independent* stated that "Egypt is experiencing a crisis that is beyond the reach of any British counsel."[266] Some commenters went further and took the events as evidence that the West can never get involved in the Middle East's road to democracy. This argument featured in particular in *The Daily Mail*, where it was stated that "this is a lesson to Western leaders who continue with breathtaking

[259] 25-07-2013: The Independent
[260] 15-07-2013: The Economist
[261] 27-07-2013: The Guardian
[262] For examples see 09-07-2013: The Washington Post; 02-08-2013: The New York Times; and 12-08-2013: The Guardian
[263] 31-07-2013: The New York Times
[264] For examples, see 05-07-2013: The Daily Mail; 16-08-2013: The New York Times; 18-08-2013: The Economist
[265] 18-08-2013: The Telegraph
[266] 18-08-2013: The Independent

naivety to try to impose their version of democracy on the region…the broader message of this seismic event is that we in the West meddle at our peril in Middle Eastern regime change."[267]

As the question of international involvement faded, it was replaced by a growing focus on the most clear-cut aspect of the Egyptian crisis: the escalating violence. Tabloids in particular quickly adopted a singular focus, without broader commentary, on the deaths following the military coup. By the end of July, most major papers were following the same route. On the 9th and 17th of July in particular, mass killings of Muslim Brotherhood supporters by the Egyptian military were reported with decreasing calls for any international action in response. Instead, the reporting adopted a general tone of dismay and factual numbers, typified by reporting in *The Sun* on the 9th which stated that "at least 51 people were killed in Cairo yesterday after pro-Morsi demonstrators clashed with the Egyptian army. Armed forces said one officer was killed and 40 soldiers were injured. At a hospital nearby emergency services said more than 430 were hurt in the incident."[268] Similarly factual tones underlay reporting of the fatal military crackdown on the 17th, with Patrick Kingsley of *The Guardian* taking one of the more emotive tones in a report stating that "seven died and more than 260 were injured, dashing hopes that the city was returning to normal."[269] This type of coverage focusing on the violence playing out in Egypt and other Arab Spring countries rather than on the possibility of international action became more dominant as the summer progressed.[270]

Overall then, this story – which was one of the most widely covered in the 2013 case – reflected a strong sense of pessimism for the future of Egyptian and Arab democracy more widely and an attitude towards the Middle East as morally complex, along with a British sense of powerlessness and ultimately resignation towards the region.

NSA Spying Scandal

Coverage of the NSA spying scandal began on June 6th, 2013 with Edward Snowden's leaking of NSA documents to *The Guardian*. Although this story received significant mileage, stretching over a month for most publications, by the outset of my case limits on the 27th of June coverage of this story was beginning to wind down in several media outlets. However, it was significantly renewed on the 1st of July with the release of documents specifically detailing how the NSA had been monitoring many of America's European allies, in particular Germany. Understandably this received more coverage in European papers than American-based outlets, with broadsheets and specialist magazines covering it more extensively than tabloids. By mid-July coverage was winding down across the board, with the only major outlet continuing to cover the story into August being *Der Spiegel*. Coverage of the story housed and revealed several arguments regarding the wider US-UK relationship, including British attitudes towards

[267] For quote see 05-07-2013: The Daily Mail, for examples of argument in other publications see 16-08-2013: The Independent; 20-08-2013: The New York Times; 25-07-2013: i

[268] 09-07-2013: The Sun

[269] 17-07-2013: The Guardian

[270] For other examples see 09-07-2013: The Daily Mirror; 09-07-2013: The Independent; 09-07-2013: The Washington Post; 17-07-2013: The Wall Street Journal; 17-07-2013: The Telegraph; 29-07-2013: The Daily Mirror; 29-07-2013: The Daily Express; 26-08-2013: The New Statesman

the US as an ally and a moral leader worthy of trusting and following into international missions.

Media discourse on this issue was highly similar across the spectrum of news outlets. A major common theme in different papers' coverage was the emphasis on scale, with most commentary describing the NSA as having an overwhelming ability to monitor the globe. It was reported in *The Guardian* that the leaked documents "detail an extraordinary range of spying methods, from bugs implanted in electronic communications gear to taps into cables to the collection of transmissions with specialised antennae… the extent of this surveillance has been staggering."[271] Meanwhile Jon Swaine wrote in *The Telegraph* that "the Americans were able to access discussions in EU rooms as well as emails and internal documents on computers,"[272] and it was specified in *The Daily Mail* that "the NSA monitored 20million German phone connections and 10million internet data sets, rising to 60 million phone connections on busy days."[273] The NSA was repeatedly depicted as wielding terrifying power of a previously unknown level,[274] perhaps most evocatively described by Jurgen Tritten in *The Guardian* who argued that "if even a few of these revelations are true, our worst Orwellian nightmares have become reality."[275]

The most ubiquitous point of analysis surrounding the July 1st leaks was that they would (and, for some commenters, should) result in a deterioration of relations and trust between European nations and the US. Commentary in *Der Spiegel* emphatically stated that "revelations that America's National Security Agency spied on top European officials sent shockwaves across the Continent this weekend…The news potentially endangers trans-Atlantic relations."[276] It was also noted by Nicholas Cecil in *The Evening Standard* that "French foreign minister Laurent Fabius has also said it would be "completely unacceptable" if it is proved America spied on EU,"[277] while reporting in *The Daily Mail* simply recounted "German FURY at US snooping on half a billion calls and emails every month."[278] This analysis was often underlain with imagery of America as a bullish and aggressive nation unworthy of trust, even in papers with a normally more pro-US stance. Reporting in *The Telegraph* stated that "NSA officials were said to boast that US spies "attack the signals" of Germans as extensively as they monitor states such as China and Saudi Arabia,"[279] while German commentary that US behaviour "was reminiscent of the actions of enemies during the cold war"[280] was requoted in *The Guardian*. Meanwhile it was noted in *Der Spiegel* that "it apparently falls to the United States intelligence agencies, primarily the NSA, to confirm all the prejudices about Americans held by much of the world."[281]

[271] 01-07-2013: The Guardian
[272] 01-07-2013: The Telegraph
[273] 01-07-2013: The Daily Mail
[274] For other examples see 07-07-2013: The Economist; 09-07-2013: The New York Times; 01-07-2013: Der Spiegel
[275] 03-07-2013: The Guardian
[276] 01-07-2013: Der Spiegel
[277] 01-07-2013: The Evening Standard
[278] 01-07-2013: The Daily Mail
[279] 01-07-2013: The Telegraph
[280] 01-07-2013: The Guardian
[281] 01-07-2013: Der Spiegel

While the coverage of this story wound down more quickly than that of the Egyptian uprisings, as papers moved on to other news foci they often made the emphatic point that the NSA story was yet incomplete. It was underlined that American spying was probably set to continue and our knowledge of it was likely to barely grasp the true scale of what was going on. Marcel Rosenbach writing in *Der Spiegel* emphasised that "more than six weeks after the scandal began, the German government is still waiting for answers on what exactly the NSA is doing in – and against – Germany,"[282] while analysis in *The Guardian* stressed that "we can only speculate about the real motivation. What type of information is being extracted, and what is being done with it? Should our delegations choose to meet at secret locations in future and prepare meetings using encrypted code, because otherwise the US National Security Agency will know their every move in advance?"[283] As the summer progressed, positive commentary on the US as an international partner was uncommon. Overall then, coverage of the NSA scandal reflected a strong sense of distrust, betrayal, and fear towards America, along with a decreased willingness to see America as a moral leader.

Relationship with the EU

Although discourse around Britain's relationship with the EU was even more extensive in 2015, the debate about leaving the EU was also underway in 2013. With this debate came extensive commentary on the positives and negatives of being in the EU, along with frequent analysis of the beneficial or harmful implications the EU's activities had for Britain. Coverage of this relationship brought to the surface several arguments about the types of international leadership and independence Britain should strive for, ideas of national pride and greatness, and desires to be internationally assertive. Unlike coverage of the NSA scandal and the Egyptian uprisings, commentary on Britain's relationship with the EU was sharply divided between papers, with certain major papers overwhelming covering the EU in positive or negative ways. Consistently pro-EU papers included *The Guardian, The Independent,* and *The Huffington Post,* while consistently anti-EU papers included *The Daily Mail*, *The Sun,* and *The Daily Express,* with most other papers regularly offering both positive and negative commentary about the UK-EU relationship.

Positive coverage of the EU focused heavily on the economic benefits membership brought, along with enhanced influence for Britain as a nation and mobility for Britons as EU citizens. Analysis in *The Guardian* that "integration has brought to the EU, and hence to the UK, in most if not all observers' opinions, appreciable economic benefits,"[284] was commonplace in pro-EU papers throughout the case.[285] More mixed papers would tend to feature this type of analysis in specific instances, such as upon the release of a CBI report on the EU's economic impact on Britain. After the release of this report Christopher Hope reported in *The Telegraph* that "despite some concerns in the reports, officials…found that the economic

[282] 12-08-2013: Der Spiegel
[283] 04-08-2013: The Guardian
[284] 23-07-2013: The Guardian
[285] For other examples see 05-07-2013: The Independent; 23-07-2013: The Herald Scotland; 01-07-2013: The Huffington Post

benefits of being inside the EU were "appreciably greater than they otherwise would be".”[286] More individual-level benefits of EU membership tended to be highlighted in *The Huffington Post*, where the EU's reduction of roaming charges was described as "one piece of news from the EU that is positive and benefits the consumer…as a result it is now cheaper to text, call and use data between EU countries."[287]

Pro-EU commentary tended to place more emphasis, however, on how disastrous leaving the EU would be, with *The Independent* and *The Daily Mirror* emphasising warnings that "leaving the EU is neither a good nor a realistic economic option for this country".[288] Meanwhile statements from Japan that Britain "must stay in the union and single market, suggesting tens of thousands of jobs would be lost if [Brexit occurred]," were stressed by Harriet Alexander in *The Telegraph*,[289] and warnings that "the risk to the UK of leaving the European Union is of a rapid drift into international irrelevance" were highlighted by Nicholas Watt in *The Guardian*.[290] This type of coverage was often accompanied by a discrediting of Euroskeptics' arguments for ditching the EU in favour of alternative relationships with English-speaking countries, with Euroskeptics being referred to as "desperate," "scaremongering," and "unrealistic."[291]

Negative coverage of the EU partly consisted of concerns regarding mass immigration and its effects on Britain's economy and social cohesion, although this type of discourse came primarily from *The Daily Mail* and *The Daily Express*. As Croatia joined the EU, it was reported in *The Daily Mail* that "tens of thousands of southern European workers have been coming [to Britain] since the start of the eurozone crisis. Croatia has a population of 4.2million and overall joblessness rate of more than 20 per cent…its citizens can travel freely to Britain from today."[292] In *The Daily Express* this focus on mass immigration was often coupled with imagery of immigrant freeloaders and criminals, with Anil Dawar reporting that "crime, particularly prostitution, has rocketed in immigrant-hit areas. Waves of job and benefit seekers will be free to pour into the UK when visa restrictions on the two new EU member states end on January 1."[293]

However, negative coverage of the EU tended to focus more on EU "bloatedness" than mass immigration in 2013. *The Spectator* published commentary on the EU's European External Action Service as being unnecessarily grandiose, stating that "it does not need 140 embassies and 500 limousines. They exist for the same reason that the EU has an anthem, a currency and a flag, and wants an army. It is a self-aggrandising EU vanity project which should be dismantled."[294] Meanwhile Macer Hall stated in *The Daily Express* that the EEAS figures "revealed the EU's bloated ambitions. They showed unelected Labour peer Baroness Ashton

[286] For quote see 23-07-2013: The Telegraph, for other examples see 07-07-2013: The Daily Mirror; 15-07-2013: The New York Times; 10-08-2013: The Times
[287] 01-07-2013: The Huffington Post
[288] 01-07-2013: The Independent; 01-07-2013: The Daily Mirror
[289] 04-08-2013: The Telegraph
[290] 23-07-2013: The Guardian
[291] See 10-08-2013: The Times; 10-08-2013: The Guardian; 23-07-2013: The Huffington Post
[292] 01-07-2013: The Daily Mail
[293] 17-07-2013: The Daily Express
[294] 19-07-2013: The Spectator

now employs more than 3,000 European pen-pushers in over 120 countries – all paid for by taxpayers."[295]

EU overreach was also a persistent concern of Euroskeptic commentary, which frequently stated that the EU was involving itself in British affairs and harmfully expanding bureaucracy in the process. Analysis in *The Evening Standard* of proposals for new EU capital regulations described the "new capital rules from Brussels as one of the biggest threats to UK jobs and growth. Chief executive Tidjane Thiam warned that the Solvency II guidelines could prevent companies such as Prudential investing in infrastructure and property if they are too onerous".[296] Meanwhile, in terms that were commonplace within negative tabloid coverage of the EU, an EU proposal for automatic brakes to be applied to cars travelling over the speed limit was described by Glen Owen in *The Daily Mail* as "draconian new road safety measures being drawn up by officials in Brussels…[meaning] vehicles already on the road could even be sent back to garages to be fitted with the 'Big Brother' technology."[297]

Overall then, this imagery of bloatedness and overreach conjured an image of the EU – on the Euroskeptic side of things – as an overlarge meddler undermining Britain's international prowess, which ultimately reflected British senses of decreasing influence along with desires to regain relevance and independence. Meanwhile, Europhile reporting displayed ideas that the EU was beneficial for Britain and that leaving it would be a disaster, reflecting British senses of being strong and relevant only through activity in conjunction with – rather than outside of – the biggest players in the international sphere.

Relationship with Russia

Britain's relationship with Russia was initially described as being one of tension and wariness but eventually moved to descriptions of outright hostility. This UK-Russia relationship was frequently subsumed under the grander "Western" relationship with Russia, with "Russia" often implicitly synonymised with Putin. At the start of the 2013 case discussions of this relationship were restricted to broadsheet newspapers and gained disproportionate coverage in American papers, and it never received as extensive coverage as the specific US-Russia relationship. However, the British/Western relationship with Russia gained increasing attention in late August before eventually becoming noted in most tabloids and local British papers in early September. Coverage of the story brought to the surface several attitudes regarding Britain's image of its own influence and normative place on the international stage.

Although rarely described as anything more positive than "productive" or "cooperative", the first major downturn in reporting of Western relationships with Russia came in late July with the trial of Alexei Navalny, a Russian opposition leader sentenced to prison in what was widely described as an attempt to smother democratic opposition to Putin.[298] Reporting on the trial became a platform on which to highlight Russia's normative distance from "Western models of the rule of law", with reporting in *The Herald Scotland* stating that "the European Union expressed concern over the conviction, saying it raised questions about

[295] 09-07-2013: The Daily Express
[296] 12-08-2013: The Evening Standard
[297] For quote see 01-09-2013: The Daily Mail, for other examples see 16-08-2013: The Sun; 21-07-2013: The Daily Mail; 29-07-2013: The Daily Express
[298] For examples see 19-07-2013: i; 21-07-2013: The Washington Post; 19-07-2013: The Guardian

the rule of law in Russia and Putin's treatment of opponents."[299] Meanwhile analysis in *Der Spiegel* argued that "the West should not turn away from this tragic development. This is deliberate abuse of democratic institutions with a goal that differs little from the Soviet leaders of the Communist Party – to stay in power for life,"[300] while Shaun Walker commented in *The Independent* that the jailing "raised serious questions about Russian law."[301]

A further downturn in reported relations, more to do with interactional rather than normative tensions, came in early August when Edward Snowden was granted temporary asylum in Russia. In what was typical of wider analysis that Russia was set to be an increasingly antagonistic nation, Alec Luhn reported in *The Guardian* that "with Russian relations now at a cold war-style low, Snowden slipped out of Sheremetyevo airport yesterday afternoon… Obama's already floundering attempts to "reset", or improve, relations with Moscow are in effect over"[302]. The incident brought to the surface significantly harsher implicit and explicit characterisations of Russia even from papers sympathetic to Snowden. Rupert Cornwell's analysis in *The Independent* stated that "Mr Snowden's moral standing would be greater had he stayed to face the consequences, instead of taking refuge in a country noted for corruption, autocracy and a disdain for human rights and the rule of law."[303] Reporting in *The Daily Mail* outlined that "Edward Snowden was granted refugee status in Russia yesterday amid Western concerns he is now in the embrace of Moscow's secret services."[304]

The more overtly hostile characterisations of the relationship with Russia did not fully emerge, however, until the reports of chemical weapons usage in Syria in late August (detailed in the section below). As Western nations considered taking action in Syria, Russia was frequently characterised as an obstructive force that would back Assad at the expense of international cooperation and Syrian peace. Philip Rucker reported in *The Washington Post* that the West faced "fresh resistance from Russia, Syria's stalwart patron,"[305] and commentary in specialist publications frequently decried Putin's actions in even stronger terms, with *The Economist* noting Russia's "threats to deliver an advanced air-defence system to Syria that would gravely complicate future Western or Israeli air strikes or no-fly zones over the country."[306] The discussion of Russian relations only continued to deteriorate in tone, with the comment "Britain is a small island who nobody listens to except the Russian oligarchs who bought up Chelsea" being attributed to a Putin spokesperson on the 7th of September right at the end of my case limits. The comment was reported in almost every British paper, including locals and tabloids. *The Sun*, *The Times*, and *The Daily Mirror* went on to report Tory MP Henry Smith's response to the comment on Twitter, in which the MP declared that "Putin really is a tosser."[307]

[299] 19-07-2013: The Herald Scotland
[300] 19-07-2013: Der Spiegel
[301] 19-07-2013: The Independent
[302] 02-08-2013: The Guardian
[303] 04-08-2013: The Independent
[304] 02-08-2013: The Daily Mail
[305] 05-09-2013: The Washington Post
[306] For quote see 10-08-2013: The Economist, for other examples see 05-09-2013: Der Spiegel; 01-09-2013: The New Statesman; 30-08-2013: The Spectator
[307] 07-09-2013: The Sun; 07-09-2013: The Times; 07-09-2013: The Daily Mirror

Overall then, the Russia Relationship story reflected an increasing hostility between Britain and Russia as the 2013 case developed, along with a sense of British normative superiority. This sense of normative superiority was not accompanied by a sense of material superiority, and indeed the opposition of Russia to British and Western activities and hopes in the Middle East was reported with an unease that reflected an underlying British sense that its international opponents were not trivial or easily dealt with.

Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons Usage

Reports of a chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, Syria on the 21st of August brought the prospect of British participation in a US-led strike against the Assad regime. Although the entirety of the British media turned its attention to the situation in Syria after the Ghouta attack, Syria was also persistently the focus of a broad spectrum of publications in July. Most tabloids and local papers tended to focus on the deteriorating state of the country and the plight of Syrian civilians, while broadsheets and specialist publications additionally covered the broader regional and international implications of the civil war and discussed its place within the Arab Spring. As with Egypt, before the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta there was little discussion of Britain getting involved in the conflict beyond humanitarian measures (and a short debate about arming Syrian rebels), and the West's influence in Syria was generally depicted as very low. Coverage of this story highlighted several arguments and attitudes regarding Britain's influence internationally and British citizens' desires to assert themselves more directly on the international stage, along with Britain's sense of commitment to different international problems and its relationship with different international actors including Russia, the US, and groups in Syria.

Before the chemical weapons attack the overarching focus of coverage of the civil war concentrated on the plight of Syrian civilians, the deterioration of the overall situation, and the seeming collapse of the Arab Spring. Several papers regularly summarised (and emphasised the tragedy within) UN reports on the conditions inside Syria. The imagery in this reporting was usually quite provocative and the language around it emotive, with a report in *The Belfast Telegraph* outlining that a "UN envoy has warned that Syria's devastating civil war, now in its third year, will force a generation of children to grow up illiterate and filled with hate,"[308] and the *i* reporting UN comments that "both sides in the Syrian conflict…continue to commit grave violations against children."[309] The UN's analysis of the Syrian situation "as the worst humanitarian crisis since Rwanda" was reported across the spectrum of media outlets. Emphasis was always on deterioration and the seeming impossibility of improvement. As late into the case as September the statement from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees that "we are witnessing a conflict in constant escalation. We have to be prepared for things to get much worse before, eventually, they start to get better"[310] was reported in *The New York Times*. Meanwhile, a report in the *i* in mid-July stating that "confrontations between Western-backed

[308] 19-07-2013: The Belfast Telegraph
[309] 19-07-2013: i
[310] 03-09-2013: The New York Times

groups and Islamic fundamentalist fighters threaten to spiral out of control"[311] was mirrored in several broadsheet and specialist publications.[312]

The Syrian situation was also frequently mentioned in the same breath as Egypt, with the two countries being compared in terms of a tragic and deteriorating loss of the promise of the Arab Spring.[313] This focus was often accompanied by bloody imagery in both broadsheets and tabloids, with analysis in *The Daily Express* stating that "those who reacted with optimism and even joy to the onset of the so-called "Arab Spring" more than two years ago have plenty of cause to reconsider. Not only is Egypt turning into a bloodbath but there has been an even greater death toll in Syria"[314] and Christopher Booker noting in *The Telegraph* that "the wishful-thinking euphoria that greeted the "Arab Spring" two years ago seems a million miles away as Egypt plunges into bloody chaos and an even greater catastrophe continues to engulf Syria."[315] Additionally, in line with the coverage of Egyptian events was the widely adopted focus on Britain and the West as powerless to improve the Syrian situation. Syria was regularly described as not just an overcomplex quagmire but also an increasingly complicating scenario in which Britain could not afford to get stuck. This stemmed primarily from two main lines of analysis, firstly that Assad was too secure to be removed from office through anything other than full Western military involvement, and secondly that the groups opposing Assad were not clear-cut reliable allies.

Publications broadly at odds on other issues were notably in agreement on the ability of Assad to maintain his power for a considerable period, with Tim Shipman reporting in *The Daily Mail* that "defence chiefs told the Prime Minister that sending small arms or ground to air missiles is 'hardly worth it' since it would make little difference to the outcome of the conflict. Even options like a no-fly zone would require air attacks on Syrian defences lasting weeks or even months."[316] It was also stated in *The Huffington Post* that "introducing a no-fly zone over Syria, could mire Britain in a conflict for months because of the strength of the regime's air defences."[317] The role of Russia in bolstering Assad's position was a frequent theme, with Patrick Wintour in *The Guardian* emphasising that "Cameron has come to realise that Russia is simply not going to abandon Assad."[318] British and Western diplomatic efforts to improve the Syrian situation were described in similarly pessimistic terms or at most a very cautious acknowledgement of small pieces of diplomatic progress. As Assad's military position strengthened, reports such as Nicholas Cecil's in *The Evening Standard*, which noted that "Britain and America have sought to put pressure on Assad and the rebels to join peace talks in Geneva. But diplomatic sources said the likelihood of this happening next month was now ebbing away," became increasingly typical.[319]

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[311] 13-07-2013: i

[312] For examples see 08-08-2013: The Independent; 09-09-2013: The Daily Mail; 15-07-2013: The Economist

[313] For examples see 01-09-2013: The Independent; 18-08-2013: The Telegraph; 26-08-2013: The Daily Mail

[314] 16-08-2013: The Daily Express

[315] 18-08-2013: The Telegraph

[316] 15-07-2013: The Daily Mail

[317] 15-07-2013: The Huffington Post

[318] 07-09-2013: The Guardian

[319] For quote see 15-07-2013: The Evening Standard, for other examples see 06-08-2013: The Telegraph; 19-07-2013: The Washington Post; 26-08-2013: The Daily Record

The character and loyalties of the Syrian rebels were persistently questioned by the international media, with few publications (the main exception being *The Huffington Post*) featuring arguments that they were trustworthy or reliable allies. Far more frequently they were depicted as an increasingly fractious group that contained significant jihadi elements perpetrating acts as unsupportable as those of the Assad regime. By mid-July reports such as Ruth Sherlock's in *The Telegraph* noting that "Syria's rebel movement descended into its own conflict yesterday after a faction linked to al-Qaeda was accused of assassinating a senior commander in the Free Syrian Army"[320] became increasingly common. On the 15th of July analysis in *The Economist* stated that "the fighting opposition inside Syria is growing ever more fractious. Two rebels were reported to have been beheaded recently…after they clashed with fighters from a rival group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham ("Greater Syria" in Arabic), which is tied to al-Qaeda."[321] In light of the unclear nature of the rebels' unity and ideological aims, questions of whether or not Western involvement should even seek to topple Assad became more frequent, rendering any moral certainty on the situation increasingly rare. By mid-August analysis such as Loveday Morris' assessment in *The Washington Post* that "with al-Qaeda-linked foreign fighters playing an increasingly prominent role in challenging government forces...if the regime falls today, it is likely to bring only more chaos and bloodshed,"[322] became commonplace. Even *The Huffington Post* (long the most stalwart proponent for aiding the rebels) featured commentary stating that "if the regime were to fall, chemical weapons could get into the hands of Al Qaeda."[323] None of this coverage was ever complimented by positive commentary of Assad, who was at best described as better than jihadists.

Once reports emerged that chemical weapons had been used in Ghouta on the 21st of August the media became dominated by coverage of the situation in Syria and Britain's possible response. A strong proportion of the coverage emphasised the clearest aspect of the incident, namely the deaths of innocent civilians, with almost every paper highlighting the high number of fatalities (estimates ranged from 200 to over 1000 initially) and some describing in rather gruesome detail the condition in which bodies of entire families were found. However, in contrast to universal reporting on the horrific nature of the attack, commentary on how to respond to this attack was significantly divided.

Arguments in favour of Britain acting against Assad through an aerial strike focused on Britain's moral duty to stand by Syrian civilians and to deter the dangerous proliferation of chemical weapons usage. While descriptions of the chemical weapons attack as "a crime against humanity" appeared in publications as diverse as *The New Statesman*, *The Daily Record*, and *The Daily Mirror*,[324] and analysis in *The Economist* argued that "air strikes might slow or halt Syrian massacres,"[325] the moral argument was typified in *The Scotsman*, where it

[320] For quote see 13-07-2013: The Telegraph, for other examples see 11-07-2013: The Guardian; 13-07-2013: The Times; 15-07-2013: The Huffington Post
[321] 15-07-2013: The Economist
[322] 18-08-2013: The Washington Post
[323] For quote see 28-08-2013: The Huffington Post, for other examples see 01-09-2013: The New Statesman; 07-09-2013: The Sun; 09-09-2013: The Financial Times
[324] 01-09-2013: The New Statesman; 22-08-2013: The Daily Mirror; 01-09-2013: The Daily Record
[325] 24-08-2013: The Economist

was asked "can the UK, still a major global power, stand by while innocent civilians die? Can we pass by on the other side of the international street, turning our head away and pretending not to see? The honest answer is that we cannot, and if that means the UK and her allies moving towards intervention short of "boots on the ground" in order to save lives, then this is an option we should contemplate."[326]

Alongside the moral argument was analysis arguing that allowing the use of chemical weapons to go unpunished would set a dangerous international precedent. Rachel Sylvester writing in *The Times* argued that "if red lines are set up and then crossed by a dictator, with no consequences, then despots all over the world will take that as encouragement to tweak the tail of the West,"[327] while commentary in *The Wall Street Journal* argued that "the use of these weapons was a threat to international peace and security."[328] The danger of allowing flagrant breaches of international law go unpunished was also frequently invoked, with arguments in *The Telegraph* stating that "as use of chemical weapons violates international law, thereby undermining the authority of the UN…the strategic risks of doing nothing are horribly clear,"[329] and commentary in *The New Statesman* describing aerial strikes as a means of sending the message to Assad "that the use of chemical weapons to kill hundreds of people was not consequence-free."[330]

Commentary opposing participation in the US-led action followed the same focus as before the Ghouta attacks, emphasising the complicated nature of the Syrian problem and the difficulty of the UK getting out if it got involved. Commentary in *The Financial Times* described "unease over the prospect of Britain getting dragged into an open-ended conflict,"[331] while it was emphasised by Oliver Wright in *The Independent* that "any strike will inevitably drag the West further into the Syrian conflict,"[332] and *The Guardian* published opinion that Cameron needed to give far stronger assurances that involvement in Syria would be "foreseeably finite."[333] Almost every anti-intervention argument conjured the shadow of Iraq, with analysis in *The Huffington Post* stating "now, before the inspectors have had time to complete their work and report, we are told it is to be a cruise missile attack by the end of the week. This is horribly reminiscent of the rush to war in Iraq before Hans Blix could complete his work"[334] being echoed in several other publications.[335] Fears that Britain would suffer a terrorist backlash if it got involved were also voiced, with *The Daily Mirror* featuring a warning that "we will need to guard against terror attacks in retaliation for a strike on Syria"[336] and analysis in *The Independent* voicing "fears that [a strike]…could lead to retaliation or terrorist attacks."[337] There was even some debate about whether or not it was Assad, a rogue

[326] 24-08-2013: The Scotsman
[327] 03-09-2013: The Times
[328] 28-08-2013: The Wall Street Journal
[329] 26-08-2013: The Telegraph
[330] 11-09-2013: The New Statesman
[331] 26-08-2013: The Financial Times
[332] 26-08-2013: The Independent
[333] 28-08-2013: The Guardian
[334] 28-08-2013: The Huffington Post
[335] For other examples see 26-08-2013: The Daily Mail; 28-08-2013: The Times; 28-08-2013: The Telegraph
[336] 26-08-2013: The Daily Mirror
[337] 26-08-2013: The Independent

commander, or the rebels themselves who unleashed the chemical weapons, although even skeptics about Assad's culpability generally stated that Assad was the most likely, although not the proven, author of the attacks.[338]

As a whole, however, coverage focusing on Syria generally lacked or intentionally avoided clear analysis of the situation and what to do about it, with doubt and complexity underlying far more of the coverage than clarity and purpose. This was perhaps best typified by Daniel Finkelstein's analysis, published in *The Times*, which stated "while the outcome of intervention in Syria is impossible to predict, so is the outcome of not acting. [In Syria] we did nothing and the situation got worse. And the worse the situation got, the more we used it as an excuse to do nothing. All this if we do nothing. But what reason is there to believe that acting might be any better? Is there anything we can do that has any point to it at all? Or are we being urged to act just for show?"[339] Such back and forth questioning focusing on the unknown and unpredictable implications of intervention became increasingly commonplace in the aftermath of the Ghouta attacks.[340]

Overall then, the Syria story reflected a British sense of pessimism for the future of Syria as a democracy or even as a fundamentally stable country, in line with reporting on Egypt. Reporting reflected a British sense of powerlessness in the face of Assad and Russia's strength and the moral complexity of the Syrian landscape (including the blurring lines between legitimate rebels and jihadists). The divided calls for and against international action in response to chemical weapons usage largely reflected an overarching sense of British hesitancy and uncertainty, torn between desires to defend international peace and civilians abroad and a fear of getting caught in a prolonged and difficult conflict.

Overall then, the most persistent media stories of the 2013 case centred around the Middle East, Russia, the EU, and the US. Coverage of these events brought to the surface a several arguments and attitudes regarding Britain's place on the international stage, including its normative goals, its perceived level of influence, its desire/hesitation to be internationally assertive, and its imagery of its international relationships. A sense of powerlessness in the face of complexity underlay much of the coverage of Middle Eastern developments, along with a dismay at the seeming collapse of the Arab Spring and the inability to form morally certain arguments regarding who was at fault and what to do about it. Coverage of the NSA spying scandal was more straightforward and outraged, although similarly lacking in any clear sense of countermeasure. While focus on Russia was uniformly and increasingly negative (reflecting a British sense of moral though not material superiority), commentary on the EU was far more divisive. As I will now detail, some, but not all, of these themes carried over to the 2015 case.

[338] For examples see 22-08-2013: The Independent; 26-08-2013: The Daily Mirror; 30-08-2013: i; 30-08-2013: The Huffington Post

[339] 28-08-2013: The Times

[340] For other examples see 21-07-2013: The New York Times; 22-08-2013: The Telegraph; 24-08-2013: The Herald Scotland; 25-07-2013: The Guardian

2015

During the 2015 case, which stretched from the 1st of October to the 18th of December 2015, three major stories received persistent media coverage. These were the refugee crisis, the EU membership negotiations and impending EU referendum, and the Syrian civil war.

Coverage Data

The following data outlines which stories were covered to what extents in 2015, hence revealing which broad news foci the British public was most exposed to in this period. In Table 4.4 below I succinctly lay out and rank the number of days and documents in which these stories were covered, while in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 I provide more detailed coverage data. The tables are organised in the same manner as the previous coverage tables for 2013. As the Syrian Civil War story at times largely focused on ISIS and Russia's actions in Syria I have separately highlighted the coverage of these facets of the Syria story. The below tables also include coverage data for every other story that received more than three days of coverage during the 2015 case, but which were still too infrequent to be detailed in this chapter. These more minor stories include coverage of Britain's relationship with Germany, Turkey's evolving status as a tense ally, Britain's relationship with Iran, the future of the Trident weapon system, and China's status as an international partner.

Table 4.4 Summary of Coverage 2015

Story	Number of Documents Covered In	(On Front Page)	Number of Days Covered On	(On Front Page)
Syrian Civil War	284	103	40	24
Syrian Civil War and Russia	184	15	40	4
Syrian Civil War and ISIS	163	92	36	22
Syrian Civil War Otherwise	97	5	36	4
Refugee Crisis	239	27	40	18
EU Relationship	236	46	39	26
Germany Relationship	39	6	14	3
Turkey As An Ally	24	0	18	0
Future of Trident	21	11	6	5
China Relationship	20	11	12	4
Iran Relationship	15	0	10	0

Table 4.5 Coverage of Major Stories Each Day 2015

	Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page)											
	Syrian Civil War								Refugee Crisis		EU Relationship	
Date	Syrian Civil War In Any Form		Syrian Civil War and Russia		Syrian Civil War and ISIS		Syrian Civil War Otherwise					
01-10-2015	13	6	13	6	4	2	3	1	11	1	6	1
03-10-2015	10		9		1		4		7		4	2
05-10-2015	9	1	9		3	1	3	1	9		10	1
07-10-2015	8		7		6		3		12		4	4
09-10-2015	12		12		0		2		10		9	3
11-10-2015	11	1	9		2		8	1	7		6	2
13-10-2015	3	1	3	1	0		2		4		7	1
15-10-2015	8	1	6		1	1	4		6		6	2
17-10-2015	2		2		1		1		7	2	10	2
19-10-2015	5		5		0		3		9	2	7	1
21-10-2015	6		5		1		4		5		6	
23-10-2015	3	2	3		1	2	1		5	1	7	
25-10-2015	4		4		1		1		4		4	
27-10-2015	6		6		1		0		8		9	1
29-10-2015	4	1	3		0		2		8		8	
31-10-2015	7	2	7		2	1	6	2	7	1	4	
02-11-2015	5	2	4		1	2	3		5		5	2
04-11-2015	5	3	5		1	3	2		8		9	1
06-11-2015	5	2	5		2	2	0		9		6	
08-11-2015	5		4		3		1		2	1	3	1
10-11-2015	2		1		1		1		9		9	4
12-11-2015	3		2		4		1		6	2	7	2
14-11-2015	8	9	4		11	9	1		7	1	5	1
16-11-2015	13	12	8		12	12	1		8	3	2	1
18-11-2015	14	9	10	4	9	9	4		3	3	5	
20-11-2015	13	11	2		13	11	2		8	1	5	1
22-11-2015	7	4	4		7	4	0		7	1	5	
24-11-2015	9	4	5		8	4	0		4	1	2	2
26-11-2015	9	4	4	4	8	1	5		2		4	
28-11-2015	6	4	3		4	4	2		3		0	
30-11-2015	9	6	1		7	6	4		4		5	
02-12-2015	11	8	3		12	8	8		1	1	2	
04-12-2015	8	7	3		11	7	4		2	1	2	2
06-12-2015	4		1		4		1		5	1	6	
08-12-2015	3	2	2		3	2	1		2		6	
10-12-2015	4		3		3		2		3	2	4	2
12-12-2015	7		4		5		2		5		4	1
14-12-2015	6		1		5		1		4		7	1
16-12-2015	4	1	1		4	1	2		5		7	1
18-12-2015	3		1		1		2		8	2	9	4
SUM	274	103	184	15	163	92	97	5	239	27	226	46

Table 4.6 Coverage of Minor Stories Each Day 2015

	Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page)				
	Germany Relationship	Turkey As An Ally	Future of Trident	China Relationship	Iran Relationship
01-10-2015	0	0	4 4	0	0
03-10-2015	0	0	1	0	0
05-10-2015	0	1	0	0	0
07-10-2015	0	1	2	0	0
09-10-2015	1	0	0	0	0
11-10-2015	1	0	0	0	0
13-10-2015	1	0	0	0	0
15-10-2015	2	0	0	2 2	2
17-10-2015	6	5	0	2	1
19-10-2015	3	3	0	3 3	1
21-10-2015	1	0	0	6 3	0
23-10-2015	1	0	0	5 3	1
25-10-2015	0	0	0	1	0
27-10-2015	2	0	0	0	1
29-10-2015	2	1	0	0	1
31-10-2015	0	1	1 1	0	2
02-11-2015	0	1	3 3	0	0
04-11-2015	3	0	2 2	0	1
06-11-2015	1	0	2	1	1
08-11-2015	1	0	0	0	1
10-11-2015	0	0	1	0	0
12-11-2015	1	1	1 1	0	0
14-11-2015	2	1	0	0	0
16-11-2015	0	1	0	0	0
18-11-2015	0	0	0	0	2
20-11-2015	0	2	1	0	0
22-11-2015	0	0	0	0	0
24-11-2015	0	0	2	0	0
26-11-2015	1	0	0	0	0
28-11-2015	0	0	1	0	0
30-11-2015	2	3	0	0	0
02-12-2015	0	0	0	0	0
04-12-2015	2 4	0	0	0	0
06-12-2015	2	0	0	0	0
08-12-2015	1	0	0	0	0
10-12-2015	1 1	1	0	0	0
12-12-2015	1	0	0	0	1
14-12-2015	0	0	0	0	0
16-12-2015	0	2	0	0	0
18-12-2015	1 1	0	0	0	0
SUM	39 6	24 0	21 11	20 11	15 0

One thing that immediately stands out is how much more coverage of issues reflecting Britain's place on the international stage there was in 2015 compared to 2013. The top three stories of 2015 were covered every single day (with the exception of 28-11-2015) and each of them was covered in over 200 issues, while in 2013 only one story gained such coverage. Front

pages were also dedicated to such issues significantly more than in 2013, with a total of 204 front page features in 2015 compared to 136 in 2013.

The most covered story of 2015 was the Syrian Civil War, being covered in 274 issues and appearing on the front page 103 times. The story received coverage at almost every stage of the case before garnering immense attention in the wake of the Bataclan attacks in Paris on the night of the 13th of November, after which point it was covered in the majority of newspaper issues every day for almost three weeks. The story was broad enough to include both coverage of ISIS and Russia's actions in Syria, with Russia initially gaining more coverage than ISIS as a result of Russia's unexpected bombing campaign in Syria in early October. The next most covered stories were the Refugee Crisis and Britain's relationship with the EU. Both stories were covered to a similar extent, appearing in 239 and 226 issues respectively, although the EU Relationship story was front page news almost twice as often as the refugee crisis. Unlike the Syrian Civil War story, which fluctuated in coverage intensity, both these stories were covered steadily and persistently, appearing in 4-8 issues almost every day (although the Refugee Crisis story was covered slightly more than this in early October).

The more minor stories managed to make front page news more often than in 2013 but were still covered rather sporadically. The exception to this was coverage of Britain's relationship with Germany, which received steadier if still low coverage. However, although technically different than coverage of Britain's relationship with the EU, the Germany Relationship story was almost always a subset of the EU Relationship story, with Germany being described almost always as an inhibitor or a facilitator of Britain's ongoing negotiations with the EU. Papers' coverage of the Britain-Germany relationship consistently mirrored their coverage of the Britain-EU relationship (which is described below), and the former was never discussed separately to the latter.

The Refugee Crisis

Coverage of the refugee crisis consistently drew attention from across the spectrum of news media from the first to the last day of the 2015 case. The story brought to the surface several arguments about Britain's international duties and historic debts to the Middle East, along with British attitudes towards international institutions and the ongoing Syrian crisis. It was a particularly divisive news story, with different publications treating the issue with notable fervour. Papers diverged sharply on how the refugees should be received, with *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *The Metro*, and *The Huffington Post* being among the more major papers routinely advocating for a more welcoming response to the refugees while *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Express*, and *The Sun* consistently took the opposite stance (with most other large papers publishing mixed commentary). Indeed, although I title it here as the "refugee" crisis, several publications even disagreed on whether the individuals arriving in Europe were refugees in need of asylum or simply "economic migrants."

Despite the broad divisions in how this story was covered, all papers were uniformly united on, and persistently emphasised, one core aspect of the crisis: the scale of human movement towards and through Europe. In October several publications published figures released by the UN on the crisis, which were summarised in *The Metro* as stating that "some 648,195 migrants have sought refuge in the EU, with 110,000 doing so in August alone. The

record influx…is 20,000 greater than last year and almost treble that of 2008."[341] Across the case, seemingly staggering numbers were frequently reported in publications from *The Daily Express* to *The Guardian* (the two papers which published the least/most welcoming attitudes towards refugees respectively). It was noted in the former paper that "refugees are arriving at a rate of more than 3,500 a day. The number of claims was double those recorded in August last year"[342] while reporting in the latter stated that "more than 400,000 people have poured into [Europe] this year."[343] Though the implications of these numbers were debated throughout the case, at every point the broad spectrum of papers depicted the scale of the crisis as monumental.[344]

For the camp arguing that Britain and Europe should accommodate these refugees, this scale was usually described alongside a sense of sympathy for the individuals making a long, arduous, and often fatal journey to Europe from various parts of the world (usually Syria, but also Afghanistan and the horn of Africa). This sense of sympathy also often materialised in newspapers that regularly published anti-accommodation arguments, with Louisa Loveluck describing in *The Telegraph* how "the approach of winter brings further misery and danger to thousands trudging through the western Balkans"[345] and reports in *The Sun* stating that "a wrecked pleasure boat lies on rocks after capsizing in high seas yesterday, killing 11 migrants including six kids. Lifeguards found ten bodies in the cabin and a young girl was washed up on a beach."[346]

More often, this imagery accompanied commentary extolling a moral argument that Britain had a duty to welcome and shelter these refugees, with a common refrain in *The Guardian* arguing that "we owe them much more than what has been petitioned for. There is a lot more the UK could and should be doing."[347] Arguments regarding "liberal values" also frequently underpinned broader pro-accommodation reporting, such as analysis in *The Economist* stating that "the use of a strong external border to shut out refugees would gravely undermine liberal values without making Europeans any safer."[348] This type of commentary was also regularly though not consistently complimented by an emphasis that Britain had a particular duty to welcome these refugees as the catastrophes forcing them from their homes were partly the result of British actions, with analysis in *The Huffington Post* asserting that "if refugees continue to come to Europe because of our actions abroad, then we have a moral obligation to support them as best we can, including an increase in the number we take into the UK."[349]

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[341] 01-10-2015: The Metro
[342] 01-10-2015: The Daily Express
[343] 17-10-2015: The Guardian
[344] For examples see 05-10-2015: The Financial Times; 06-11-2015: i; 11-10-2015: The Evening Standard; 17-10-2015: The Economist; 17-10-2015: The Telegraph; 18-12-2015: The Guardian
[345] 02-11-2015: The Telegraph
[346] 02-11-2015: The Sun
[347] For quote see 19-10-2015: The Guardian, for other examples see 09-10-2015: The Guardian; 27-10-2015: The Guardian; 08-11-2015: The Guardian
[348] For quote see 22-11-2015: The Economist, for other examples see 21-10-2015: The Telegraph; 04-11-2015: The New York Times; 04-12-2015: The Huffington Post
[349] For quote see 04-12-2015: The Huffington Post, for other examples see 26-11-2015: The New Statesman; 22-11-2015: The Economist; 04-11-2015: The New York Times

Although less frequent than the focus on a moral duty to accommodate refugees, pro-accommodation arguments regularly stressed that Britain and Europe were capable of handling the influx. It was emphasised by Zoe Williams in *The Guardian* that "there is no shortage of space on this island,"[350] while it was noted in *The New York Times* that "the total [influx of refugees] would increase the European Union's population by 0.4 percent at most."[351] Aside from simply being manageable, the refugee influx was sometimes described as economically beneficial for Britain, with it being stressed in *The Huffington Post* that "those coming from Syria are potential professional workers desperately needed to sustain Europe and its aging population"[352] and *The Daily Star* publishing analysis that "while the refugee crisis has caused chaos for European governments…the new arrivals could benefit economies within a few years."[353]

For those on the other side of the debate, the scale of the refugee crisis was usually depicted as a core reason for why refugees needed to be turned away. One of the most common themes amongst such commentary was that Britain simply could not cope with the amount of people that wanted entry to the country. While this argument was usually made within papers that were outright hostile to refugees, it also frequently appeared in papers offering more mixed commentary. A typical refrain from mixed papers, taken here from *The Telegraph*, was "that such a large number of incomers will have a massive impact on social cohesion and economic infrastructure."[354] Much focus was placed on the experience of Germany, the main EU receiver of refugees, with Jeevan Vasagar describing in *The Financial Times* "chaotic scenes outside Berlin's State Office for Health and Social Affairs [which] have proved humiliating…after months in which its staff have struggled to cope."[355] On the more hostile side of things, it was more directly argued in *The Daily Express* that other countries should "shoulder the burden of feeding, housing and educating these individuals and families many of whom are either too old or too young to work and will simply be a drain on public services."[356] *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Express*, and *The Sun* frequently included analysis arguing many of these individuals were not refugees but rather economic migrants.[357] This was often accompanied by an explicit rejection of any British duty to help these individuals, with opinion in *The Sun* stating that "when someone comes to this country, what should matter is what is good for US and not simply what is good for THEM…our country does not simply exist to give the rest of the world a better life."[358]

Aside from the focus on the difficulty of coping with refugees on this scale, one of the most common themes on this side of the debate was an association of the refugee influx with

[350] 04-11-2015: The Guardian
[351] For quote see 06-11-2015: The New York Times, for other examples see 02-11-2015: The Huffington Post; 05-10-2015: The Herald Scotland; 24-11-2015: The Guardian
[352] 27-10-2015: The Huffington Post
[353] 06-11-2015: The Daily Star
[354] 16-11-2015: The Telegraph
[355] For quote see 12-12-2015: The Financial Times, for other examples see 03-10-2015: The Wall Street Journal; 08-12-2015: The Daily Mail; 14-11-2015: The Telegraph
[356] For quote see 05-10-2015: The Daily Express, for other examples see 04-11-2015: The Daily Mail; 11-10-2015: The Financial Times; 23-10-2015: The Sun
[357] For examples see 13-10-2015: The Daily Express; 17-10-2015: The Daily Mail; 21-10-2015: The Daily Mail; 23-10-2015: The Sun; 23-10-2015: The Daily Express
[358] 11-10-2015: The Sun

anti-social behaviour, crime, and, in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks in Paris (detailed below), terrorism. Early in the 2015 case *The Telegraph*, *The Sun*, and *The Metro* featured reports that "three Libyan soldiers convicted of sexual assaults in the UK are seeking asylum in this country,"[359] while *The Times* ran extended coverage on "several crime bosses from immigrant communities who have turned to people smuggling."[360] Scenes of chaos at the refugee camp Calais were regularly invoked, with it being reported in *The Daily Express* that "the people of Calais must long to see the back of these antisocial neighbours…They roam the streets in gangs, brazenly breaking the law and making life a misery."[361] Across the board, even amongst papers sympathetic to refugees, there was frequent coverage of refugees attacking lorries in Calais to try to gain entry to the UK. Peter Allen reporting in *The Daily Record* detailed that "hundreds of migrants living in illegal camps around the port town could be seen throwing stones at lorries, and then trying to clamber aboard them when they stopped"[362] and even *The Guardian* published reports from Kevin Rawlinson of "people trying to break locks and slash open roofs of lorries, while diversionary tactics were apparently also used to draw police away."[363] This focus on refugees as dangerous reached its peak directly after the Bataclan attacks in Paris, when it was it was regularly emphasised in almost all but the most pro-accommodation of papers that the perpetrators may have entered Europe disguised as refugees.[364] This was countered by statements in the pro-accommodation camp emphasising that this was not enough of a reason to turn away refugees, as typified in the argument published in *The Guardian* that "the moral case for Europe to remain a place of refuge is unaltered by what happened [in Paris]."[365]

Overall then, the Refugee Crisis story brought to the fore very different British attitudes regarding how committed Britain should be to international problems and how much of a moral duty Britain owed the wider world, along with differing ideas of Britain's material and logistical capability to make good on any such moral duty. The divisive but charged coverage of the story ultimately reflected a polarised but morally certain British public in 2015 when it came to international duties.

Relationship with the EU

As Prime Minister Cameron and Chancellor Osborne made regular trips to Brussels from late October onwards to renegotiate the terms of Britain's EU membership ahead of a promised referendum on this membership, the subject of Britain's relationship with the EU remained under the spotlight. In the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks the EU relationship also received attention, as the anti-EU camp attributed some blame for the attacks on EU freedom of movement laws. Coverage of this relationship again brought to the surface several arguments about the types of international leadership and independence Britain should strive for, ideas of

[359] 01-10-2015: The Telegraph; 01-10-2015: The Sun; 01-10-2015: The Metro
[360] 01-10-2015: The Times
[361] For quote see 04-11-2015: The Daily Express, for other examples see 05-10-2015: The Daily Mail; 03-10-2015: The Daily Record; 15-10-2015: The Daily Express
[362] 03-10-2015: The Daily Record
[363] 18-12-2015: The Guardian
[364] For examples see 16-11-2015: The Daily Express; 16-11-2015: The Sun; 20-11-2015: The Telegraph
[365] For quote see 16-11-2015: The Guardian, for other examples see 06-12-2015: The Washington Post; 20-11-2015: The Huffington Post; 22-11-2015: The Economist

national pride and greatness, and desires to be internationally assertive. Many of the themes from the 2013 commentary on the EU carried over into 2015. The same papers continued to divide along the same lines of describing positive and negative relationships between the EU and Britain, with the only major focus from 2013 dropping in prevalence being the vision of the EU as a bloated institution.

However, in 2015 some themes gained considerably more attention than in 2013, while some entirely new themes emerged as well. These were mostly on the anti-EU side of things. One major and persistent new focus was on Cameron as having no ability to effectively negotiate meaningful new terms of membership with the EU. Although new, this theme complimented the pre-existing focus on the EU as an overlarge and overreaching institution against which Britain had no power. While the pro-EU commenters also described Cameron as unable to deliver on his election promise of a renegotiation, their focus was usually on the negotiations as being unnecessary in the first place and consequently not something the EU should indulge. This was typified with numerous reports in *The Metro*, *The Guardian*, and *The Independent* supporting John McDonnell's November statement that the negotiations were "a meaningless publicity stunt demanding powers of veto we already have."[366] On the anti-EU side, commentary instead fixated on the seemingly bullish intransigence of EU negotiators, depicting them as unfair and unconcerned with reasonable British demands. John Stevens writing for *The Daily Mail* reported that Cameron was "ordered to compromise on his demands for welfare reform [by] European Council president Donald Tusk,"[367] and analysis in *The Daily Express* stressed that "it is the EU, not Cameron, that has proved stubborn",[368] while more mixed papers such as *The Times* featured reports that "European allies hardened their resolve to reject [Cameron's] plan last week."[369] This focus was regularly complimented by a disappointment with seeming weakness on Cameron's side and a desire to make bigger bolder demands and actions, with opinion in *The Daily Mail* noting the "limpness"[370] of Cameron's agenda and Charles Moore expressing in *The Telegraph* "frustration that Cameron is not making stronger demands."[371]

A major difference in focus between the two cases was that in 2015 even usually pro-EU papers began highlighting the EU as an incohesive and indeed an incompetent institution. Across the spectrum of papers, attention frequently turned to the EU's inability to find common and timely solutions to problems, a commentary uniting papers as ideologically opposed as *The New Statesman* and *The Telegraph*. The latter featured descriptions of "the EU's collective leadership [as] arrogant and divided,"[372] while the former published analysis that "EU decision-making has become a two-stage process. At first, there is paralysis because the institutions cannot find a solution with which everyone can agree. Then, when crisis turns to emergency, power politics takes over."[373] This type of analysis was consistently applied to the EU's

[366] 04-11-2015: The Metro; 04-11-2015: The Guardian; 04-11-2015: The Independent
[367] 08-12-2015: The Daily Mail
[368] 10-12-2015: The Daily Express
[369] 14-12-2015: The Times
[370] 12-11-2015: The Daily Mail
[371] For quote see 14-11-2015: The Telegraph, for other examples see 10-11-2015: The Times; 12-11-2015: The Daily Express; 10-11-2015: The Sun
[372] 17-10-2015: The Telegraph
[373] 04-11-2015: The New Statesman

handling of the refugee crisis. Commentary from *The Independent* stated that "the EU's main problem is that we don't have a common approach,"[374] while Gideon Rachman writing in *The Daily Mail* argued that "the EU is creaking under the strain. Its 28 members are arguing bitterly, and seem incapable of framing effective responses to their common problems."[375] Reports even appeared in *The Guardian* lamenting the EU's "deepening divisions and failure to follow through on past promises."[376] As the refugee crisis wore on, the EU was painted in an increasingly poor light across the board, with its overall competence being frequently questioned even by usually pro-EU publications.[377]

Perhaps the most intense deterioration in commentary on the EU relationship between the cases was that in 2015 there was an increasing focus on the EU as an unintentional aid to terrorists, a focus that was very rare in 2013. This focus emerged in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks in Paris, when it was widely reported that at least one of the terrorists had posed as a refugee to gain entry to Europe, with headlines repeatedly appearing in anti-EU papers such as *The Daily Express* stating that "KILLER WAS RESCUED FROM SINKING BOATFUL OF MIGRANTS".[378] The EU's freedom of movement and refugee policies were thereafter increasingly referred to as not just unwise but dangerous, with John Gray arguing in *The New Statesman* that "uncontrolled immigration on the scale that has been reached in the past year cannot avoid posing security risks in conditions that approximate those of war,"[379] while Janet Daley writing in *The Telegraph* questioned "how can you track suspected terrorists across a continent which has not only dismantled boundaries but deconstructed the apparatus which allows nation states to monitor transit across their territory?"[380] While several pro-EU and mixed papers regularly acknowledged this commentary, most counter-commentary was found in *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, and *The Huffington Post*, with analysis such as that in *The Guardian* stating "it's not clear that even a miniscule proportion of these refugees has any terrorist connection of any kind,"[381] being regularly repeated in these papers.

Overall then, as in 2013, reporting on Britain's relationship with the EU reflected the same Euroskeptic desires to regain relevance and independence and the same Europhile senses that Britain was strong and relevant only through activity in conjunction with the biggest players in the international sphere. In addition, there was an added Euroskeptic sense that the EU was an aid to terrorists, and a feeling across the board that this large international player was devolving into something incoherent, internally divided, and incompetent, along with a common sense that Cameron was powerless against the EU. This ultimately reflects a British sense that the EU was incapable of using its own power to good effect, which was bolstered on the Euroskeptic side by a sense that the EU was simultaneously prohibitive of British power.

[374] 10-11-2015: The Independent
[375] 01-10-2015: The Daily Mail
[376] 18-12-2015: The Guardian
[377] For examples see 17-10-2015: The Independent; 12-11-2015: The Guardian; 20-11-2015: The Economist; 06-12-2015: The Washington Post
[378] For quote see 16-11-2015: The Daily Express, for other examples see 16-11-2015: The Sun; 16-11-2015: The Daily Mail; 18-11-2015: The Telegraph
[379] 26-11-2015: The New Statesman
[380] 22-11-2015: The Telegraph
[381] For quote see 20-11-2015: The Guardian, for other examples see 22-11-2015: The Economist; 20-11-2015: The Huffington Post; 06-12-2015: The Washington Post

Syrian Civil War (including the actions of ISIS and Russia)

Despite having been waged for almost four years at this point, the Syrian Civil War was still covered extensively across the spectrum of newspapers throughout the 2015 case. Coverage of this story highlighted several arguments and attitudes regarding Britain's influence internationally and British citizens' desires to assert themselves more directly on the international stage, along with Britain's sense of commitment to different international problems and its relationship with different international actors.

Commentary surrounding the situation in Syria in 2015 had both notable similarities and distinctions to commentary on Syria in 2013. Perhaps the most major theme common to both 2013 and 2015 was a depiction of Russia's obstructive and untrustworthy involvement in the conflict, although this theme received significantly more attention in 2015. When Russia began bombing Syria in early October its actions were immediately regarded with distrust and even hostility. Commentary in *The Daily Mirror* indicated that "Britain has said that Russia's bombing raids in Syria were striking pro-democracy rebels. But Mr Putin insisted air strikes were hitting Islamic State,"[382] while it was reported in *The Guardian* that "experts have offered a plethora of theories for Russia's action in Syria, from a bargaining chip to get the Americans around the table, to the beginning of a sustained drive to save Bashar al-Assad, to more implausible suggestions such as a nefarious plot to further burden Europe with millions more refugees."[383] More sensationalistic papers described the situation in even more alarmist terms of international tension, with *The Daily Mail* running the headline "RUSSIA DEFIES THE WEST TO DROP BOMBS ON SYRIA."[384] Across the board, Russia's actions were seen as obstructive, avoiding rather than contributing to the fight against ISIS, and even a prelude to a Western-Russian conflict, with Bel Trew describing Russia in *The Times* as "undermining a political process, aggravating the humanitarian situation and increasing radicalisation,"[385] while commentary in *The New York Times* stated that "the Syrian conflict is edging closer to an all-out proxy war."[386]

This commentary was regularly punctuated with a dismay that the West was not being as assertive as Russia, with commenters from every category of newspaper arguing that by stepping back the West was allowing this to happen. Commentary in *The Guardian* stated that "when you call something a quagmire, you have told the world that you're out and staying out. Russia and Iran will have their way,"[387] while Simon Heffer writing in *The Telegraph* argued that Russia's assertiveness "is why rogues such as Putin can command such respect internationally, and can exert themselves as they do."[388] This was often accompanied by calls for Britain and the West to step up and take more timely and forthright action in Syria, with commentary in *The Daily Star* asking "When is someone going to take action over Syria? And

[382] 04-11-2015: The Daily Mirror
[383] 01-10-2015: The Guardian
[384] For quote see 01-10-2015: The Daily Mail, for other examples see 09-10-2015: The Sun; 11-10-2015: The Daily Star; 12-12-2015: The Daily Mirror
[385] 13-10-2015: The Times
[386] 13-10-2015: The New York Times
[387] 08-11-2015: The Guardian
[388] For quote see 08-11-2015: The Telegraph, for other examples see 09-10-2015: The Herald; 02-11-2015: The Financial Times; 09-10-2015: The Sun

what's happening with President Assad? It's a crisis and it wants tackling now,"[389] and Frederic Hof writing in *The Washington Post* stating that "in Syria-time, months mean deaths: thousands of them. Months mean people slaughtered, maimed, stampeded, starved, tortured and raped by Assad's people."[390]

A major difference between the commentary on Syria in 2015 and 2013 was a much reduced focus on the paralysing complexity of the war. This focus was certainly still visible in 2015, with analysis in *The Independent* stating that "a map of the ground war would show a jigsaw puzzle of different parties in control of different bits of territory…there is an increasing risk of aircraft hitting the wrong target,"[391] and a common refrain in several papers being "Syria is complex."[392] However, this type of commentary was significantly less ubiquitous than in 2013. Additionally, it was increasingly countered with analysis that elements of Syria could and must be managed. This move from complexity to clarity arose as focus shifted from Assad to ISIS.

The question of Assad's removal disappeared completely in the wake of Russia and Iran's staunch defence of him, with Bill Powell's analysis in *Newsweek* that "Assad can stay in power for as long as his two patrons desire"[393] echoing most wider commentary. Focus instead moved to ISIS. Unlike commentary on Assad in 2013, there was no moral ambiguity about the possible negative consequences of defeating ISIS, with the group regularly being described as "evil" or in similar terms,[394] and with no mentions of a worse alternative ready to replace them if they were eliminated. Furthermore, focus on the feasibility of defeating ISIS was mixed, with frequent analysis across the spectrum of papers noting the difficulty but possibility of eliminating the group. *The New York Times* regularly published analysis on "the potential for using a combined air and ground operation to defeat the Islamic State,"[395] and reporting in *The Telegraph* stated that "the bombing campaign against Isil has cut its oil revenues and squeezed its finances to a point where it is cutting fighters' pay."[396] Additionally, in the aftermath of prolonged Russian bombing reporting in tabloids took up a theme of highlighting fleeing ISIS fighters, such as Jerry Lawton's report in *The Daily Star* of "panic and desertion spreading through the bloodthirsty Islamic warriors."[397]

Even before the Bataclan attacks, this kind of reporting on how ISIS could and should be defeated was often (like reporting on Russian assertiveness) accompanied by a denigration of perceived Western sluggishness and a call to join the fight against ISIS more directly. Niall Ferguson writing in *The Evening Standard* argued that "Syria has been 'meetinged' to death,

[389] 07-10-2015: The Daily Star
[390] 12-12-2015: The Washington Post
[391] 08-12-2015: The Independent
[392] For examples see 11-10-2015: The Daily Record; 15-10-2015: Newsweek; 18-11-2015: The Washington Post; 31-10-2015: The Huffington Post
[393] For quote see 15-10-2015: Newsweek, for other examples see 15-10-2015: The Independent; 19-10-2015: The Wall Street Journal; 29-10-2015: The Financial Times
[394] For examples see 07-10-2015: The Daily Star; 28-11-2015: The Daily Express; 02-12-2015: The Daily Mirror
[395] 05-10-2015: The New York Times
[396] For quote see 08-12-2015: The Telegraph, for other examples see 18-11-2015: The Washington Post; 22-11-2015: The Economist; 26-11-2015: The New Statesman
[397] For quote see 07-10-2015: The Daily Star, for other examples see 14-11-2015: The Daily Mail; 26-11-2015: The Daily Record; 22-11-2015: The Daily Mail

along with up to 330,000 of its citizens,"[398] and the question "when the heck is Britain going to show it has the backbone to send in its bombers too?"[399] being asked in *The Daily Express*. Even *The Huffington Post* (usually the most averse to publishing pro-military intervention opinions) published analysis that "there is absolutely a basis for intervention."[400]

Although ISIS had been described as a threat to British and international security before the Bataclan attacks in Paris on the 13th of November, in the aftermath of these attacks this type of commentary became extensive. Jason Burke writing in *The Guardian* stated that "events in Paris confirm that Isis has gone global,"[401] while commentary in *The Huffington Post* argued that "the attacks in France this year have now brought this war to Europe",[402] and Catherine Philp writing in *The Times* described the attacks as "a major and dangerous evolution in the threat [ISIS] poses to the West."[403] In comparison to 2013 the seeming approach of British military action in Syria in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks was met with far fewer mentions of the shadow of Iraq. Additionally, descriptions of Syria as a complex quagmire were met with the above-outlined arguments of the possibility of defeating ISIS and the urgency of the security objectives at hand.

One of the most ubiquitous themes uniting the broad spectrum of newspapers in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks was a solidarity with France, which appeared not only in the major national papers and specialist publications but also in almost every local newspaper (which usually covered international events more sporadically). It was reported in *The Newcastle Chronicle* that "united in grief, the people of the North East showed their defiant solidarity with the French after the Paris terror outrage,"[404] while *The Bristol Post* published that "from football fans to students, Bristol stood in solidarity with the French after Friday's deadly terrorist attacks in Paris,"[405] while statements in *The Scotsman* declared that "we stand with the people of France"[406] and Sam Leith writing in *The Evening Standard* described "London and Paris [as] kindred cities united in grief."[407]

Overall, reporting on Syria in 2015 reflected considerably stronger British senses of moral clarity and purpose than in 2013. This emerged through the sense of solidarity with France, the more clear-cut vision of ISIS as a morally unambiguous and possibly defeatable target, and the overarching frustration with the hesitancy and trepidation Britain (unlike Russia) had displayed in regard to Syria over the past years.

Overall then, the most persistent media stories of the 2015 case centred around Syria, Russia, the EU, and refugees. Several themes from 2013 carried over into 2015, including a

[398] 11-10-2015: The Evening Standard
[399] 28-11-2015: The Daily Express
[400] For quote see 04-11-2015: The Huffington Post, for other examples see 04-11-2015: The Telegraph; 18-11-2015: The New Statesman; 24-11-2015: The Economist
[401] 14-11-2015: The Guardian
[402] 14-11-2015: The Huffington Post
[403] 16-11-2015: The Times
[404] 16-11-2015: The Newcastle Chronicle
[405] 16-11-2015: The Bristol Post
[406] 14-11-2015: The Scotsman
[407] For quote see 16-11-2015: The Evening Standard, for other examples see 16-11-2015: The Birmingham Mail; 18-11-2015: The Nottingham Evening Post; 20-11-2015: Derby Telegraph

sense of hostility between Russia and the West along with most commentary surrounding the EU. Nonetheless, the sense of powerlessness in the face of complexity regarding Syria was much less ubiquitous. It was also frequently countered with a focus on clearer moral goals and paths to defeating enemies. There was also a common sense of frustration at seeming sluggishness and inability to directly confront international issues, with these themes underlying much of the coverage of both Syria and the EU.

Combining this with the commentary from 2013, we see the broad discursive landscapes that the British public were immersed in during my cases. As was outlined in Chapter Two, these landscapes formed a major discursive context that influenced the securitizations I am looking at by upholding, containing, and reflecting important visions and senses of the international world for the British public. Consequently, it was from these lines of discourse that I extracted precise articulations and identifications regarding Britain's place on the international stage, documented their character and frequency over time via the research exercises outlined in the Methodology Chapter, and analysed their precise effects on securitizations (and securitizations' effects on them). In the next chapters I will present this data and its significance for my research.

CHAPTER FIVE
Research Data and Hypothesis Tested

Chapter Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to present the data that emerged from my research phases and to show how this data provides strong evidence supporting my hypothesis. The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, I overview my data on securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric from the 2013 case. I then overview my data on identifications from the same period, highlighting their strength, density, and alignment to the (anti-)securitizing rhetoric. In doing so, I reveal the audience receptivity which securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments would have enjoyed under the dynamics laid out within my hypothesis. I do this textually with the support of some highlighted graphs from my dataset, while remaining graphs can be found in the Appendix. I then do the same for the 2015 data, before detailing how combining my two cases of data provides strong empirical support for my hypothesis regarding how identifications affect securitizations. Aside from directly supporting my hypothesis, in this chapter I also highlight noteworthy data from within my dataset which sheds light on identification strength outside of and during securitizations, and which also provides indications of a possible trajectory for modern British identifications.

Introduction

This chapter aims to validate my hypothesis regarding how identifications affect securitization success by testing if this hypothesis can be empirically verified.

To make this chapter as clear as possible, I will now summarise the data and what it reveals. I will then carefully elucidate the details of this data (and how it reveals what it does) over the course of the chapter. This summary is as follows.

My hypothesis argued that the receptivity of the audience to the (anti-)securitizing argument will be determined by the co-locations between the argument and the audience's identifications. As is re-summarised in the table below this paragraph, the audience will be most receptive to arguments that co-locate with identifications that are strong, thick, and aligned to the argument.

Table 5.1

Identification Co-located With Argument	Receptivity Score For Argument
Strong, Thick, Aligned	+2
Strong, Usually Thin, Aligned	+1.5
Weak/Thin/Not Present	+1
Strong, Usually Thin, Misaligned	0
Strong, Thick, Misaligned	-1

Recall that in 2013 the securitization failed and in 2015 the securitization succeeded. My data (which I detail in this chapter) revealed that in 2013 the anti-securitizing argument co-located with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much

greater extent than did the securitizing argument. The anti-securitizing argument co-located mostly with identifications that were strong, thick and aligned, while the securitizing argument co-located mostly with identifications that were weak, thin, or usually thin. My hypothesis would therefore predict that in 2013 the audience would have been much less receptive to the securitizing argument than to the anti-securitizing argument, and consequently the identifications at play would have been conducive to a securitization failure. Additionally, my data revealed that in 2015 the securitizing argument co-located with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much greater extent than did the anti-securitizing argument. In this case, the securitizing argument co-located almost entirely with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned, while the anti-securitizing argument co-located almost entirely with identifications that were weak or thin. My hypothesis would therefore predict that in 2015 the audience would have been much less receptive to the anti-securitizing argument than to the securitizing argument, and consequently the identifications at play would have been conducive to a securitization success. As such, my research into the two most similar securitizations in the 21st century – securitizations which were similar and in some ways identical across a range of important conditions, including securitizing move, securitizing actors, and surrounding political and cultural contexts – shows that the different outcomes of these highly similar securitizations can be explained by my hypothesis regarding the influence of identifications on securitizations.

I will now detail my data and show how it reveals the above. I will do so with the following structure. First, I overview my data on securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric from my 2013 case. I then overview my data on identifications from the same period, while at the same time highlighting how the identification data and securitization data relate to each other by showing the co-locations between 2013 (anti-)securitizing rhetoric and 2013 identifications. I then do the same for my 2015 case. At this point, I combine the two cases of data to make clear how the data supports my hypothesis. Throughout this chapter, I present my data textually with the support of some important graphs from my dataset, while remaining graphs can be found in the Appendix (as indicated at relevant points in this chapter).

2013 Securitizing and Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric

I begin this section by outlining the securitizing argument of 2013. The aim here is to extract and highlight the key rhetorical assertions that built this argument and their relative ubiquity. By doing so, I can then show how these assertions related to contemporary identifications, which will allow me to test my hypothesis.

Securitizing Rhetoric

Securitizing rhetoric was tracked via an analysis of all parliamentary and governmental statements made to the public during my case studies which developed the arguments that there were certain objects of worth under certain threats which could be resolved via actions which were appropriate and feasible. As public statements from parliamentary or governmental sources, these were very well documented in records that were easily accessible through government and public watchdog archives. These statements included official statements, document releases, speeches, public debates, and press conferences from Downing Street, the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth

Office, the British UN Ambassador, and the Department for International Development, among others. Each of the original public documents I analysed including links to their sources can be found via Sheet Five in the Appendix.

In line with the breakdown of securitizing arguments which I outlined in Chapter Two, I analysed this securitizing rhetoric under key categories: arguments regarding the proposed object(s) of worth; arguments regarding the proposed threat(s) to this object; arguments regarding the feasibility of the proposed military air strikes to resolve this threat (in that, the air strikes can achieve what they set out to do); and arguments regarding the appropriateness of this proposed action. "Appropriateness" arguments were further sub-divided into two sets of arguments, one regarding the justness of the action (in that the action is appropriate because it is morally justified) and the other regarding the necessity of the action (in that the action is appropriate because there is no other course of action available for resolving the threat). This gives us five key categories of securitizing rhetoric, each of which are fundamental to the overall securitizing argument.

It should be noted the rawest possible rhetorical assertion data can be found via Sheet Six in the Appendix. This Sheet contains links to opensource documents online in which I have included every rhetorical assertion I extracted from every public document which I analysed in both of my cases. Through Sheet Six you can see the original segments I coded for rhetorical assertions (both securitizing and anti-securitizing) and how I coded those segments. These segments are too numerous to attach directly to this thesis, which is why I have placed them in the opensource documents which are accessible via Sheet Six of the Appendix.

I will begin by detailing the 2013 securitizing rhetoric which built the argument that the proposed military air strikes were "just". It is important to view each sub-section ("just action" rhetorical assertions, "objects of worth" rhetorical assertions, etc.) separately like this because each sub-section forms a critical part of the overall argument, without which the argument as a whole is fundamentally lacking as a securitizing proposition. Note that a key Master Graph numerically backing up statements here such as "x assertion was made to a great extent" or "a large proportion of the argument consisted of y assertion" is included at the end of this section. More detailed graphs numerically presenting the data that underlies the textual descriptions here can be found in Sheet Seven of the Appendix.

In 2013 the "just action" element of the securitizing argument was built from six rhetorical assertions, but the most commonly utilised assertion by far was that Assad had used chemical weapons against civilians. This assertion formed the core of the argument that the proposed policy of bombing Assad was justified, and indeed made up a large proportion of the overall securitizing argument. To a slightly lesser extent, but still quite persistently, the justification for the policy was backed up with the assertion that the policy was legal and proportionate, and that UN processes for authorising such military action would be respected. Some securitizing actors also tried to justify the military policy by making the point that UN processes did not necessarily have to be respected in order for this policy to be justified, and as such any doubts that UN processes were not being respected were irrelevant anyway. This indicated an uncertainty – or at least debatable quality – about the assertion that UN processes were being respected. Surprisingly, given the political and media climate of the time which so heavily and negatively referenced the securitization in relation to Iraq (as was outlined in Chapter Four), securitizing actors largely declined to point out differences between Syria 2013

and Iraq 2003 as a means of justifying the mission. A final assertion that was made to justify the proposed mission was that Assad was simply an illegitimate ruler who deserved removing, but by the end of the case this assertion was made only rarely and even sometimes refuted by other securitizing actors.

It is noteworthy that this assertion that Assad was illegitimate and deserved removing formed the majority of the just action securitizing rhetoric for most of the case, with Assad's illegitimacy forming 100% of the justifications at one point. Only in the last few days of the case did the assertion about the legality of the action form a significant proportion of the "just action" rhetoric, while the other assertions formed negligible proportions of this rhetoric until the final day of the case. This indicates a very rapid and indeed hasty reorientation of justifications at the last minute, an indication reinforced by the observation that the "Assad illegitimacy" point all but disappears on the final day of the case. The final "just action" argument as a whole sought to present the military policy as falling under a clear legal framework and as a response to a heinous act. In doing so it aimed to reduce the complexity of the situation and make it morally clear.

Then there is the element of the securitizing argument claiming that the action was necessary. Securitizing actors built this "necessity" argument on five core rhetorical assertions. By far the most ubiquitous of these was the assertion that international responsibilities had to be met, an assertion which made up over 42% of the argument that the policy was necessary. The vast majority of the remainder of the necessity argument was built from the vague assertion that inaction in this situation was simply impossible (this idea that we cannot do nothing), and the similar but more specific assertion that the use of chemical weapons could not go unreacted to. The necessity of doing something about the worsening humanitarian situation in Syria was also a major concern, though less ubiquitous than the above mentioned assertions. Overall, the necessity argument was rather unspecific, focusing mostly on the idea that "something" had to be done, or that doing nothing was not an option, revealing a lack of a clear rationale for the hastily put together security measure. This is reinforced by the fact that in the last ten days of the securitization these assertions underwent an almost total reorientation in terms of priority and emphasis, indicating again the unformed and unsure nature of the securitizing argument. By the end of the case just two assertions formed the majority of the "necessity" argument.

Next, there was the argument that the action was feasible. When building this argument, securitizing actors oscillated between several different and often unclear assertions. It is particularly telling that the most ubiquitous assertion made to defend the feasibility of the action was that risks and difficulties are always present in foreign and military policy, so the UK should not let the risks and difficulties associated with this mission deter the mission entirely. This is less a robust defence of the feasibility of the mission than it is a dismissal of arguments against its feasibility, a sort of "ignore how infeasible this seems" argument. A further common assertion defending the feasibility of the proposed mission was that there was no slippery slope in Syria (Britain would simply get in and get out). This assertion was more than a little out of place in a political and media environment dominated by the idea of the slippery slope (as was outlined in Chapter Four). More direct assertions regarding how the mission would be feasibly supported included claims that the mission would be backed up with both diplomatic efforts towards a political transition in Syria, that humanitarian relief would form a large backdrop to the military element of the mission, and that Britain had the support

of the international community. Surprisingly again, securitizing actors largely avoided pointing out that Syria 2013 was different to Iraq 2003 and hence more feasible, with this assertion forming less than 6% of the overall feasibility argument.

Next, there was the securitizing argument regarding what the object of worth under threat was. This argument was much more straightforward. It consisted of five rhetorical assertions, but two of these dominated the argument. Securitizing actors almost always asserted that the objects of worth under threat were Syrian civilians and/or the international norm of non-use of chemical weapons. The latter assertion was often backed up with the claim that international law and order in general was also under threat. Sometimes, but relatively rarely, securitizing actors asserted that Middle Eastern regional stability and Britain's international reputation were also under threat, but these assertions were not nearly as ubiquitous as the others. The object of worth argument was one of the steadiest made in 2013, with Syrian civilians being either the most emphasised object of worth or a close second for the entirety of the case. Towards the end of the case, the norm of non-use of chemical weapons and the upholding of international law and order gained significantly in prominence, while Middle Eastern regional stability and Britain's credibility also made slight gains. Securitizing actors were therefore far steadier regarding what they proposed they were defending than they were regarding how/why they could defend these things through military air strikes.

Finally, there was the argument regarding what was threatening these objects of worth. Very interestingly, securitizing actors rarely described external actors as the threat to the delineated objects of worth, with the assertion that Assad was a threat to Syrian civilians making up just over 10% of the argument about threats. Instead, rather than assigning threat status to a clear "other", securitizing actors asserted that it was actually British inaction that was threatening the objects of worth. The most ubiquitous assertion here was that British inaction threatened the international norm of non-use of chemical weapons. This was closely followed by the assertion that British inaction would threaten the livelihood of Syrian civilians. The final assertion in this argument was that British inaction would threaten international law and order itself. While the argument that Assad was a threat to Syrian civilians maintained a prominence for the entirety of the case, it dropped significantly in the final stretch to make way for the three other proposed threats. This threat ascription is intriguing, as it focuses on Britain itself as generating a threat through inaction, rather than foreign actors as generating a threat through their actions. While the two are implicitly connected, the explicit emphasis here is very much on British action as the necessary ingredient for the deterrence of threats.

In the below graph, we can now separate and highlight the main assertions forming the core of the full securitizing rhetoric. This graph shows us that by the end of the case the core of the securitizing rhetoric oriented largely around chemical weapons, Syrian civilians, and asserted commitments to international law and international responsibilities.



The above outlining of the 2013 securitizing argument and the assertions that built it is fully displayed numerically on the Master Graph on the next page. More detailed graphs showing the precise proportions of assertions in the individual argument elements (the just action element, necessity of action element, etc.) both statically and longitudinally can be found in Sheet Seven in the Appendix.

Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric

Having outlined the 2013 securitizing rhetoric, I will now outline the 2013 anti-securitizing rhetoric, before then presenting the 2013 identifications and showing how these identifications co-located with this securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric. During my case periods, anti-securitizing rhetoric was not publicly documented as efficiently as securitizing rhetoric. Securitizing actors came mostly from the governing political party of the time, along with the governing Cabinet and senior political figures such as the UN Ambassador. When such figures released statements, they were quickly and systematically made part of the public record of governance documents. This facilitates analysing and consistently comparing them over time in an analytically sound manner. Meanwhile, most (though not all) anti-securitizing rhetoric came from opposition parties and peripheral political figures. These figures' public statements, press briefings, and office releases – beyond those which were given in the Houses of Commons and Lords or at party conferences – were not as systematically documented, being mostly summarised and cut down in various media outlets and online political tracking blogs. They were therefore not conducive to a data set that could lay claim to analytical consistency, a holistic representation of anti-securitizing rhetoric, or a longitudinal comparability to the securitizing rhetoric dataset. Nonetheless, the anti-securitizing argument laid out in the final Commons debate on the motion to authorise military action in Syria was fully documented and is suitably comparable to the securitizing argument data documented in the same debate. As such, the anti-securitizing rhetoric data outlined here has been taken from



Argument Pertains To:

- Justness of Action
- Necessity of Action
- Feasibility of Action
- Objects of Worth
- Threats

that debate and will be compared only to the securitizing rhetoric from that final debate. The transcript of the anti-securitizing side of this debate can be found via Sheet Five in the Appendix, while every segment of anti-securitizing rhetoric that I coded for rhetorical assertions can be viewed via Sheet Six in the Appendix.

I will now outline the data on the proportional deployment of rhetoric building the argument that the proposed air strikes were not just, not necessary, and not feasible, along with rhetoric asserting what the anti-securitizing actors believed the objects of worth to be. The proportion of the anti-securitizing argument that concerned misidentified threats was too small (only 1.6% of the anti-securitizing rhetoric as a whole) to extract meaningful data from.

Anti-securitizing rhetoric arguing that the proposed mission was unjust relied most heavily on the assertion that UN resolutions and processes were necessary for the action to be just but were being ignored. This was backed up with the commonly made assertion that the action would not be legal if it went ahead, with these two assertions combined making up 43% of the unjust mission argument. It is interesting to note that the second most common assertion in this argument was the idea that Assad may not have used chemical weapons. This was an assertion that went against almost all available evidence at the time, but which reflected an overarching lack of British confidence in their understanding of the Middle East, which they saw as complex, difficult to make sense of, and uncontrollable, as was laid out in Chapter Four. Other less common assertions forwarded the ideas that the action was unjust because the British public were against it, because it would contribute to Syrians' suffering, and because the use of chemical weapons does not necessarily justify war. Overall, this "unjust action" argument appeals to the British concern with complexity by passing responsibility for a situation that is hard to grasp on to higher authorities, and additionally by applying clear-cut legal frameworks and jurisdictions to the problem at hand.

Next, there was the argument that the action was unnecessary. This was a highly monolithic argument. Over half of the overall argument was built from the single assertion that the mission had been put together too quickly and that not enough facts were yet known. The only other assertion that built a significant chunk of the "unnecessary action" argument was that diplomacy and the UN should be utilised more before opting to take a military route. The rest of the argument was built from assertions that other nations should take responsibility, that humanitarian and legal tools should be pursued first instead, and that Britain did not simply have to follow America's lead, along with often vague invocations of Iraq 2003 and how that mission had not been necessary either. The "unnecessary action" argument complements the "unjust action" argument above, as it plays off an underlying discomfort with taking action when a situation still is not fully understood, along with a continuing affinity for doubt rather than leaps of faith in the face of missing information. Combined, these arguments appeal to a desire to pass the buck onto other nations or at least into the future.

Then there was the argument that the proposed mission was not feasible. As the below graph shows, this argument was built from a large number of different assertions. The majority of these assertions are oriented around the core ideas that Syria is set to worsen, that British action will only add to this degeneration, and that the situation is not clear-cut enough to be confident in positive results. This fits very well with the above arguments that Britain simply does not have the understanding or the influence to make a positive difference in such a volatile and deteriorating region.



Finally, there was the anti-securitizing argument regarding what the object of worth was. Anti-securitizing actors most commonly asserted that a stable Syria for Syrians was what was most in need of defending, and that the proposed action would not deliver on this need. Indeed, this assertion took up almost half of the overall "objects of worth" argument. The next most common assertion in this regard was that Middle Eastern regional stability itself was at stake, and that this stability would be undermined by the proposed action. These two assertions complemented each other and painted a picture of a Syria that would only get worse if meddled with. The remaining two objects of worth assertions partly agreed with the securitizing argument, claiming that the norm of non-use of chemical weapons and the upholding of international law were both in need of defending.

We can now separate and highlight the main assertions forming the core of the anti-securitizing rhetoric.



The above graph shows that the core anti-securitizing concerns oriented themselves around the ideas that Britain did not fully understand the situation in Syria and needed more evidence and clearer objectives, that action may well make the situation worsen, that there was a slippery slope, that UN resolutions were necessary but being ignored, that the object of worth was a stable Syria for Syrians, and that British action may not be enough to stop chemical weapons being used.

The above outlining of the 2013 anti-securitizing argument and the assertions that built it is fully displayed numerically on the Master Graph on the next page. More detailed graphs showing the precise proportions of assertions in the individual argument elements (the unjust action element, the unnecessary action element, etc.) both statically and longitudinally can be found in Sheet Seven in the Appendix.

Having outlined the 2013 securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric, I will now present the 2013 identifications and show how these identifications co-located with this securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric. In and of itself, the identification data I have uncovered and will present here also reveals much about core British attitudes towards Britain as an international actor, what Britain should stand for, what ability it has to pursue these goals, who its friends are, and where British international anxieties lie. These shifting identifications have significant implications for Britain's future direction as an international actor, which I will highlight towards the end of this chapter. The presentation of this identification data will therefore be geared both towards presenting information necessary for answering my core research question and towards illuminating major and shifting elements of modern British identifications.

2013 Identifications and Co-Locations

Before going through this data, I will outline a few important points on its presentation. For simplicity, in this chapter I refer to the British public's "identifications regarding Britain's



Argument Pertains To:

- Justness of Action
- Necessity of Action
- Feasibility of Action
- Objects of Worth
- Threats

place on the international stage" as the British public's "international identifications". As I laid out previously, I am focusing on international identifications because the securitizations I am looking at regarded international issues, international actors, and purported international threats, with the primary proposed remedy to these international threats in both cases being the military of the British nation-state. Consequently, British identifications that were more domestically focused, such as Britain as the country of the NHS or the royal family, were not relevant for this study.

Identifications and Identification Points

As I detailed in the Methodology Chapter, my analysis of discourse was aimed at extracting articulations regarding Britain's place on the international stage. Once these raw articulations were gathered, however, they were too numerous and individually specific to serve as usable data points with which to examine identifications. Consequently, they were grouped under higher categories which illustrated the underlying *identification point* that these articulations oriented themselves around and expressed.

For instance, an identification point might be "Britain's Deference to International Institutions," which encompasses normative articulations of Britain's position relative to international institutions (should these international institutions supersede British autonomy/sovereignty or not?). All articulations regarding Britain's deference to international institutions (for instance the articulations "Britain must respect UN decisions" and "Britain should disregard international treaties") were grouped under this identification point.[408] These identification points were not pre-conceived but rather emerged from the data based on entities/concepts (such as deference to international institutions) that numerous articulations commonly regarded.

While an identification point only refers to the entity/concept that articulations regard, *identifications* refer to both the entity/concept and how this entity/concept is regarded. For instance, under the identification point "Britain's Deference to International Institutions," we have the associated identifications "Britain should defer to international institutions" (under which all articulations expressing that Britain should defer were grouped) and "Britain should not defer to international institutions" (under which all articulations expressing that Britain should not defer were grouped). This is re-illustrated in the below table.

Identification Point "Deference to International Institutions"					
Identification "Britain should defer to international institutions"			**Identification** "Britain should not defer to international institutions"		
Articulation "Britain should abide by UN decisions"	**Articulation** "Britain should obey international law"	**Articulation** "War can only be authorised by the UN"	**Articulation** "Britain has complete international autonomy"	**Articulation** "International law is a guideline, not a rule"	**Articulation** "Only national parliaments authorise war"

[408] Note that one articulation can be grouped under several different identification points simultaneously.

Condensed Data Presentation

As I laid out in Chapter Two, identifications have three major characteristics, strength, density, and alignment of their content to the (anti-)securitizing argument. Here, I will simultaneously present my data on these three characteristics with the aid of the following type of diagram: Condensed Segments. Here is an example Condensed Segment.



Here is the legend for Condensed Segments.



As the legend here outlines, at the point of the Condensed Segment we see the identification point. On the green and red spaces, we see the two competing identifications concerning this identification point, one of which holds that Britain should be active/forthright on the international stage, and the other of which holds that Britain should be internationally restrained. Outside them, we see yellow bars indicating the content and frequency of the five most common articulations underlying each of these identifications. In the centre we see black

dashes, which quickly indicate the density of the identification point and underlying identifications (which in the example Segment is persistently thick).

Then there is the blue bars pointing to the green and red spaces. These simultaneously illustrate the "content balance" of this identification point and the strength of the underlying identifications. These terms require clarification. As I detailed in the Methodology Chapter, a dominant identification and its content are defined by the balance of articulations grouped under an identification point at a given moment. If, at a certain moment, articulations expressing that Britain should be internationally active far outweigh those that express that it should not, then this reflects that the dominant identification for this identification point in this moment is that Britain should be internationally active.

An identification's strength is defined by whether or not this content balance changes over time. If the content balance never changes (i.e. if the "be active" articulations always outweigh the "be restrained" articulations), then we have only one dominant identification and it is strong. On the other hand, if this content balance changes sides over time (i.e. if at one point the "be active" side outweighs the "be restrained" side, but at another point this is not the case) then this would indicate that at different times we have dominant "be active" and "be restrained" identifications, but they are both weak identifications

As is explained in this legend, the *position* of the blue bars in these Segments indicates the range of content balances over time, and consequently the strength of the dominant identifications.



Position of Blue Bars	**Strength of Identification**
Bars are all on one side (just green side or just red side)	*Strong*
Bars are on both sides (both green and red sides)	*Weak*

Looking at the example Condensed Segment, re-illustrated on the next page, we see that the content balance for the "Mode of International Activity" identification point swung from between a +100% balance on the side of the "Britain should be active" identification to a

+40% balance on the side of the "Britain should be active" identification. As indicating a swing from 100% on the "Active side" to 40% on the "Active" side requires blue bars all of which are on the "Active" side, the example segment quickly indicates the presence of one strong, persistently thick identification holding that Britain should be an internationally active nation.



Note that detailed graphs breaking down all the information contained within Condensed Segments are located in Sheet Eight of the Appendix.

Content Categories

As a final point, I laid out in Chapter Two that identification content was broken down into content regarding national norms, influence, affiliations/estrangements, perceptions in the eyes of others, and history. Identifications under each category filter in/out specific types of securitizing rhetoric that they co-locate with, as I laid out in Fig. 2 from Chapter Two (reproduced below).



However, looking at this graphic we can see that "perceptions in the eyes of others" content has the same co-locations as "affiliations/estrangements" content, in that they both co-locate with and act to filter in/out securitizing rhetoric regarding feasible actions and actors

with threatening intentions. Additionally, over the course of my research it became clear that almost all "perceptions in the eyes of others" articulations acted simultaneously as articulations regarding "affiliations/estrangements" (for instance the articulation "Russia views Britain as a pushover"). Essentially then, "perceptions in the eyes of others" articulations mapped onto and did the same work as "affiliations/estrangements" articulations. As such, to simplify the extensive data here, articulations on "perceptions in the eyes of others" have been treated as a sub-set of "affiliations/estrangements" data rather than being displayed separately.

Additionally, as I laid out in Chapter Two and as I indicated in Fig. 2 above, history content serves to back up the filtering processes performed by the other content categories. As such, to make the data I gathered more efficient I sorted articulations on British history under the identification content category these articulations were backing up. For instance, the statement "Russia has always been working against Britain in some way" would have been sorted under the affiliation/estrangement identification "Russia has an antagonistic relationship with Britain." As such, as I present my data on identifications below I will divide these identifications into three main categories, namely British international identifications regarding norms, relative influence, and affiliations/estrangements.

I will now present and unpack my identification data from 2013. In 2013 there were 24 identification points. The Master Graphs on the next two pages provide us with a snapshot of these 24 identification points.

2013 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Role Generally & In ME*/Syria Specifically



The core concept which the identification concerns.

*ME = Middle East
Dem. = Democracy
Inf. = Influence
Int. = International
Refs. = Refugees
CW = Chemical Weapons
Mil. Act. = Military Activity
Syr. = Syria

Persistently Thick Identification.

Usually Thin But Sometimes Thick Identification.

The range of ways this core concept was identified with over time.
More Bars = Wider Range = More Changeable/Weaker Identification

Frequency of Articulation Supporting This Identification.
Longer = More Frequent (numerical data for all data points is in other charts)

A blue bar pointing to the most solid green end of the spectrum indicates that at at least one point in time the balance between green and red identifications was 80%-100% in favour of green. A blue bar pointing to the most faded red point indicates that at least once the balance was 0%-20% in favour of red. Etc.

2013 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Relationships



The core concept which the identification concerns.

Rel. = Relationship
CW = Chemical Weapons
Syr. = Syrian
Civ. = Civilians

Persistently Thick Identification.

Usually Thin But Sometimes Thick Identification.

The range of ways this core concept was identified with over time.
More Bars = Wider Range = More Changeable/Weaker Identification

100%-80%
80%-60%
60%-40%
40%-20%
20%-0%
0%-20%
20%-40%
40%-60%
60%-80%
80%-100%

A blue bar pointing to the most solid green end of the spectrum indicates that at at least one point in time the balance between green and red identifications was 80%-100% in favour of green. A blue bar pointing to the most faded red point indicates that at least once the balance was 0%-20% in favour of red. Etc.

Frequency of Articulation Supporting This Identification.
Longer = More Frequent (numerical data for all data points is in other charts)

I will now break these identification points down and unpack the data within each set of identifications, so as to extract the core data necessary to empirically evidence my hypothesis. I will start with the normative identification points.

Normative Identifications

As the extracted Condensed Segment below shows, a large number of articulations in 2013 oriented themselves around the question of whether it was normatively desirable for Britain to have an active international military role. These articulations fell under two distinct identifications. The first identification held that Britain should be militarily active, and was supported mainly by articulations stating that military operations are effective tools, back up diplomacy, show a willingness to use force, and engender an acceptable level of risk. A second identification held that Britain should not be militarily active, and was supported by articulations stating that military operations worsen conflicts, are ineffective, worsen civilian conditions, and are hard to get out of. However, the content balance was always in favour of the identification holding that Britain should not be militarily active. Additionally, these articulations were mostly primed towards the end of the case, going through long periods of infrequent and even entirely absent priming, hence making the identification here usually thin. This means that we have one strong, usually thin identification holding that Britain should not be militarily active.



How did this identification co-locate with securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments? Starting with the securitizing argument, we can see that this identification co-locates with two of the previously outlined securitizing rhetorical assertions. The first is the assertion that risks and difficulties are ever present with military operations and that their presence should not deter military activity. This assertion is misaligned with this strong, usually thin identification, as the identification is built from articulations precisely stating that risks and difficulties of military activity make military activity unacceptable. Next, there is the securitizing assertion that the proposed mission was designed to protect Syrian civilians as an object of worth. This assertion is misaligned with this strong, usually thin identification, as the identification is built from articulations explicitly stating that military operations worsen civilian conditions and

conflicts in general. This identification also co-locates with five rhetorical assertions in the anti-securitizing argument. These are the assertions that the military action will contribute to Syrians' suffering, that humanitarianism would be more effective, that international legal routes would be more effective, that war is too costly, and that it would not achieve any deterrence of chemical weapons. The identification aligns with all of these anti-securitizing assertions, as it is built on articulations regarding the ineffectiveness of military operations and the idea that military operations worsen civilian conditions.

What do these (mis)alignments mean for audience receptivity? Recall the receptivity scores for (anti-)securitizing assertions in my hypothesis, re-summarised in the below table.

Identification Co-Located With Argument	**Receptivity Score For Argument**
Strong, Thick, Aligned	+2
Strong, Usually Thin, Aligned	+1.5
Weak/Thin/Not Present	+1
Strong, Usually Thin, Misaligned	0
Strong, Thick, Misaligned	-1

By applying these scores to above securitizing assertions based on their identification co-locations, we see that both of the securitizing assertions would get a receptivity score of 0 (because they co-locate with a strong, usually thin, and misaligned identification). Next, by looking at the previously presented Master Graph which showed the entirety of the 2013 securitizing argument (on page 123), we can see that these two securitizing assertions combined made up 16.4% of the securitizing argument. As such, 16.4% of the securitizing argument gets a receptivity score of 0.

Meanwhile, each of the anti-securitizing assertions would have received a score of +1.5 (because they co-locate with a strong, usually thin, and aligned identification). These assertions combined made up 13.1% of the anti-securitizing argument, as we can see in the previously presented Master Graph showing the entirety of the 2013 anti-securitizing argument (on page 127). As such, the anti-securitizing argument so far has a receptivity score of 19.65 (13.1×1.5). Consequently, at this point the securitizing argument has a receptivity score of 0 and the anti-securitizing argument has a score of 19.65.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
0	19.65

As I go through the identifications and their alignments to (anti-)securitizing rhetoric I will keep track of these receptivity scores, so we can see the relative receptivity that the two arguments would have received. This will steadily reveal how my data supports the hypothesis that higher/lower audience receptivity generated by certain identification-assertion co-locations can help explain how securitizing arguments win or lose when they contest with an anti-securitizing argument.

Next, there are the normative identifications regarding Britain's mode of international activity. Several articulations in 2013 oriented themselves around the question of whether it was normatively desirable for Britain to be an active player on the international stage. In fact, as the below Condensed Segment shows, this was a persistently thick identification point, being regularly primed throughout the 2013 case. The first identification here held that Britain should be internationally active, and was built from articulations stating that Britain cannot remain inactive or removed from the international stage, that standing back allows for problems to emerge, that the UK should step up international problems, and that the UK should demonstrate forthright leadership internationally. The competing identification held that Britain should be internationally restrained, and was built from articulations stating that restraint was pragmatic, meddling abroad makes things worse, that Britain should avoid hubristic actions, and that international activity was always risky. Over the course of the 2013 case, the balance of articulations for this identification point was always on the side of the Britain should be internationally active identification, making this a strong, persistently thick identification.



This identification co-located with two assertions from the 2013 securitizing argument and none from the 2013 anti-securitizing argument. In the securitizing argument, the identification co-located with the assertion that the use of banned chemical weapons simply could not go unreacted to, and the assertion that inaction was simply impossible (that something had to be done). It aligned with both of these assertions, as it was built from articulations stating that the UK cannot stand back from problems and that it simply cannot be internationally inactive. As such, both of these assertions co-located with strong, thick, and aligned identifications, and therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. These assertions combined made up 4.8% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 9.6 (4.8×2) to the securitizing argument's receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
9.6	19.65

Then there is the identification point regarding Britain's commitment to international duties and bonds. The first identification here held that Britain should be committed to international duties, and was built from articulations stating that Britain must defend human rights abroad, had humanitarian duties generally, had duties to migrants, had duties to civilians in other countries, and should take part in international coalitions. The other identification rejected the idea that Britain was internationally duty-bound, and was built from the articulations that the UK had no duties to migrants, that Britain needed to be more sovereign and less internationally tied, and that international aid was a waste of resources. Over the course of 2013, the balance between these articulations expressing that Britain was or was not internationally duty-bound changed from one identification to the other, meaning that these were two weak identifications.



These weak identifications co-located with four assertions in the 2013 securitizing argument and one in the anti-securitizing argument. In this case, the question of whether or not the identifications aligned or misaligned with the assertions is irrelevant, as weak identifications give the assertions they co-locate with a receptivity score of +1, regardless of alignment.[409] In the securitizing argument, the identifications co-located with the assertions that international responsibilities must be met, that the international community was calling for something to be done, and that international law and order and human rights were being threatened and had to be protected. Each of these assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1. These assertions combined made up 15.3% of the securitizing argument, hence adding 15.3 to the securitizing argument's receptivity score. In the anti-securitizing argument, the identifications co-located with the assertion that UN processes needed to be respected and abided by. This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of +1. The assertion made up 5% of the anti-securitizing argument, hence adding 5 to the anti-securitizing argument's receptivity score.

[409] Recall from my hypothesis in Figure 1 that alignment only matters if an identification is strong, as only strong identifications will reject arguments they misalign with, while weak identifications may well bend to accommodate an argument.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
24.9	24.65

A further normative identification point that emerged from the data came from articulations stating that Britain should or should not defer to international institutions. As the below Condensed Segment shows, this identification point was built from only a small number of articulations. These were primed infrequently, making these identifications usually thin, but they did go through periods of very strong priming, being expressed in great volume towards the end of the case. The first identification here held that Britain must defer to the rule of international institutions, and was built from the articulations that international law must be respected and that only the UN could provide justifications and permissions for a country to go to war. The second identification held that Britain did not have to defer to international institutions, and was built from the articulations that UN approval was not necessary to go to war, and that international law did not have to be respected. Throughout the case, the balance of articulations here was firmly on the side of the identification holding that Britain had to defer to international institutions, making this a strong, usually thin identification.



This identification co-located with five assertions from the 2013 securitizing argument and three from the anti-securitizing argument. In the securitizing argument, this strong, usually thin identification aligned with the assertions that the proposed mission would be just because it was legal and because it respected UN processes, and with the assertion that the international norm of non-use of chemical weapons was an object of worth that Britain had to protect. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1.5. Combined, they made up 18% of the securitizing argument, thus adding 27 to the securitizing argument's receptivity score. The identification misaligned with the securitizing assertion that UN processes did not necessarily have to be respected in order for the action to justified, and therefore that assertion receives a receptivity score of 0. On the anti-securitizing side, the identification aligns with the assertions

that the mission needed to be legal, needed to respect UN processes, and that the international norm of non-use of chemical weapons was something Britain had to protect. These assertions therefore also receive a receptivity score of +1.5. Combined, they made up 10.3% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 15.45 to the anti-securitizing argument's receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
51.9	40.1

The final normative identification point concerned Britain's normative duty to respond to chemical weapons usage. The articulations building this identification point supported an identification holding that Britain could not ignore the use of chemical weapons. Nonetheless, these assertions were primed mostly at the end of the case, making this a strong but usually thin identification.



This identification co-located with one assertion in the securitizing argument and none in the anti-securitizing argument. In the securitizing argument, this strong, usually thin identification aligned with the assertion that the Assad's likely use of chemical weapons justified a response, giving this assertion a receptivity score of +1.5. This assertion made up 10.5% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 15.8 to the securitizing argument's receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
67.7	40.1

Influence Identifications

I will now turn to British identifications regarding British influence over Syria and the Middle East. In 2013 seven British identification points concerned Britain's influence in the Middle East, in particular Syria. These seven identification points broadly refer to different aspects of Britain's self-image as an (un)influential supporter and guardian of democracy and stability in the Middle East. These points concentrated on Britain's ability to support democracy in Egypt, Britain's ability to spread democracy/stability to the Middle East,

Britain's diplomatic influence over Syria, clarity of Britain's role in Syria, the Syria Crisis' trajectory, Britain's ability to see moderate rebels prevail, and Syria-Iraq parallels.

While the first three of these points are relatively straightforward, the latter four can be unpacked quickly. The clarity of Britain's role in Syria point refers to the British public's sense of purpose and coherence in their role in Syria. It encompasses identifications holding that Britain has a clear/manageable role in Syria or that this role is complex/hard to understand. This point is comprised of articulations referring to the worthiness of Britain's goals in Syria, the reliability of its relationships in Syria, and its ability to foresee its future path in Syria. The Syria Crisis' trajectory point refers to how Britain identifies Syria with unstoppable deterioration (and consequently how it identifies Britain with powerlessness in Syria), while the Britain's ability to see moderate rebels prevail point refers to identifications holding that Britain has/does not have the influence to aid the moderate rebels in Syria to victory. Finally, the Syria-Iraq parallel point is comprised of articulations that co-locate the 2003 Iraq experience with the 2013 Syrian situation, or which state that the two are distinct.

The majority of these identification points were persistently thick throughout the 2013 case. The only two that were usually thin are the Syria-Iraq parallel and diplomatic influence over Syria points. Indeed, these were some of the thickest identifications in the 2013 case. This shows that the identification of Britain as an (un)influential supporter and guardian of democracy and stability in the Middle East formed a fundamental part of Britain's international identifications in this period, constantly being primed and invoked to very high levels. These identifications directly impacted Britain's sense of what it could achieve and what kind of international missions were feasible. Additionally, these identifications related to a specific aspect of Britain's influence (Britain's influence in a specific region), an aspect which directly impacted visions of the feasibility of the mission the securitization proposed. These identifications' combined thickness and specific relevance to the securitization makes them particularly important identifications for this case study.

Moreover, the finding that such a substantial portion of the articulations in 2013 concern Britain's ability to influence the exact part of the world that the securitization (which took place at the end of the case) later proposed influencing is quite significant. It shows that for months before the securitization took place the discursive bedrock not only of general international identifications relevant to *a* securitization (such as basic British norms and the influence of other nation-states generally) but indeed the discursive bedrock of very specific identifications relevant to exactly *this* securitization (Britain's influence in Syria precisely) was being laid. This evidences the idea that by observing national identifications over time one can uncover the information relevant to upcoming securitizations that are not yet in motion or indeed predicted. This is a particularly useful insight, as it lends weight to the idea that the content of an upcoming securitization (which usually cannot be known) does not need to be known in order to apply this method and use it to gauge receptivity to securitizations that later emerge.

Not only were these some of the thickest identifications of the 2013 case, but they were also some of the strongest. Five identifications here were very strong, and there were only two weak identifications holding that Britain has and does not have diplomatic influence in Syria. These five very strong and persistently thick identifications identify Britain with an inability to support democracy in Egypt, Britain with an inability to spread democracy/stability to the

Middle East, Britain's role in Syria with unclarity and complexity, Britain with a weak ability to support moderate rebels in Syria, and Syria with unstoppable deterioration.

With the exception of the weak and usually thin identification of Britain with diplomatic influence in the Middle East, *every one* of these identifications identifies Britain with low influence in Syria and the Middle East, painting an unmistakable vision of powerlessness in the region the British focused on the most. Coupling this information on British senses of powerlessness with the above data on British desires to be internationally active and to not ignore the use of chemical weapons in Syria, we see a nation notably torn between what it desires to be and what it feels it can do; a potent recipe for the kind of hesitation and proposals lacking follow-through that we see in the 2013 securitization process.

I will now go through these identifications individually and show how they co-located with the (anti-)securitizing arguments of 2013. First there is the identification regarding the clarity of Britain's role in Syria. This was a very strong and persistently thick identification holding that Britain's role in Syria was complex and difficult to understand. It was built from articulations that stated that the rebels in Syria (which Britain was claiming to back and defend) were fractious and contained jihadists, that Syria was a slippery slope, that the Syrian crisis was not abating, and that the West had no vision for Syria.



This strong, thick, identification mis-aligned with one assertion from the securitizing argument. This was the assertion that there was no slippery slope in Syria, which went directly against a core articulation building this identification, and consequently received a receptivity score of -1. This assertion made up 3.2% of the securitizing argument, therefore reducing the securitizing argument's receptivity score by 3.2. The identification aligned with four assertions from the anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions that the mission's justifications were unclear and lacked evidence, that the consequences of the mission were worryingly unknown, that a slippery slope was on the horizon, and that the mission's objectives were unclear and confused. Each of these assertions aligned with the strong and thick identification of Syria with complexity and unclarity, and consequently receive a score of +2. Combined, these assertions made up 24.5% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 49 to the anti-securitizing argument's receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
64.5	89.1

Next there is the identification regarding the trajectory of the Syrian crisis. This was a very strong and persistently thick identification which identified the Syrian crisis with unstoppable deterioration, and was built from articulations stating that the humanitarian crisis was dire and deteriorating, that the situation as a whole was worsening, that the wider region was destabilising, that the conflict was internationalising, and that jihadists were proliferating.



This strong, thick identification aligned with one assertion from the securitizing argument, the assertion that the action was necessary because the Syrian crisis was worsening fast, hence giving this assertion a receptivity score of +2. This assertion made up 1.6% of the securitizing argument, hence adding 3.2 to the securitizing argument's receptivity score. The identification misaligned with one assertion from the securitizing argument, the assertion that it was possible to bring about a political solution to the crisis in Syria, hence giving this assertion a score of -1. This assertion made up 2.7% of the securitizing argument, hence reducing the receptivity score by 2.7. The identification aligned with three assertions from the anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions claiming that the region was likely to destabilise, that Syria was likely to deteriorate, and that the action had little hope of improving things. These assertions therefore receive a score of +2. These assertions made up 12.5% of the anti-securitizing argument, hence adding 25 to the anti-securitizing argument's receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
65	114.1

Next, there are the identifications regarding Britain's diplomatic influence over Syria. There were two identifications for this point, one holding that Britain had a high diplomatic influence and the other holding that it had a low diplomatic influence, with both identifications being weak.



These weak identifications co-located with only one assertion, which was from the anti-securitizing argument. This was the assertion that more diplomacy could be tried first before the proposed mission, hence giving this assertion a receptivity score of +1. This assertion made up 4% of the anti-securitizing argument, hence adding 4 to the anti-securitizing argument's receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
65	118.1

Then there was the identification of Syria 2013 with Iraq 2003. This identification was usually thin but quite strong, built from the articulation made to a great extent towards the end of the case which synonymised Syria 2013 with Iraq 2003 in an unambiguous and extensive manner.



This identification aligned with two assertions from the anti-securitizing argument, which were the identifications holding that the mission was unjustified and unnecessary as it too closely resembled the rush to war in Iraq in 2003. These assertions therefore receive a

receptivity score of +1.5. Combined, they made up 3.4% of the anti-securitizing argument, hence adding 5.1 to the anti-securitizing argument's receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
65	123.2

Finally, there were three identifications regarding Britain's influence in the Middle East that did not co-locate with any assertion from either argument. These were the strong, and persistently thick identifications holding that Britain did not have the influence necessary to bring the Syrian rebels to victory and that Britain did not have the ability to spread democracy to Egypt or the Middle East. These identifications and the articulations that built them are displayed in the Condensed Segments here.





Influence of International Actors Identifications

I will now turn to British identifications regarding the influence of international actors, specifically the US, the EU, Assad, Russia, the West, and of course Britain itself. Note that these six actors appear here simply as a result of the articulations expressed by the British in 2013. These are the actors that the British focused on and to which they attributed high/low influence. Whether or not other actors who "actually" have more influence should be listed here and whether or not these six really are "actors" with influence (it is particularly debateable whether or not "the West" is an actor) is beside the point that the British attributed actor status and some level of influence to these entities.

Only two of the six identification points regarding international actors' influence were persistently thick during the 2013 case. These are the points concerning Britain and America's international influence, which were frequently articulated whether or not specific momentary events were invoking senses of these countries' influence. Other actors' influence, in particular that of the EU and Russia, invoked identifications only in specific moments related to immediate events. The EU Influence point was only thick at the beginning of the case when questions of the EU's potential to impact the Egyptian crisis were raised, while the Russian Influence point was thick only towards the end of the case when the debate over how to respond to chemical weapons usage in Syria brought Putin's role into the spotlight. It would seem then that in 2013 only Britain and America's international influence formed a fundamental part of British visions of the international matrix of influences, and consequently of British visions of opportunities and feasible missions overseas.

As for these identifications' strength, they were generally weaker than the normative identifications above. There were four strong identifications; one which identified Assad with high international influence; one identifying the West with a lack of international influence; one identifying the US with a lack of international influence; and one identifying Russia with international influence. There were four weak identifications: one holding that the EU is internationally influential and one holding that it is not, and one holding the Britain is internationally influential and one holding that it is not.

It is important to note here that the British *consistently* attribute low influence to each of Britain's allies (America and the West) and high influence to each of Britain's perceived opponents (Assad, Russia, and the EU[410]). This contributes to a sense that international coalitions of Britain's allies and against its opponents are unlikely to have the influence to achieve their goals, which indicates a vision of international isolation and incapability amongst the British public. This is particularly so towards the end of the case when the attribution of international influence to Russia increased sharply while the attribution of influence to Britain disappeared.[411] As such, while the British do identify Britain with international influence for much of the case, they tend to identify the international stage as a whole with an overwhelming imbalance of influence on the side of their opponents, especially at the late end of the case.

Below we see the Condensed Segments for these identifications, which summarise their individual content, strength, and articulations. None of these identifications co-located with any (anti-)securitizing rhetoric assertions[412], but presenting them helps us form a fuller picture of British identifications in this period. First, we see two weak, persistently thick identifications that Britain has high and low international influence.



Then, for the Russian Influence point, we see one strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification that Russia has high international influence.

[410] I will show in the ***2013 Affiliations/Estrangements Identifications*** section below that British identifications held the EU relationship to be a conflictual one in this period, with the EU seen as restricting Britain and undermining British democracy.

[411] See Sheet Eight in the Appendix for detailed graphs regarding this.

[412] Technically the British Influence identifications did co-locate with assertions, but the assertions they co-located with also co-located with other identifications. As the British Influence identifications were weak identifications, their influence is superseded by the influence of the other strong identifications that those assertions co-located with.



The next segment for the Assad Influence point shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification that Assad has high international influence.



This next segment for the EU Influence point shows two weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identifications that the EU has high and low influence.



The US Influence point shows one strong though almost weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identification that the US has low international influence.



The final segment here for the Western Influence point shows one strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification that the West has low international influence.



Affiliations/Estrangements Identifications

The final set of identifications from 2013 is the set of identifications regarding Britain's international relationships (affiliations and estrangements). In 2013 six identification points emerged regarding Britain's international affiliations and estrangements. These concerned Britain's relationships with the US, the EU, Russia, Assad, the Syrian Rebels, and Syrian Civilians. These relationships are defined not in terms of relative influence but rather in terms of the mutual trust and intent that was perceived as existing between different international entities and Britain. They were built by articulations stating that these actors were intentionally working against/with Britain or could present confrontations/alliances. The various types of relationships envisioned ranged from positive and cooperative to negative and outright antagonistic. These relationships reveal much about Britain's sense of international isolation/integration and its comfort with this environment. This directly impacted British visions of who was going to present obstacles and assistance regarding international problems, and consequently British visions of how feasible international missions would be.

Almost all of these identification points were persistently thick, which reveals that the British public's ideas of Britain's international relationships formed a particularly important part of their sense of place on the international stage. Additionally, the concentration on Syrian actors (who made up half of these identifications) long before the securitization itself further reinforces the previous indication that the discursive bedrock relevant not only to a securitization but to the upcoming securitization specifically was laid down in the months before the securitization itself. This again indicates that this research method can be used to uncover data relevant to specific upcoming securitizations even if the researcher does not know the content of these future securitizations.

Note that in this section "Antagonistic" refers to a relationship where the entity concerned is perceived as actively working against Britain or its interests (including normative affronts such as human rights abuses). "Negative" refers to a relationship where the entity concerned is not perceived in a positive light but is described as someone who must be cooperated with despite unpleasantness (rather than as a direct or prioritised enemy/opponent). For instance, the Assad relationship was sometimes seen as "Negative" due to Assad being described as the lesser of two evils.

Every identification in this set was strong. Three were particularly strong, these being an identification identifying Britain's relationship with Assad as antagonistic; another

identifying Britain's relationship with Syrian civilians as sympathetic; and another identifying Britain's relationship with Syrian rebels as unsupportive. There was also a strong identification of Euroskepticism, and two further strong identifications identifying Britain's relationship with Russia as antagonistic and Britain's relationship with the US as negative.

These identifications present a clear-cut picture that reinforces previous identification data. Overwhelmingly, the relationships envisioned here are not positive. The US was never described in positive terms during this case, being at most a necessary if unpleasant ally. Russia hovered between being seen as a necessary ally and an outright antagonist, being perceived more and more as the latter as the case progressed. Assad was usually considered an antagonist, though as reports of jihadists infiltrating the Syrian rebels proliferated at the latter end of the case there was increasing talk of Assad as the lesser of two evils. The rebels themselves were rarely unreservedly seen as supportable allies. Overall then, the previous indication that Britain held a sense of international isolation in the absence of influential allies is reinforced here by a vision of consistently counterproductive international relationships and an absence of truly positive international friendships.

I will now go through these identifications individually to draw out their co-locations with assertions building the 2013 securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments. First, there is the identification of Britain's relationship with Assad as antagonistic. This identification was persistently thick and quite strong. It was built from articulations stating that Assad had targeted civilians both with and without chemical weapons, was actively working against the UK and the West, and was uncooperative and obstructive.



This strong, thick identification aligned with two assertions from the securitizing argument. These were the assertions that Assad was a threat to Syrian civilians and that the action was justified because Assad was harming Syrian civilians. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, they made up 3.4% of the securitizing argument, thus adding 6.8 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. The identification

misaligned with one assertion in the anti-securitizing argument, the assertion that Assad may not have used chemical weapons. This assertion therefore gets a score of -1. This assertion made up 4.2% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore reducing the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score by 4.2.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
71.9	119

Next, there is the identification of Britain's relationship with America as negative. This was a strong but usually thin identification, built by articulations stating that the US relationship had been damaged by the NSA scandal, that Obama was not an admirable leader, and the US was generally not a nation to admire.



This identification aligned with one assertion in the anti-securitizing argument, the assertion that Britain should not be following America's lead. This assertion therefore receives a score of +1.5. The assertion made up 1.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 2.5 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
71.9	122.4

Next there is the identification of Britain's relationship with Syrian rebels as unsupportive. This identification was strong and persistently thick. It was built from articulations stating that the rebels contained jihadists, that they were acting in very concerning ways, that they may have used chemical weapons, and that the UK could not arm them.



This identification aligned with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument. This was the assertion that the Syrian rebels were not clear-cut allies. As such, this assertion, which made up 4.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, receives a receptivity score of +2, and the consequently adds 9.4 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
71.9	131.8

Next there is the identification of Britain's relationship with Syrian civilians as sympathetic. This was a strong and persistently thick identification built from a highly frequent articulation that repeatedly expressed great sympathy for Syrian civilians and their dire plight.



This identification aligned with two assertions from the securitizing argument. These were the assertion that the mission should contain humanitarian relief to aid Syrian civilians, and the assertion that inaction would leave Syrian civilians in a threatening situation. These assertions therefore receive a score of +2. As combined these assertions made up 4.6% of the securitizing argument, they add 9.2 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. The assertion aligned with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument, the assertion that any

mission should be focused on securing a stable Syria for Syrians. This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of +2. This assertion made up 8.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 17.4 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
81.1	149.2

There were two more identifications in this set that did not co-locate with any assertions in either the securitizing argument. These identifications are displayed here in order to give us a complete picture of the identifications present in 2013. The first was a strong, persistently thick identification of Euroskepticism.



The second was a strong, persistently thick identification of an antagonistic relationship with Russia.



Finally, a small proportion of the assertions in the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments did not co-locate with any contemporary identifications, and therefore received a receptivity score of +1. In the securitizing argument, these were the assertions that Assad would only respond to military force, that Britain's credibility and Middle Eastern regional stability were objects of worth being threatened. Combined, these assertions made up 6.3% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 6.3 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. In the anti-securitizing argument, these were the assertions that chemical weapons usage did not justify war, that the British people were not in favour of the action, that responsibility to act lied with other nations, and that Middle Eastern regional stability was an object of worth. Combined, these assertions made up 9.6% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 9.6 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
87.4	158.8

2013 Summarised

Looking at this data, we see a British public aspiring to be active and decisive while at the same time not knowing how to do so and lacking confidence in Britain's capabilities as an international actor. The British public in 2013 were concerned with Britain's status as an internationally active nation as a fundamentally important question of character, yet concentrated only intermittently on what forms of international activity were actually desirable. When they did focus on specific elements of their normative character they were unsure of what exactly to stand for and how, identifying negatively with military force, identifying positively with deference, switching between conflicting identifications regarding international duties, and ultimately not holding any specific positive normative goals regarding what types of activity Britain should be involved in. This desire to be forthright and decisive while lacking a clear sense of what to do and how to do it facilitates the hesitancy and proposals lacking follow-through which we see with the failed securitization at the end of the 2013 case.

The British identified far more consistently with characteristics of international influence, which they attributed strongly to their opponents, waveringly to themselves, and never to their allies. Emphasis on holding clear visions and executing them decisively formed a significant part of identifications regarding international influences, rather than more material-based forms of power. This clarity of vision and decisiveness is precisely what the British aspired to gain yet saw themselves as lacking, particularly when Russia was seen as exhibiting this trait (implying a form of Russian envy). Ultimately this contributes to a British sense of international powerlessness and a vision that the international stage was filled with overwhelming oppositional forces, which is not likely to have aided a securitization effort calling for international action.

Identifications regarding Middle Eastern actors and issues made up a significant proportion of the identifications in 2013, which highlights the usefulness of this method for researching receptivities to various upcoming securitizations whose content is as of yet unknown. When it came to the Middle East, the British held a debilitating sense of uncertainty and lacked confidence regarding Britain's capabilities. They leaned much more on the side of

doubt than clarity, altogether lacking a clear sense of purpose and not knowing who exactly Britain should be supporting. The Middle East as a whole was identified with fractiousness, volatility and uncontrollable elements, while Syria was identified with unstoppable deterioration and regularly equated with the 2003 situation in Iraq. These general and specific senses of powerlessness were reinforced by a sense of international friendlessness, with no wholly positive international relationships coming to the fore at any point during the case study.

In this section I have outlined the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments from 2013 and broken them down into their core assertions. I then presented the British identifications of the same period while highlighting their (mis)alignments to these (anti-)securitizing assertions. Based on the resulting co-locations between identifications and argument assertions, I applied the receptivity scores from my hypothesis to each argument assertion. *By doing so, we can see that in 2013 the successful anti-securitizing argument would have enjoyed a much higher audience receptivity than the failed securitizing argument it contended with*. This data is quickly summarised visually on the Master Graphs on the next two pages, which show that the anti-securitizing argument received a far greater proportion of co-locations with strong, thick and aligned identifications (the best kind of co-location for receptivity) than the securitizing argument. It is also numerically displayed in the table here.

2013 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score Overall	**2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score Overall**
87.4	158.8

This data lends backing to my hypothesis regarding the influence of identifications on securitizations. I hypothesised that audience receptivity to (anti-)securitizing arguments is generated by identification-assertion co-locations (strong, thick, aligned co-locations giving high receptivity; strong, usually thin, and aligned less receptivity; and so on). I then hypothesised that audience receptivity to securitizing arguments provides the conditions for securitizing success in conjunction with other factors such as securitizing move and securitizing actor based factors, and all things being equal audience receptivity can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization. The 2013 data demonstrates that if we treat audience receptivity as being generated in the manner I hypothesised, we can see that the failed securitizing argument was indeed suffering from lower audience receptivity than its counter-argument. However, I must now present my data for the 2015 case before I can truly say that my hypothesis has been strongly evidenced. This is because in 2013 the securitization failed while in 2015 it succeeded, despite the fact that these securitizations were highly similar and indeed almost identical in several respects of securitizing move and securitizing actors. If I can show that in 2013 the failed securitizing argument suffered from lower audience receptivity than its counter-argument according to my hypothesis, and in 2015 the successful securitizing argument enjoyed higher audience receptivity than its counter-argument according to my hypothesis, then I will have shown that relative differences in audience receptivities (generated by identification-assertion co-locations) create conditions for securitization success with a significant and meaningful impact, and all things being equal audience receptivity can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization.



Corresponding Identification Is:

- Strong, Thick, and Aligned to Argument
- Strong, Aligned, But Usually Thin
- Weak/Thin/Not Present
- Strong, Misaligned, But Usually Thin
- Strong, Thick, Misaligned



Corresponding Identification Is:

- Strong, Thick, and Aligned to Argument
- Strong, Aligned, But Usually Thin
- Weak/Thin/Not Present
- Strong, Misaligned, But Usually Thin
- Strong, Thick, Misaligned

2015 Securitizing and Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric

The 2015 securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric data was uncovered via the same research methods, sources, and processes as the 2013 data. The original public documents (both securitizing and anti-securitizing) which I analysed for the 2015 case can be found via Sheet Five in the Appendix, and the raw segments I coded (along with how I coded them) can be found via Sheet Six in the Appendix.

Securitizing Rhetoric

I will start with the "just action" element of the securitizing argument. The "just action" argument in 2015 went through considerable flux the week before the securitization gathered pace, before then steadying out. This indicates that the week preceding the full-paced securitization acted as a tentative period of formation for the securitizing argument. In its final form, the securitizing argument placed most of the emphasis in its just action argument on the claims that military air strikes were just because they were backed by the international community, and would avoid civilian casualties. This shows clear emphasis on both the moral and legal justifications of the military action. The next most commonly made assertions here were that the action was justified because it was sanctioned by international law, and because there was no need to respect the Syria-Iraq border as a conflict demarcation. The remaining assertion was that Britain should not let the memory of Iraq deter future international actions. Overall, the just action securitizing argument balanced moral and legal justifications while making a call to shake off the memory of Iraq and move forward with moral certainty.

Next there was the securitizing argument that the action was necessary. This aspect of the securitizing argument also fluctuated in the week before the securitization gathered pace but took slightly longer to steady off, finding a consistent form about eight days before the end of the case. The main rhetorical assertions forming this aspect of the securitizing argument were that the situation in Syria demanded resolve, persistence, and action, that Britain had to honour its commitment to allies, and that defeating ISIS required attacking them in Syria. These were much clearer and specific reasons for action than those within the 2013 securitizing argument, and hinged much more on an underlying theme of international obligations. Less common assertions in this argument also hinged on this theme, including assertions that Britain had to stand united with other nations and could not outsource its international responsibilities. A final assertion appealed directly to a British sense of strength, holding that the UK's capabilities could provide necessary input in Syria. Overall, the argument appealed to a need for action over complacency, and a need to stand with – rather than apart from – the international community.

Next there was the securitizing argument that the action was feasible. This argument fluctuated much more than the above arguments but again found a stable form in the last eight days of the case. The largest rhetorical assertions here claimed that the action was feasible because it would combine several different tools beyond the military, including humanitarian and diplomatic tools, while the second most common assertion emphasised that Britain was committed to a long term political solution in Syria. While both these claims seek to divert attention away from the military, the third major assertion claimed that the action was feasible because ISIS was militarily defeatable. Other lesser assertions included the assertion that Britain would be supported by moderate Syrian rebels, and that Britain had a comprehensive

strategy ready for the mission. There is a clear wariness here about putting all the eggs of the feasibility argument in the military basket, which suggests a sense of caution following the failed securitization of 2013.

Finally, there were the arguments about objects of worth and threats to these objects. These arguments were both relatively monolithic. The most emphasised objects of worth were the safety of the British people and the protection of civilians internationally, followed by assertions that Western liberal/democratic values were in need of protection. Threats to these objects were consistently described as being ISIS and British inaction, with the greater emphasis being placed on ISIS. At this point we can look at main concerns of the securitizing argument as a whole, which are displayed on the below graph. This graph shows that strong appeals to the safety of British and international civilians, assertions that the action would utilise non-military methods, and invocations of the need to be resolved, persistent, active and to honour commitments to allies formed the core of the overall securitizing argument.



The entirety of the 2015 securitizing argument is displayed on the Master Graph on the following page.

Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric

I will now overview the 2015 anti-securitizing argument that contested this securitizing argument, starting with the anti-securitizing argument that the proposed mission was unjust. The largest part of this "unjust action" argument centred on the possibility of harm to civilians through military action, while the second most common assertion focused on the need to take


Complete Securitizing Rhetoric 2015
Disregard Syria-Iraq Border, 0.9%
Iraq Should Not Deter All Future Action, 1.2%
Will Avoid/Deter Civilian Casualties, 2.5%
Attacking ISIS is Self-Defence, 0.7%
Action is Backed by International Community , 2.6%
Action is Sanctioned by (International) Law , 2%
Defeating ISIS Requires Attacking Them in Syria , 3%
Cannot Outsource Britain's Security, 1.5%
The Situation Requires Resolve, Persistence, and Action, 10.7%
Must Stand United Internationally, 2.1%
Must Honour Committment to Allies, 7.1%
UK's Capabilities Necessary , 3.6%
Mil. Force Necessary For Peace, 2.4%
We Cannot Delay, 1.7%
Britain Has Comprehensive Strategy, 1.1%
ISIS Is Defeatable (Has Been Losing Ground), 2.9%
Assisted By Moderate Local Ground Troops, 1.5%
We Will Combine Humanitarian, Military, and Diplomatic Tools, 5.2%
Committed to Political Solution, 2.6%
British Safety, 13.5%
Democratic/Western Liberal Values, 2.5%
Protection of Civilians Internationally, 5.4%
Britain's Int. Influence, 1.0%
Britain's Credibility, 1.1%
ISIS As Threat to Britain/West, 13.5%
ISIS As Threat to Civilians in Syria (Region), 2.9%
Inaction on Britain's Part, 4.7%
Argument Pertains To:
Justness of Action
Necessity of Action
Feasibility of Action
Objects of Worth
Threats

a more humanitarian route first. There were also smaller emphases on the lack of clear legal authorisation from the UN and the Foreign Affairs Committee, along with an assertion that Britain did not have to support its allies with the proposed action. The unjust action rhetoric nonetheless placed potential harm to Syrian civilians at the centre of its argument, very much banking on this assertion to portray the proposed mission as unjustifiable.

Next there was the anti-securitizing argument that the proposed mission was not necessary. This argument was very straightforward. The two most common assertions (which were made in almost equal measure) were that Britain should attempt to defeat ISIS using non-military tools, and that Britain had little ability to actually make a difference in Syria anyway. A third assertion claimed that the responsibility for the Syrian situation lay with other nations, so Britain did not need to act. It is worth noting that the first of these assertions did not truly counter the securitizing argument, which also emphasised the use of non-military measures.

Next there was the anti-securitizing argument that the proposed action was not feasible. This aspect of the anti-securitizing argument was far more mixed, consisting of several smaller assertions that are fully laid out in the below graph. As this graph shows, the largest part of the argument focused on the assertion that there were not 70,000 moderate reliable local partners on the ground in Syria that would assist with the operation. This is a direct refutation of the assertion within the "feasible action" aspect of the securitizing argument that such a force did exist. However, the securitizing argument did not place much emphasis on the assertion about the local partners (it formed only 1.5% of the overall securitizing argument), so the emphasis on refuting this assertion seems an inefficient use of the argumentative space available to the anti-securitizing side. There is also an assertion here stating that Syria was complex, an assertion that Britain's strategies were incoherent, and an assertion that airstrikes alone would not succeed.



Finally, there were the anti-securitizing arguments regarding objects of worth and threats to these objects. The anti-securitizing argument made the same assertions about objects of worth as the securitizing argument, focusing on British safety and Syrian civilians. However, it stressed that the threats to these objects had been misjudged by the securitizing actors. Anti-securitizing rhetoric instead asserted that Assad, not ISIS, was the real threat to Syrians. It also asserted that taking military action was playing into ISIS' hands and would incite a terrorist backlash, hence creating its own threat. This anti-securitizing argument centres the threat on British action rather than inaction.

We can now take a look at the main concerns of the anti-securitizing argument overall, which are displayed in the graph below.



This graph shows that the core anti-securitizing assertions oriented themselves around the lack of moderate reliable local partners, the incoherence of Britain's strategy, British irrelevance, the inefficacy of airstrikes, and Syria's complexity. The large emphasis here on refuting the securitizing claim about moderate reliable local partners highlights the inefficient dedication of time the anti-securitizing argument spent countering this relatively minor part of the securitizing argument. Finally, we can look at the anti-securitizing argument as a whole, which is displayed in the Master Graph on the next page.



Argument Pertains To:

- Justness of Action
- Necessity of Action
- Feasibility of Action
- Objects of Worth
- Threats

2015 Identifications and Co-Locations

Having outlined the 2015 securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments and the proportional composition of assertions building them, I will now detail the 2015 identifications and highlight their (mis)alignments with these assertions. This will be done via the same system as with the 2013 identifications. Note that the detailed graphs breaking down the data behind each of the Condensed Segments in this section can be found in Sheet Eight in the Appendix. Two Master Graphs providing a snapshot of the full identification data from 2015 are laid out on the next two pages. I break these Master Graphs down here, starting with the 2015 normative identifications.

Normative Identifications

The normative identification points that arose in 2015 were very similar to those in 2013. Points regarding Britain's Mode of International Activity, Commitment to International Duties/Bonds, and Military Role all appear again in 2015, indicating their long-term importance for the British public's international sense of self. There are some differences between the normative identifications appearing in the two cases, with neither the Response to Chemical Weapons nor the Deference to International Institutions points (the two thinnest normative identification points of 2013) appearing in 2015. Additionally, a new point regarding Britain's Willingness to Assist Migrants arises in 2015. This point encompasses identifications holding that Britain should or should not assist/welcome migrants entering the country. It is considered a separate identification point from the Commitment to International Duties/Bonds point due to the sheer number of articulations specific to duties to migrants that arose in 2015 separately from articulations regarding Britain's international duties in general or regarding other international duties.

Normative identifications in 2015 were significantly thicker than in 2013. Every normative identification point was persistently thick, with articulation levels for each substantially higher than in 2013. Normative identifications are therefore far more concentrated on in 2015 than 2013, forming a much more fundamental part of the British people's sense of place on the international stage in this period. Although International Duties and Migrants points became thinner towards the end of the case as questions of international military activity gained salience, they remained thick almost for the entire duration of the case.

There were six normative identifications in 2015: a strong identification holding that Britain should be an active/forthright nation; a strong identification hold that Britain should be committed to international duties/bonds; two weak identifications holding that Britain should and should not welcome migrants; and two weak identifications holding that Britain should and should not be a militarily active nation. This reveals significant differences and continuities between normative identifications in 2013 and 2015. While on the one hand the number of weak identifications in 2015 still indicates considerable uncertainty about what Britain should stand for and what norms it should uphold, there is a consistent shift between the two cases towards the side of using all tools necessary to contribute to the solving of international problems. While in 2013 the British held a strong negative identification with the use of military force abroad, in 2015 they are completely unsure about this. Additionally, while in 2013 the British were unsure of whether they should be committed to international

2015 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Role Generally & In Syria Specifically



2015 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Relationships



duties/bonds, holding weak identifications regarding this norm, in 2015 they have gained a strong identification that they should be internationally committed. The absence of the Deference to International Institutions point further backs this up, removing a normative conflict between the desire to be internationally forthright and deferent. Indeed, the only identification that has not changed is the one holding that Britain should be an internationally active nation, which remains strong in both cases. Overall, in 2015 we see a British public with identifications much more open and even committed to internationally forthright activity utilising a broader range of tools in the service of a wider array of peoples.

I will now break these points down and highlight their co-locations with contemporary (anti-)securitizing arguments. First we see one strong, persistently thick identification holding that Britain should be an internationally active nation, built from articulations that Britain should take on a pro-active, confident international leadership, that Britain should step up to confrontations, that Britain should be internationally relevant, that Britain should not do nothing on the international stage, and that Britain should deliver through action rather than make purely rhetorical international commitments.



This strong and thick identification aligned with five assertions in the 2015 securitizing argument. These were the assertions that Britain should not be inactive now due to past international failings, that Britain must actively defend its security rather than outsource this role, that Britain must show resolve, persistence, and action, that Britain should step up rather than delay, and that inaction was a threat to British objects of worth. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, they made up 20.8% of the 2015 securitizing argument, therefore adding 41.6 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. The identification aligned with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument, the assertion that Britain should be taking more action to resolve the Syrian humanitarian crisis. This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of +2. The assertion made up 2.5% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 5 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
41.6	5

Next, there is the strong, persistently thick identification holding that Britain should be committed to international duties/bonds. This identification was built by articulations that Britain had to fulfil its international humanitarian commitments, that it should be involved in international collective actions, that it should commit itself to international causes, and that it must stand by its international allies.



This strong, thick identification aligned with five assertions from the 2015 securitizing argument. These were the assertions that the action was justified by the international community's assent to it, that the mission was justified because it was sanctioned by international law, that the mission was necessary because Britain had to stand united with the international community, that the mission was necessary because Britain must honour its commitments to its allies, and that the mission was feasible because Britain would remain committed to it in the long term. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, these assertions made up 16.1% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 32.2 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. The identification misaligned with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument- the assertion that the mission was not necessary because Britain could pass the responsibility for the Syria crisis on to other nations. This assertion therefore receives a score of -1. This assertion made up 3.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore reducing the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score by 3.7.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
73.8	1.3

Next, there are the two weak identifications holding that Britain should and should not have an active military role on the international stage. These identifications were built from articulations stating, on the one hand, that the British military was a force for good, the military force is needed for defence, that civilian casualties in war can be avoided, and that Trident is a

worthwhile military tool. On the other hand, there were several and frequent articulations that the British military was of limited use, that military activity simply fuelled backlashes, that military activity worsened conflict, and that ideological, legal, and diplomatic tools were more worthwhile than military ones.



These weak identifications co-located with three assertions from the securitizing argument. These were the assertions that the mission would avoid civilian casualties, that military force was necessary to ensure peace, and that the mission would protect civilians internationally. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1. Combined, these assertions made up 10.3% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 10.3 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. The identification co-located with five assertions from the anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions that the mission was unjust because civilians may suffer, that the mission was unnecessary because only diplomacy will solve the situation, that the mission was unnecessary because military action would not defeat ISIS, that war breeds terrorists, and that war would incite a backlash. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1. Combined, these assertions made up 22.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 22.7 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
84.1	24

There were two normative identifications in 2015 that did not co-locate with any assertions in either argument. These were weak identifications that Britain should and should not assist migrants. For completeness, they are displayed here.



Influence of International Actors Identifications

Next, there was the set of identifications regarding the influence of international actors. This set of identifications once again formed a significant part of Britain's international identifications in 2015. There is a strong degree of continuity in this aspect of Britain's identifications, in that four of the six actors whose influence the British regularly focused on in 2013 reappear in 2015, these being the EU, the US, Russia, and Britain itself (however, Britain's international influence was a much thicker identification in 2015, thick enough that I am presenting it and its sub-identifications in a separate section later). This indicates the long-term significance these actors' influence has for British ideas of Britain's place on the international stage. Meanwhile, identifications regarding the international influence of the West and Assad have altogether disappeared in 2015. Like the normative identifications that failed to reappear in 2015, these were two of the thinnest identifications in their set in 2013, reinforcing the idea that particularly thin identifications are more likely to lack longevity. In their place we see new identifications focusing on the international influence of Germany and France.

Only two of these identifications were persistently thick, those concerning the influence of Russia and the EU. All others were usually thin, with the US Influence point significantly thinner than in 2013 and the France and Germany points thinner than the 2013 West and Assad points which they replaced. Additionally, the overall trend here was decreasing thickness as the case progressed, whereas in 2013 influence identifications became thicker as the case progressed and specific missions became more salient. All in all, this indicates that the international influence of non-British actors was much less important to the British sense of international place in 2015 than in 2013. Within this set there were three strong identifications: one identifying France with influence, one identifying Germany with a lack of influence, and one identifying the EU with a lack of influence. There were four weak identifications: two identifying Russia as influential and as lacking influence, and two identifying the US as influential and as lacking influence.

This shows significant differences between the influence identifications active in the two cases. Whereas in 2013 international opponents were consistently attributed with influence

while allies were seen as uninfluential, here we see two key allies (the US and France) being identified with influence. This is particularly so in the second half of the case when a specific international mission was being proposed. Meanwhile, of Britain's perceived opponents – Russia and the EU[413] – the EU is this time strongly identified with a lack of influence, and the identification of Russia with influence disappears when the securitization begins. The vision of the international stage as a place where opponents are strong and allies weak is therefore much less prevalent in 2015. This likely enhanced a British sense of international capability and reinforces the indication from the normative identification set that the international stage was now seen more as a place for productive action rather than filled with overwhelming oppositional forces.

None of these identifications co-located with any assertions from the 2015 securitizing or anti-securitizing arguments. This is interesting in itself, as it shows that the arguments made in 2015 were much more centred on Britain than on international actors. This further reinforces a shift away from the 2013 mode of thinking about the international stage as a stage filled with overwhelming forces. In 2015, British security rationales were much more focused on Britain itself and its capabilities. For completeness, I will display here the identifications regarding other nations' influence. The first Segment shows two weak, persistently thick identifications identifying Russia as influential and as lacking influence.



The next segment shows one strong but almost weak, persistently thick identification identifying the EU as lacking influence.

[413] In 2015 the EU was once again seen as having a conflictual relationship with Britain, as I will outline in the ***2015 Affiliations/Estrangements Identifications*** section below.



The next shows two weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identifications identifying the US as influential and as lacking influence.



The next shows one strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification identifying Germany as lacking influence.



The final segment shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification identifying France as influential.



British Influence Identifications

In 2015 British identifications regarding international influence focused heavily on Britain's influence specifically, far more so than in 2013. This shows that, while the British were becoming less concerned with the influence of others in 2015, their own international influence was forming a much more fundamental part of their international identifications. The sheer amount of articulations regarding British influence made it possible to divide them under the three distinct sub-identification points of Britain's Military Strength, Economic Power, and International Effectiveness. Given the individual thickness of these sub-points and their significance for understanding important British self-images, I present them here separately along with the overall British Influence point. Doing so highlights the more precise ways in which the British identified with Britain's international influence. This was not possible in the 2013 case given the much lower density of these sub-identification points during that period, which made extracting meaningful information from any of them much less feasible.

While the Britain's Military Strength and Economic Power sub-points were only sometimes thick, their presence and intermittent thickness (particularly the Military Strength sub-point) indicate a substantive shift from the 2013 case in which they barely featured. This backs up the indication from the previous section that in 2015 material forms of international influence were much more important to British visions of the international matrix of influences. Every identification regarding British influence was weak, and particularly weaker than their 2013 counterparts. This indicates that when it comes to Britain's own influence in 2015 the British had entirely changeable identifications.

Additionally, it should be noted that in the second half of the case each of the identifications moved notably towards the side of confidence in British international influence, and the "Britain is militarily strong" identification actually remained strong for almost the entire case. This reinforces previous indications that as the 2015 case progressed the British held an increasing openness to the feasibility of international missions and saw the international stage as less composed of overwhelming oppositional forces.

I can now break these identifications down and highlight their co-locations with contemporary (anti-)securitizing assertions. First we see two weak identifications identifying

Britain with high and low international effectiveness. These were built from articulations, on the one hand, stating that Britain was decisive and impactful, while on the other hand we see identifications stating that Britain was indecisive and lacked vision and impact.



These weak identifications co-located with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument- the assertion that British action would have little impact in Syria. This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of +1. This assertion made up 7.1% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 7.1 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
84.1	31.1

Next there are two weak identifications identifying Britain with high and low military strength, built from articulations directly stating that Britain was military weak and that Trident was ineffective, and competing articulations stating that Britain was militarily strong and that the British military was necessary abroad.



These weak identifications co-located with one assertion from the securitizing argument- the assertion that British capabilities could provide the necessary input against ISIS. This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of +1. This assertion made up 3.6% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 3.6 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
87.7	31.1

The final segment shows two weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identifications identifying Britain with high and low international economic power. This identification did not co-locate with any assertions in the securitizing or anti-securitizing arguments of 2015.



British Influence in Syria Identifications

Next, there is the set of identifications which emerged in 2015 regarding Britain's international influence vis-à-vis Syria specifically. Like their counterparts in 2013, these identifications were again highly relevant to the specific upcoming securitization, reinforcing the indication that this research method can be used to gauge receptivities to various securitizations before these securitizations take place and without knowing the content of these upcoming securitizations. The influence identifications regarding Syria in 2015 focused on Britain's Ability to Remove Assad, Britain's Ability to Manage Syria, Britain's Ability to Defeat ISIS, and Britain's Diplomatic Influence Over Syria. These are quite different identification points to the ones regarding Syria in 2013, with the only point appearing in both cases being the Diplomatic Influence point. Although the 2013 influence over Syria identifications were some of the thickest of the 2013 case, they were also some of the most heavily related to current events of 2013. This indicates that identifications specifically relevant to current issues rather than more general aspects of national character can have particularly low longevity while also temporarily being highly important for how a nation sees itself.

It is interesting to note the total absence in 2015 of identifications orienting themselves around an image of Britain as a guardian of democracy/stability in the Middle East, which was the underlying guiding image of the 2013 influence over Syria/the Middle East identifications. The 2015 identification points are much more streamlined. The Middle East in a broad sense is no longer in focus, with Syria alone coming into focus. Regarding Syria, the British public appears not to be concerned with Britain's ability to improve Syria in terms of democracy, stability, or humanitarian conditions, but instead is concerned with removing regimes and defeating terrorists. Britain's image of its potential role and influence in Syria is therefore less grandiose and more efficient in 2015, oriented less around the introduction of governance systems and more around specific and tangible aspirations.

Unlike in 2013, the majority of these identification points were usually thin, indicating that Britain's level of influence in Syria mattered much less to the British in 2015 than in 2013. In 2015, abilities to manage Syria in general, to remove Assad, or to assert diplomatic influence are only contingently important to Britain's sense of place on the international stage. This reinforces the previous indication that in 2015 Britain was much more focused on its own inherent influence than its relative international influence. Meanwhile the Ability to Defeat ISIS point is the only one that was persistently thick, which once again indicates an increasing focus on military influence and objectives.

There were four identifications in this set: one strong identification of ISIS as defeatable, one strong identification of Assad as unremovable, one strong identification of Britain with high diplomatic influence in Syria, and one strong identification of Syria as unmanageable. This shows that, as in 2013, the identifications specifically relevant to the upcoming securitization are amongst the strongest of the case. This further reinforces the significance of these identifications for the overall success of the securitization, as well as the ability of this research method to identify important discursive bedrocks in the run-up to a securitization.

These identifications are much more favourable to the proposition of an international mission in Syria than those of 2013. The entirety of the 2013 identifications indicated a very low British sense of influence in Syria and the Middle East, whereas two of the four identifications here (the identification of Britain with high diplomatic influence and of ISIS as defeatable) indicate a British sense of influence. Although the overall situation in Syria is still seen as unmanageable and Britain is not seen as having the ability to remove Assad, as a whole the British public's sense of influence in Syria in 2015 is more mixed and positive than the overwhelming sense of powerlessness that emerged in 2013.

I will now break these identifications down and highlight their co-locations with contemporary (anti-)securitizing arguments. First we see one strong, persistently thick identification holding that ISIS can be defeated.



This strong, thick identification aligned with two assertions from the securitizing argument. These were the assertions that the action was feasible because Britain could defeat ISIS, and that the action was necessary because Britain could only defeat ISIS by attacking them in Syria. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, these assertions made up 6.4% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 12.8 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
100.5	31.1

Next there is the strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification holding that Britain has high diplomatic influence over Syria.



This identification aligned with one assertion in the securitizing argument- the assertion that the mission was feasible because it would utilise diplomatic tools. This assertion therefore

receives a receptivity score of +1.5. This assertion made up 5.2% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 7.8 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
108.3	31.1

Next there is the strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification holding that Syria cannot be managed, built by articulations that Syria was a complex quagmire and that there were no ground troops or local partners available in Syria to help manage it.



This identification misaligned with one assertion in the securitizing argument, the assertion that Britain would be assisted by moderate, local ground troops. This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of 0. The identification aligned with three assertions in the anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions that Syria was complex, that the mission could lead to Britain becoming stuck in Syria, and that there were not 70,000 moderate, reliable ground troops in Syria. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1.5. Combined, these assertions made up 26.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 40.1 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far
108.3	71.2

Lastly, there was one strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification holding that Britain does not have the ability to remove Assad. This identification did not co-locate with any assertions in the securitizing or anti-securitizing arguments of 2015.



Threats Identifications

In 2015 two identification points emerged encompassing identifications of certain entities on the international stage as being/not being threats. These points concerned terrorism and migrants. To be clear, I use the term "threat" here as a simple means of signifying "a danger to British lives," referring specifically to the possibility of physical mortality rather than dangers to ways of life or quality of life. The articulations underlying these identifications specifically linked terrorism or migrants with intentions, activities, or processes that were described as (not) actively putting British lives at risk. Of course, the very theory of securitization underscores the meaning of the word "threat" as entirely subjective and socially-contingent. Again, I am using "threat" here as a shorthand for "a mortal danger to life," and am not implying on any level that this is the one true meaning of the word. It should be noted that, on the one hand, these threat identifications were low in number, frequency, and articulations in 2015 (which makes this section shorter than others). Nonetheless, their presence alone in 2015 (compared to their absence in 2013) indicates that in 2015 a sense of international physical threat was fundamentally stronger than in 2013.[414]

Breaking these two identification points down, first we see a strong, persistently thick identification identifying terrorism as an active danger to British lives.

[414] We might consider this set of identifications to be a cross-section of the "Influence" and "Affiliations/Estrangements" sets, as they co-locate with (see Fig. 2 in Chapter Two) securitizing rhetoric regarding both actors with threatening abilities (as do "Influence" identifications) and regarding actors with threatening intentions (as do Affiliations/Estrangements identifications).



This strong and persistently thick identification aligned with three assertions from the securitizing argument. These were the assertions that attacking ISIS was justified as it was self-defence, and that the object of worth was British safety which was being threatened by ISIS. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, these assertions made up 27.7% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 55.4 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. The identification aligned with one assertion in the anti-securitizing argument- the assertion that the object of worth was British safety. This assertion therefore receives as receptivity score of +2. This assertion made up 0.6% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 1.2 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
163.7	72.4

Then there were weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identifications identifying migrants as being and not being active dangers to British lives. These identifications did not co-locate with any assertions in the securitizing or anti-securitizing arguments of 2015.



Affiliations/Estrangements Identifications

The final set of identifications in 2015 concerned Britain's relationships with various other nations. Although affiliations and estrangements identifications once again formed a

significant part of British identifications in 2015, the international actors featured in these identifications (France, Russia, Turkey, the EU, and China) were very different to those in 2013. Only the Russia and EU relationships feature in both cases, with the US, Assad, Syrian Rebels, and Syrian Civilians identification points of 2013 failing to reappear in 2015. As the US relationship point was quite thin for most of the 2013 case and the Assad, Syrian Rebels, and Syrian Civilians points were very much linked to important but temporary issues of 2013, this data reinforces the previous indication that identifications that are thin or heavily related to current events tend to lack longevity.

In marked contrast to the 2013 relationship identifications, three of the five points in 2015 are usually thin. Meanwhile, the only two persistently thick points became thinner as the case progresses. This indicates that in 2015 the British were much less concerned with their international relationships than in 2013, with these relationships forming only contingent elements of the British sense of international place in this period.

There were six relationship identifications in 2015: one strong identification of an antagonistic relationship[415] with China, one strong identification of solidarity with France, one strong identification of an antagonistic relationship with Turkey, one strong identification with Euroskepticism, and two weak identifications of a negative and antagonistic relationship with Russia. As with the 2013 case, we again see a significant lack of British visions of truly positive international relationships, although the solidarity with France identification bucks this trend somewhat. While this does present a continuing sense of international friendlessness, the general thinness of these identifications also indicates that this friendlessness is much less important to the British in 2015 than in 2013 (when these identifications were all persistently thick). Consequently, the vision of the international stage as full of oppositional forces still exists in 2015, though it is focused on much less and is marked by an exception.

None of these identifications co-located with any assertions from the 2015 securitizing or anti-securitizing arguments. This reinforces the previous indications that the arguments made in 2015 were much more centred on Britain than on international actors, reflecting a shift away from the 2013 mode of thinking about the international stage as a stage filled with overwhelming forces. In 2015, British security rationales were much more focused on Britain and its capabilities. For completeness, I will display British identifications of international relationships here. First, we see two weak, persistently thick identifications identifying a negative and an antagonistic relationship with Russia.

[415] As in 2013, here "Antagonistic" refers to a relationship where the entity concerned is perceived as actively working against Britain or its interests, while "Negative" refers to a relationship where the entity concerned is not perceived in a positive light but is described as someone who must be cooperated with despite unpleasantness (rather than as a direct or prioritised enemy/opponent).



The next segment shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification identifying an antagonistic relationship with Turkey.



The next shows one strong, persistently thick identification with Euroskepticism.



The next shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification of solidarity with France.



The final segment shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification identifying an antagonistic relationship with China.



Finally, a significant proportion of the assertions in the anti-securitizing argument did not co-locate with any contemporary identifications, and therefore received a receptivity score of +1. These were the assertions that supporting allies does not justify the mission, that the UN had not given clear authorisation, that the British public were against the action, that Britain should target ISIS finances instead, that Iraq 2003 evidenced that this mission was a bad idea, that Britain's strategy was not comprehensive, that ISIS wanted the West involved in the Middle East, and that Assad was a bigger threat. Combined, these assertions made up 36.6% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 36.6 to the anti-securitizing argument's overall receptivity score. The fact that such a large proportion of the anti-securitizing argument did not co-locate with any contemporary identifications is in itself very interesting, as it shows that the anti-securitizing argument was very detached from the tangible and active concerns of the contemporary British public. It also indicates that attempting to contest (anti-)securitizing arguments by banking on ideas that do not conflict with identifications is a much less effective strategy than utilising arguments which appeal to pre-existing strong and thick identifications. The securitizing argument contained a small proportion of assertions that did not co-locate with any contemporary identifications. These were the assertions that is not necessary to respect the Syria-Iraq border as a conflict demarcation, that Britain had a comprehensive strategy, that Britain's credibility was at stake, and that liberal values were at stake. Combined, these assertions made up 8.3% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 8.3 to the securitizing argument's overall receptivity score.

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far	**2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score So Far**
172	109

2015 Summarised

Looking at this data, we can see that in 2015 the British concentrated far more on Britain's normative character and international influence than they did previously, with a much lower concentration on the influence of, or British relationships with, other international actors. This in itself signals a much lower preoccupation with the status of other nations and overall a greater sense of self-confidence. Normatively, the British are more open to using military force, which is now associated with both efficacy and a positive moral dimension. They are also more committed to assisting in international crises, placing an emphasis on international cooperation, collective action, and shared responsibilities, and are no longer conflicted between the desire to be internationally forthright and deferent. The only normative identification that does not shift between the cases is the desire to be internationally active, which maintains a very similar strength over a long period. Overall, this signals a fundamental desire to be active and a Britain much more open and even committed to internationally forthright activity utilising a broader range of tools in the service of a wider array of peoples.

When it comes to Britain's own influence, in 2015 the British had entirely changeable identifications, far too weak to act as schemata providing any significant filtering effects on securitizing arguments. Ideas of international influence are still largely formed from ideas of decisiveness and clarity of vision. However, there is also a greater emphasis on and belief in

Britain's economic and military power than previously. The British become more confident in Britain's influence as the case progresses. This also applies to British ideas of influence in Syria, which now present visions of both low and high influence in Syria as opposed to the overwhelming sense of powerlessness Britain held in 2013. This focus on Syria again shows the discursive bedrock specifically relevant to the upcoming securitization being laid in the period before this securitization.

When the British did concentrate on the influence of others they concentrated on many of the same actors. However, they no longer saw all opponents as strong and all allies as weak, particularly during securitizations. This likely enhanced a British sense of international capability. It also reinforces the indication from the normative identifications that the international stage was now seen more as a place for productive action rather than as filled with overwhelming oppositional forces. Furthermore, identifications regarding the influence of others are weaker in 2015 overall, indicating that not only were the British less concerned with the international influence of others but they were also less certain about the status of these influences. Ideas of influence are still primarily made up of articulations of decisiveness and clarity of vision, although now (particularly with opponents) material military and economic bases of international influence are much more prominent. This backs up the British shift towards an openness to using military power (observed in the normative identifications) with a shift towards a greater vision of the importance of this form of influence. Additionally, when the British did concentrate on their international relationships they also moved towards more positive visions of these relationships as the case progressed. Finally, in 2015 the British had a more acute sense of international threat, which briefly but intensely formed a notable part of the British public's overall sense of place on the international stage.

Having outlined the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments from 2013 and broken them down into their core assertions, and having then presented the British identifications of the same period while highlighting their (mis)alignments to these (anti-)securitizing assertions and applying the receptivity scores laid out in my hypothesis, we can see that applying my hypothesis to this case reveals that the 2015 securitizing argument would have enjoyed a much higher audience receptivity than the anti-securitizing argument it contended with. The Master Graphs on the next two pages show all of the identification-assertion co-locations of 2015 which were detailed above, and quickly reveal that the securitizing argument received a far greater proportion of positive co-locations than the anti-securitizing argument.



Corresponding Identification Is:

- Strong, Thick, and Aligned to Argument
- Strong, Aligned, But Usually Thin
- Weak/Thin/Not Present
- Strong, Misaligned, But Usually Thin
- Strong, Thick, Misaligned



Corresponding Identification Is:

- Strong, Thick, and Aligned to Argument
- Strong, Aligned, But Usually Thin
- Weak/Thin/Not Present
- Strong, Misaligned, But Usually Thin
- Strong, Thick, Misaligned

2015 Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score Overall	2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument Receptivity Score Overall
172	109

The below table combines the 2013 and 2015 data. It shows that *in both cases the historically successful argument was the one that co-located with identifications in such a way that (according to the dynamics I outlined in my hypothesis) would have allowed that argument to garner a higher receptivity than its opposing argument.*

Argument Aspect	Receptivity Scores			
	2013 (Failed Securitization)		2015 (Successful Securitization)	
	Securitizing	Anti-Securitizing	Securitizing	Anti-Securitizing
Just/Unjust	+130.1	+87.5	+187.3	+119
Necessary/Unnecessary	+153.2	+166.5	+181.6	+59.6
Feasible/Infeasible	−9.7	+187.6	+148.1	+119.9
Objects of Worth	+48.5	+155	+161.5	+114.3
(Misjudged) Threats	+160	n/a	+186.2	+100
Full Argument	+87.4	+158.8	+172	+109

As such, my data has revealed that in 2013 the anti-securitizing argument co-located with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much greater extent than did the securitizing argument. The 2013 anti-securitizing argument co-located mostly with identifications that were strong, thick and aligned, while the 2013 securitizing argument co-located mostly with identifications that were weak, thin, or usually thin. My hypothesis would therefore predict that in 2013 the audience would have been much less receptive to the securitizing argument than to the anti-securitizing argument, and consequently the identifications at play would have been conducive to a securitization failure. Additionally, my data revealed that in 2015 the securitizing argument co-located with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much greater extent than did the anti-securitizing argument. In 2015, the securitizing argument co-located almost entirely with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned, while the anti-securitizing argument co-located almost entirely with identifications that were weak or thin. My hypothesis would therefore predict that in 2015 the audience would have been much less receptive to the anti-securitizing argument than to the securitizing argument, and consequently the identifications at play would have been conducive to a securitization success. As such, my research into the two most similar securitizations in English-speaking countries in the 21st century – securitizations which were similar and in some ways identical in terms of securitizing move, securitizing actors, and surrounding political and cultural contexts – shows that the different outcomes of these highly similar securitizations can be predicted and explained by the dynamics regarding the influence of identifications on securitizations which I hypothesised in Chapter Two.

To summarise, I have taken the two most similar securitizations in English-speaking countries in the 21st century. One of these resulted in securitization success and the other in

failure. I have shown that the differing results of these highly similar securitizations can be explained by looking at the audience receptivity the two contesting arguments enjoyed. By looking at this receptivity, which we derive from the dynamics regarding the influence of identifications on securitizations which I outlined in Chapter Two, we can see that relative differences in audience receptivities create conditions for securitization success that have a significant and meaningful impact, and all things being equal audience receptivity can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization. As such, the audience receptivity dynamics which I hypothesised in Chapter Two can provide a meaningful contribution to explanations of how and why securitizations succeed and fail.

Secondary Identification Data

In my Conclusions Chapter, I will clearly summarise this finding and argument, along with implications for important literatures. Before I move on to the Conclusions Chapter, however, I will present two secondary findings that emerged from the dataset on identifications that my research produced. The first of these two findings concerns the potential trajectory of modern British identifications, while the second concerns how these identifications' strength fluctuated outside of and during securitizations. This data, while not a core finding of my research, is nonetheless of relevance for scholars concerned with identity fluctuation in general, with modern British identity trajectories in particular, and with the strength of identifications in the face of broader forces.

Trajectory of Modern British Identifications

By comparing the identification data from 2013 and 2015, we can uncover a possible trajectory for current British identifications. This will provide an idea of where modern British identifications may be heading, which will complement the above information on the state of these identifications in very recent periods.

Firstly, however, I must emphasise that these ideas of trajectory are made cautiously, with complete deferment to the possibility that trajectories can be shifted suddenly by major events, and conscious of the fact that trajectories become less useful as time goes on without continual tracking of relevant data. These trajectories should therefore be taken as (i) forecasts, not predictions, (ii) revealing of the type of information a researcher at the end of 2015 would have been equipped with had they utilised this research method, (iii) an indication of the kind of information that could be improved upon if this method were taken up by other researchers who could apply it more continually and observe more trends in identification shifts over longer periods, hence keeping trajectory forecasts short-term and well-informed by cumulative data.

To help present the data informing these trajectories, below we have comparative Continuum Graphs. Each Continuum Graph positions identification points on a scale of strength. The higher up on the graph an identification point appears, the stronger the point. A point's position on this graph is determined by how much its content balance swung over the course of my identification tracking study. Any point with a swing of more than 100% is a weak identification. The first Continuum Graph below displays the strengths of identifications that appeared in only one case, while the second graph shows the differences in the strengths of identifications that appeared in both cases.

Strengths of Identifications Which Appear in Only One Case



*Ids. = Identifications

Comparative Strengths of Ids.* Common to Both Cases



Number indicates the difference in strength between this identification in 2013 and 2015. + indicates that the identification was stronger in 2015, - indicates that it was weaker in 2015.

*Ids. = Identifications
Rel. = Relationship
Int. = International

These graphs show that 13 of the 24 identification points in 2013 failed to reappear in 2015. High strength in 2013 was no indicator of long term strength, with 12 of these 13 disappeared points being strong and five of them being very strong. Additionally, the identification points that were new in 2015 were spread evenly along the strength continuum, and four of the six identifications that appeared in both cases were strong in 2013 but became weak in 2015. *Identification strength over the course of weeks and months would therefore seem to be no indicator of strength over the course of years*. More consistently, in fact very consistently, the above data shows that every identification lacking the strength to persist between the two cases were either the *regularly very thin* identifications of 2013 and/or those that were most *closely related to important but temporary events* of 2013. A much better indicator of a lack of long-term strength would therefore seem to be regularly very low density and/or close relation to current events.

If we check to see which of the 2015 identification points fall under one or both of these categories we produce the following table. Light and dark green identification points fall under neither category, indicating that they are most likely to remain salient for the British sense of place on the international stage. However, light green points appeared in 2015 but not in 2013, which makes it difficult to develop an idea of their long-term trajectory. Light red points fall under one of these categories, while dark red ones fall under both, indicating low and very low likelihoods of remaining salient over longer time periods respectively.

Regularly Very Thin	**British Identifications 2015**	**Heavily Related to Current Events**
	Mode of International Activity	
	Commitment to International Duties/Bonds	
	Military Role	
	Willingness to Assist Migrants	✓
	British Influence Overall	
	British International Effectiveness	
	British Military Strength	
✓	British Economic Power	
✓	Ability to Remove Assad	✓
	Ability to Defeat ISIS	✓
✓	Diplomatic Influence Over Syria	✓
✓	Ability to Manage Syria	✓
✓	Germany Influence	
	US Influence	
	EU Influence	
	Russia Influence	
✓	France Influence	
	Threat from Terrorism	✓
✓	Threat from Migrants	✓
✓	France Relationship	
	Russia Relationship	
	EU Relationship	
✓	Turkey Relationship	
✓	China Relationship	

At this point, if we compare the content of British international identifications in 2013 and 2015 we can see certain clear trajectories regarding the content of above dark green identification points.

Two of the dark green points steadily maintained one identification in both cases. The Mode of International Activity point remained very steady between to the two cases, consistently holding a "Britain should be active/forthright" identification with no signs at any point of this identification significantly wavering. Additionally, the EU Relationship point steadily held a "Euroskeptic" identification in both cases without any major signs of this changing. If these current trajectories continue we would expect to see these two identifications maintained.

Three identification points make steady shifts between the cases which indicate clear trajectories. The EU Influence point moves from strongly holding an "EU is influential" identification to strongly holding an "EU lacks influence" identification, while the Commitment to International Duties/Bonds point shifts from holding two considerably weak "committed" and "uncommitted" identifications to holding one strong "committed" identification. Meanwhile, the Britain's Military Role point goes from holding one strong negative identification with military force to holding two weak negative and positive identifications with military force. If these trajectories continue, we would expect to see the "EU lacks influence", "Britain should be committed to international duties/bonds", and "Britain should be militarily active" identifications become more prevalent over time.

Finally, two identification points simply show weakness in both cases, making an idea of their trajectory over time very unclear. These are the British Influence and US Influence points, although the British Influence point does seem to have moved towards the "Britain is influential" identification as the 2015 case progressed. At this point we would forecast only ongoing changeability in these identification points, though their salience looks likely to continue.

Overall then, based on a comparison of the identification data from both cases outlined in this chapter, we would cautiously forecast – with an emphasis on regular tracking of relevant data so as to develop more nuanced and informed ideas of identification shifts over time – that the British look set to maintain or further develop identifications holding that "Britain should be active/forthright", that the "EU lacks influence", that "Britain should be committed to international duties/bonds", and that "Britain should be militarily active", along with "Euroskeptic" identifications. Meanwhile, the British Influence and US Influence identifications are likely to remain changeable yet salient. Finally, the British International Effectiveness and British Military Strength identification points seem set to remain salient, although their direction is unclear given that they did not appear in 2013.

Identifications' Strength Outside of and During Securitizations

Tracking identifications across my two cases revealed these identifications' general strength both outside of and during securitizations. This is because these cases' limits were stretched to include time periods both before, during, and after the securitizations took place in earnest. By the "securitization taking place in earnest" I refer to the period in which a "full" securitizing argument was deployed almost on a daily basis. Before and after this period,

preliminary and partial securitizing arguments may still have been made irregularly. While the securitization in the 2015 case can be said to have happened in earnest between the 14th of November and the 2nd of December, I tracked the surrounding identifications and securitizing rhetoric from the 1st of October to the 18th of December. This makes the case 78 days long in total, and captures six weeks of identifications developing (and strengthening/weakening) without the influence of concerted securitizations. The 2013 case was also 78 days in length. The 2013 securitization took place in earnest between the 21st and 29th of August, and I tracked both the identifications and securitizing rhetoric surrounding this case from the 27th of June to the 13th of September. This produced sufficient "control" data on identification strength outside of securitizations to then gauge whether or not identifications fluctuated more during securitizations than they normally fluctuate outside of securitizations.

The data that emerged regarding 2013 identifications' strength both outside of and during securitizations is displayed on the below two graphs. The first graph is a Continuum Graph. Any point below the 100% mark on this graph is a weak identification. The second graph shows the precise time periods in which identification points weakened (indicated by the different lines' position on the x-axis) and the extent to which their content balance shifted during this weakening (indicated by the different lines' position on the y-axis).

2013 British Identifications on Continuum of Strength



If at its highest an identification was 80% in favour of its red side and at its lowest it was 30% in favour of its green side, then this would be a swing of 110%. The more it swings the more changeable/ weaker the identification is.



The above Continuum Graph highlights that the vast majority of the identification points in 2013 were strong and indeed a high proportion gravitated towards the very strong end of the continuum. Of the 24 points, *only four are weak*. Of the remaining 20, 10 are very strong, although three (the US Influence, Relationship With US, and Relationship With Russia points) are almost weak. Additionally, recalling that the securitization took place between the 21st and 29th of August, we can see in the second graph that the securitization *cannot be seen to weaken any identification*. The second graph also shows that over the course of an 11-week identification tracking study involving 24 identification points (so 264 "identification weeks") there were six instances of weakening, one of which occurred over the course of two weeks. This represents identifications weakening in only 2.6% of the time over which they were tracked. Moreover, of the four identification points that weakened *only one* did so after a prolonged period of strength (the Britain's Influence point). As there were 18 points, including the Britain's Influence point, that showed prolonged periods of strength, we see that *only 1 of 18 persistently strong identifications eventually weakened*.

Next we can look at the same data for the 2015 identifications, which is displayed in the below two graphs (in the same format as the last two graphs).

2015 British Identifications on Continuum of Strength



If at its highest an identification was 80% in favour of its red side and at its lowest it was 30% in favour of its green side, then this would be a swing of 110%. The more it swings the more changeable/ weaker the identification is.



The above Continuum Graph highlights that out of the 24 identification points in 2015 ten are weak, with five of these being very weak. Of the remaining 14, seven are very strong. As such, while the majority are still strong in 2015, altogether there is more weakness than in 2013. Overall, the identifications are spread rather evenly across the continuum, although they still gravitate somewhat towards the strong end. The second graph shows that over the course of an 11-week identification tracking study involving 24 identification points (so 264 "identification weeks") there were 16 instances of weakening, six of which occurred over the course of two weeks. This represents identifications weakening in 8.3% of the time over which they were tracked. This is more frequent than in 2013, but still quite low overall. Moreover, *only two* identification points weakened after a prolonged period of strength (the US and Russia Influence points). As there were 14 points – including the US and Russia Influence points – that showed prolonged periods of strength, we see that *only two of 14 persistently strong identifications eventually weakened in 2015*.

Recalling that the securitization took place between the 14th of November and the 2nd of December, we can see in the second graph that six identifications weakened during this period. However, two of these six (the Willingness to Assist Migrants and British Military Role identifications) were in a state of considerable flux both before and after the securitization, and as such their weakening does not seem to be connected to the securitization's outset or closure. As such there are four instances in which the identifications can be seen to weaken during a securitization period.

At this point, by combining the data on identification strength from both cases we can forward an empirical and context-conscious datapoint (and one that can be treated as a base that can be built on through continued and regularly refined research on this topic) regarding

identifications' strength during and outside of securitizations. Looking at the two cases, we see that identifications only weaken 2.6% of the time in the 2013 case and 8.3% of the time in the 2015 case, which averages out at 5.5% of the time over which identifications were observed. Additionally, out of the 32 identifications which showed periods of prolonged strength over the two cases – 18 from 2013 and 14 from 2015 – only three eventually weaken. Empirically speaking then, the observed identifications in modern Britain tend to be strong the vast majority of the time, and if they are strong for prolonged periods they seem particularly unlikely to weaken. As such, the datapoint I present here regarding identifications' general strength is that they weaken very rarely.

The datapoint I present regarding identifications' strength during securitizations is that securitizations can weaken identifications, but rarely and usually in a specific circumstance. The fact that across both cases there are only four examples of identifications weakening during a securitization shows us the possibility but rarity of identifications weakening during securitization periods. Yet, why would we think that it is the securitization process that is weakening these identifications, and why would we think that this tends to happen in a specific circumstance? To explicate this answer, we can examine a common characteristic that three of these four weakenings share, which is that they are directly related to changes in British perceptions of the decisiveness of a certain nation, a change in perception that is consistently linked to that nation's reaction to a securitization.

Why does this seem to be the case? The four identification points that weaken during securitizations are the Russia Relationship, British Influence, US Influence, and Russia Influence points. Looking at these points, we can see that the latter three weaken in tandem with shifts in attributions of decisiveness to these three nations. How do we see this for each of these three identification points?

For the British Influence point, the "Britain lacks influence" identification weakens during the securitization *in parallel* with the shift in its "Britain is internationally effective" sub-identification[416]. This sub-identification was primarily (over 50%) composed of a "Britain is decisive" articulation[417], meaning that without a shift in this "Britain is decisive" articulation the weakening of the "Britain lacks influence" identification would not have been possible.

For the US Influence point, when the "US lacks influence" identification weakens during the securitization it is replaced with a "US is influential" identification which is comprised *solely* of a "US is decisive" articulation[418]. This means it would have been impossible for the "US is influential" identification to arise without the "US is decisive" articulation suddenly outweighing *all other* articulations under this US Influence point.

For the Russia Influence point, the "Russia is influential" identification weakens into a "Russia lacks influence" identification. This is despite the fact that the "Russia is decisive" articulation underlying the "Russia is influential" identification outweighs *every articulation*

[416] See the "2015 General British Influence Identifications: Strength/Content" Graph in Sheet Eight in the Appendix.
[417] See the "2015 Articulations Regarding British High/Low Influence Overall" Graph in Sheet Eight in the Appendix.
[418] See the "2015 Articulations Regarding The US Being Influential/Lacking Influence" Graph in Sheet Eight in the Appendix.

underlying the "Russia lacks influence" identification *combined.*[419] This means it would have been impossible for the "Russia is influential" identification to weaken into a "Russia lacks influence" identification as it did without a major downturn in the frequency of this "Russia is decisive" articulation.

It would seem then, that in three of the four instances we have of identifications weakening during securitization periods they do so as a direct result of shifts in the attributions of decisiveness afforded to specific nations. What is important to note is that these shifts in decisiveness articulations are *consistently linked* to the ways in which nations react to securitizations.

British normative and influence identifications in both 2013 and 2015 show that the British strongly and persistently aspired towards being an internationally active nation, consistently valuing decisiveness and activity, while judging different nations by the extent to which they seem to hold these traits. In instances where nations react to securitization periods by stepping up to confrontations and getting involved in international missions to solve specific international problems, such as with Britain and America in 2015 and Russia in 2013, these nations are attributed with enhanced decisiveness and this consequently weakens identifications. Meanwhile, in instances where nations do not react to securitization periods with increased international activity against specific international problems, such as with Britain, and the US in 2013 and Russia in 2015,[420] they are attributed with less decisiveness and again identifications weaken. This presents us with the possibility that securitizations can weaken British identifications by *acting as a test of a nation's decisiveness*, which can consequently weaken certain influence identifications. As such, *securitizations would seem to be able to weaken British identifications that are closely tied to ideas of national decisiveness.*

As such, the empirical and context-conscious datapoint (which can be treated as a base that can be built on through continued and regularly refined research on this topic) regarding identifications' strength in general and during securitizations which I present here is as follows: *For the British public in very recent periods identifications weaken very rarely, particularly if these identifications show prolonged strength. Securitizations seem only able to weaken specific influence identifications that are tied to ideas of national decisiveness, which they do by presenting a test of the extent to which various nations hold this trait.*

Having presented my data, I will now move on to my Conclusions Chapter where I will summarise my findings and their implications for important literatures.

[419] See the "2015 Articulations Regarding Russia Being Influential/Lacking Influence" Graph in Sheet Eight in the Appendix.

[420] As I outlined in the Environment Chapter, during the 2015 securitization Russia was seen as avoiding rather than contributing to the fight against ISIS.

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions, Contributions, and Recommendations

At the outset of this thesis I laid out the core research question "How do the public audience's identifications influence the success and failure of securitizations?" To answer this question, I built on previous critiques of securitization theory and synthesised research from fields of identity and cognitive studies. This allowed me to develop a hypothesis in answer to my research question. I subsequently conducted an empirical investigation into contemporary British identifications and securitizations which provided evidence to support my hypothesis. My research has additionally produced holistic pictures of the core international identifications held by the contemporary British public, pictures which have shown how the British have viewed their nation's place on the international stage during recent and consequential periods. This has been accompanied with an outline of identification trajectories indicating which of these visions seem set to shift, remain, and disappear. In this chapter I will summarise these findings and how they contribute to important literatures. I will begin with a summary of my findings.

Summary of Findings

My research has produced three sets of findings. The first (and primary) finding regards the influence of public audiences' identifications on securitization success. The other two findings are secondary and intended as datapoints of note to scholars studying identity in general and British identity in particular. These secondary findings regard the recent status and trajectory of the British public's identifications, and the stability of identifications both in general and during securitizations specifically. I will now summarise each of these sets of findings in order.

Influence of Public Audience Identifications on Securitization Success

This thesis has presented theoretical reasons and empirical evidence that *the relationships/co-locations between public audience's identifications and (anti-)securitizing arguments generate specific levels of audience receptivities. These receptivity levels impact the ability of each argument to (de)securitize issues.* In Chapter Two, I drew from cognitive, securitization, and identity studies to produce a hypothesis. This hypothesis' main components included:

1. In securitizations which are publicly visible and that require the approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can come into effect, the public (defined as individuals who are citizens of the state) becomes a relevant audience for the securitization.
2. Individuals' identifications or self-schemata have important characteristics regarding their strength, thickness, and alignment of content to rhetoric.
3. Depending on the status of an individual's identification characteristics (strong, thin, misaligned, etc.), these identifications will filter in/out certain rhetoric that the individual is exposed to. This will generate different levels of audience receptivity to rhetoric, based on the system illustrated below.


The public audience's pre-existing identifications
Are they strong or weak?
Weak (*no schemata – receptivity increases*)
+1 Increase in Receptivity
Strong (*more restricted sec. actor*)
Are they thick or thin or usually thin but sometimes thick??
Thin (*less regularly invoked schemata – receptivity increases*)
+1 Increase in Receptivity
Usually Thin but Sometimes Thick (*inconsistent effects*)
(*more restricted* Thick *sec. actor)*
Is their content aligned or non-aligned to the (anti-) securitizing argument?
Is their content aligned or non-aligned to the (anti-) securitizing argument?
Aligned (*receptivity and resonance increase*)
Misaligned (*receptivity decreases*)
Aligned (*receptivity and sometimes resonance increase*)
Misaligned (*receptivity sometimes increases and sometimes decreases*)
+2 Increase in Receptivity
-1 Decrease in Receptivity
+1.5 Increase in Receptivity
0 Effect on Receptivity

4. The content of national identifications (national norms, influence, perception in the eyes of others, relationships, and history) filters in/out the very rhetoric central to (anti-)securitizing arguments (objects of worth, threats, and appropriate and feasible means of dealing with these threats to objects of worth).
5. As such, the relationships between (anti-)securitizing arguments and the national identifications held by the audience will impact audience receptivity to these (anti-)securitizing arguments.
6. Audiences will not engage with arguments that they are unreceptive to. As such, the argument garnering lower audience receptivity has a lower ability to impact audiences' perceptions of security issues.
7. Consequently, in securitizations where the public is a relevant audience, the contestation between securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments (and thus the success of the securitization) will be impacted by the public audience's identifications.

Having developed this hypothesis, I then sought to empirically test it. To test whether or not public audience identifications did have an impact on securitization success in the way that I had hypothesised they do, I took two recent securitizations as my case studies. These case studies were chosen with the intention of comparing two securitizations in an English-speaking country in the 21st century that were highly similar if not identical in several important aspects, yet which produced different outcomes (success and failure respectively). The two case studies I selected were almost identical in terms of securitizing actors and securitizing environment (including the political, cultural, media landscape), and highly similar in terms of securitizing proposition. Additionally, in both cases the criteria I had laid out for situations in which the public is a relevant audience (securitizations which are publicly visible and that require the approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can come into effect) were met.

Selecting such similar securitizations allowed me to isolate the factor of relationships between public audience identifications and (anti-)securitizing arguments. I could therefore test if the differences between these relationships in the two cases could account for the securitization succeeding in one case and failing in the other. In essence, by equalising the status of all other important factors and allowing for variance in this factor, I tested to see if this factor has an impact on securitization success in the manner that I hypothesised.

Drawing from identity studies, I developed an inductive, interpretive, and empirical method for recovering public identifications from historic time periods. I applied my method to my case studies and in doing so tracked and mapped public identifications within these periods. This included a track of their strength, thickness and content, and a breaking down of their content in terms of norms, influence, and relationships. I also analysed the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments made in the same time periods, breaking them down into arguments about objects of worth, threats, and appropriate and feasible means of dealing with these threats. I was then able see the relationships between public audience identifications and (anti-)securitizing arguments. Based on these relationships, I applied the following receptivity scores (derived from my hypothesis) to the (anti-)securitizing arguments.

Identification Co-located With Argument	Receptivity Score For Argument
Strong, Thick, Aligned	+2
Strong, Usually Thin, Aligned	+1.5
Weak/Thin/Not Present	+1
Strong, Usually Thin, Misaligned	0
Strong, Thick, Misaligned	-1

Applying these scores clearly showed that if the public is a relevant audience in certain securitizations as I hypothesised, and if identifications have an impact of securitizations as I hypothesised, then my hypothesis would predict and explain the failure of the 2013 securitization as being the result of the securitizing argument garnering much lower audience receptivity than the anti-securitizing argument. Meanwhile, the success of the 2015 securitization would be predicted and explained by my hypothesis as being the result of the securitizing argument garnering much higher audience receptivity than the anti-securitizing argument in 2015. As such, a comparison of actual historical securitization outcomes (failure in 2013 and success in 2015) with outcomes predicted by my hypothesis reveals that in my case studies public audience identifications influenced securitizations as my hypothesis predicted they would. This is a strong empirical validation of my hypothesis.

This finding can be most succinctly summarised as follows. In answer to my research question – "How do the public audience's identifications influence the success and failure of securitizations?" – I have found that *the relationships/co-locations between the public audience's identifications and (anti-)securitizing arguments generate specific levels of audience receptivities. These receptivity levels are generated based on identification characteristics of strength, density, and alignment with (anti-)securitizing arguments. In highly visible securitizations these public audience receptivities impact the ability of each argument to (de)securitize issues. Specifically, the argument garnering lower public audience receptivity has a lower ability to impact public audience perceptions of issues as (not) being security issues. That argument consequently has a lower ability to gain legitimation and authorization of its proposed viewpoint through security practice.*

There is, however, a notable gap here. This gap concerns information on the *degree* of influence that identifications have on securitization success. My research has shown that, all things being equal, identifications can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization, and consequently they have a significant and meaningful influence on securitization success. However, my research has not revealed (nor did it seek to reveal) the relative impact identifications have compared to the impact of other important securitization factors (securitizing move, securitizing actor, political, cultural, and media environments, etc.). To do so would require a comparative study of several rather different securitizations in which these other important factors are different to each other (comparing securitizations involving different actors but the same receptivities, different propositions but the same actors and different receptivities, etc.), and in which neither the securitizing nor anti-securitizing argument has a very low audience receptivity. This would be a complex analysis of several highly qualitative influences in varying environments, which is far beyond the scope of this thesis. What I have evidenced is that the relationships between identifications and these arguments

generate specific levels of audience receptivities to securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments, and these receptivities increase/decrease arguments' ability to (de)securitize issues. Nonetheless, it remains to be researched what impact these identifications have relative to the impact of other important securitization factors.

Status and Trajectory of the British Public's Identifications

My research required that I track the identifications of the British public over two recent time periods. Tracking these identifications revealed both the recent status of these identifications and a possible trajectory that they seem to be following.

In 2013, British normative identifications were highly changeable and inconsistent. The British were aspiring to be active and decisive while at the same time not knowing how to do so and lacking confidence in Britain's capabilities as an international actor. The British public in 2013 saw Britain's status as an internationally active nation as fundamentally important to British national character, yet concentrated only intermittently on what forms of international activity were actually desirable. When they did focus on specific elements of their normative character they were unsure of what exactly to stand for and how, identifying negatively with military force, positively with deference, switching between conflicting identifications regarding international duties, and ultimately not holding any specific positive normative goals regarding what types of activity Britain should be involved in.

Identifications regarding British international influence in 2013 made up a much more consistent part of the British public's identifications. They attributed international influence strongly to their opponents, occasionally to themselves, and never to their allies. Emphasis on holding clear visions and executing them decisively formed a significant part of British identifications regarding international influences, rather than more material-based forms of power. This clarity of vision and decisiveness is precisely what the British aspired to gain yet saw themselves as lacking, particularly when Russia was seen as exhibiting this trait (implying a form of Russian envy). Ultimately this contributed to a British sense of international powerlessness and a vision of the international stage as being filled with overwhelming oppositional forces.

Finally, in 2013, identifications regarding Middle Eastern actors and issues made up a significant proportion of the British public's identifications. When it came to the Middle East, the British held a debilitating sense of confusion about their goals and lacked confidence in Britain's capabilities. They gravitated much more to the side of doubt than certainty, altogether lacking a clear sense of purpose and not knowing who exactly Britain should be supporting. The Middle East as a whole was identified with fractiousness, volatility and uncontrollable elements, while Syria was identified with unstoppable deterioration and regularly equated with the 2003 situation in Iraq. These general and specific senses of powerlessness were reinforced by a sense of international friendlessness, with no wholly positive international relationships coming to the fore at any point in 2013.

All the British identifications from 2013 are summarised visually in the graphs on the next two pages.

2013 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Role Generally & In ME*/Syria Specifically



The core concept which the identification concerns.

*ME = Middle East
Dem. = Democracy
Inf. = Influence
Int. = International
Refs. = Refugees
CW = Chemical Weapons
Mil. Act. = Military Activity
Syr. = Syria

Persistently Thick Identification.

Usually Thin But Sometimes Thick Identification.

The range of ways this core concept was identified with over time.
More Bars = Wider Range = More Changeable/Weaker Identification

Frequency of Articulation Supporting This Identification.
Longer = More Frequent (numerical data for all data points is in other charts)

A blue bar pointing to the most solid green end of the spectrum indicates that at at least one point in time the balance between green and red identifications was 80%-100% in favour of green. A blue bar pointing to the most faded red point indicates that at least once the balance was 0%-20% in favour of red. Etc.

2013 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Relationships



The core concept which the identification concerns.

Rel. = Relationship
CW = Chemical Weapons
Syr. = Syrian
Civ. = Civilians

Persistently Thick Identification.

Usually Thin But Sometimes Thick Identification.

The range of ways this core concept was identified with over time.
More Bars = Wider Range = More Changeable/Weaker Identification

100%-80%
80%-60%
60%-40%
40%-20%
20%-0%
0%-20%
20%-40%
40%-60%
60%-80%
80%-100%

A blue bar pointing to the most solid green end of the spectrum indicates that at at least one point in time the balance between green and red identifications was 80%-100% in favour of green. A blue bar pointing to the most faded red point indicates that at least once the balance was 0%-20% in favour of red. Etc.

Frequency of Articulation Supporting This Identification.
Longer = More Frequent (numerical data for all data points is in other charts)

In 2015, British identifications were quite different. In 2015 British identifications centred far more on Britain's normative character and international influence than they did previously, with a much lower orientation towards the influence of, or Britain's relationships with, other international actors. This in itself signals a much lower preoccupation with the status of other nations and overall a greater sense of British self-confidence. Normatively, the British identified much more positively with the use of military force, which became associated with both efficacy and a positive moral dimension. They were also more committed to assisting in international crises, identifying Britain positively with international cooperation, collective action, and shared responsibilities. Furthermore, British normative identifications in 2015 were no longer conflicted between the desire to be internationally forthright and deferent. The only normative identification that did not shift between the cases was the desire to be internationally active, which maintained a very similar strength over a long period. Overall, in 2015 we see British normative identifications that are much more open and even committed to internationally forthright activity utilising a broader range of tools in the service of a wider array of peoples.

Regarding Britain's own influence, in 2015 the British had entirely changeable identifications. Ideas of international influence were still largely formed from ideas of decisiveness and clarity of vision. However, there was also a greater emphasis on and belief in Britain's economic and military power than previously, with the British becoming more confident in Britain's influence as the case progressed. This was particularly so regarding British ideas of influence in Syria. Furthermore, in 2015 the British identified Britain with both low and high influence in Syria, as opposed to the overwhelming sense of powerlessness they held in 2013.

When the British did concentrate on the influence of others in 2015 they concentrated on many of the same actors as in 2013. However, they no longer saw all opponents as strong and all allies as weak, which likely enhanced a British sense of international capability. This also reinforces the indication from the 2015 normative identifications that the British were seeing the international stage more as a place for productive action rather than as being filled with overwhelming oppositional forces. Furthermore, influence identifications were weaker in 2015 overall, indicating that not only were the British less concerned with the international influence of others but they were also less certain about the status of these influences. Ideas of other nations' influence were still primarily made up of articulations of decisiveness and clarity of vision, although material military and economic bases of international influence became much more prominent parts of these identifications. This backs up the British shift towards an openness to using military power (observed in the 2015 normative identifications) with a shift towards a greater vision of the importance of this form of influence. Finally, when the British did concentrate on their international relationships in 2015 they held more positive visions of these relationships. They also held a more acute sense of international threat, which briefly formed a notable part of the British public's overall sense of place on the international stage. All the 2015 identifications are summarised visually in the graphs on the next two pages.

It could well be noted that some of the identifications held in 2013 and 2015 were inconsistent and conflicted with each other. For instance, in 2013 the British believed that Britain should be active and forthright on the international stage, but also that Britain should

2015 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Role Generally & In Syria Specifically



2015 British Identifications Regarding Britain's International Relationships



defer to international institutions, while in 2015 they believed that Britain should hold true to its international commitments, but were torn on whether or not Britain should assist migrants and refugees. This presence of inconsistent identifications is to be expected; individuals often exhibit dialogical selves rather than single consistent ones.[421] Their impact, however, is difficult to gauge. On the one hand, conflicting identifications displayed both strength and weakness, which indicates that they are not necessarily more changeable or more easily manipulated than identifications that are unconflicted. On the other hand, the presence of two or more conflicting identifications is likely to have broadened opportunities for both securitizing and anti-securitizing actors to align their arguments to a single individual's identifications. This, however, seems like shaky ground on which build an argument. If an individual holds two conflicting identifications then one day they may find one set of identifications primed while another they would find the opposite set primed. (Anti-)securitizing arguments that align with conflicted identifications are therefore likely to experience varying and rather unpredictable levels of audience support. As such, these conflicting identifications would seem to be unreliable friends for (anti-)securitizing actors to appeal to. A concerted study into the impact of these conflicting identifications is nonetheless warranted, as during my research too few conflicting identifications emerged for any extraction of meaningful trends regarding their impact on securitizations.

By breaking down the 2013 and 2015 sets of identifications and analysing the continuities and differences between them, certain trajectories were ascertained. These trajectories were made cautiously, with complete deferment to the possibility that trajectories can be shifted suddenly by major events, and conscious of the fact that trajectories become less useful as time goes on without continual tracking of relevant data. Analysis of the evolution of British identifications between 2013 and 2015 revealed that short-term identification stability was no indicator of long-term stability. Much more reliable indicators of long-term stability were high density and/or a lack of close relation to current events. Applying these indicators to the British identifications observed in 2015 revealed which identifications were likely to remain salient in the future, while observing the development of these identifications between the cases revealed what form they were likely to take on over time.

The clearest among these trajectories were that the British look set to maintain or further develop identifications holding that Britain should be active/forthright, that the EU lacks influence, that Britain should be committed to international duties/bonds, and that Britain should be militarily active, along with Euroskeptic identifications. Meanwhile, identifications regarding British influence and US influence are likely to remain changeable. Finally, identifications regarding British international effectiveness and British military strength seem set to remain salient, although their direction is unclear given that they did not appear in 2013.

It should be noted that a gap regarding this finding is that learning may have occurred between 2013 and 2015 that may well have ceased to occur since 2015. In the 2013-2015 period the British public were exposed to a number of highly salient narratives regarding the status of Britain and the international society which it sat within. These narratives are likely to have impacted British identifications during this time. Many of these narratives are less salient now than they were in that period. In particular, in the 2013-2015 period the degeneration of Syrian

[421] Hermans, "The Dialogical Self"; Lebow, *The Politics and Ethics of Identity*.

Civil War was focused on to a great extent by the British media, while since 2015 the civil war has (in relative terms) stabilised and coverage of it become more intermittent. As such, the trajectories of British identifications between 2013 and 2015 should not be assumed to have continued without ongoing research. These trajectories should therefore be taken as (i) forecasts, not predictions, (ii) revealing of the type of information a researcher at the end of 2015 would have been equipped with had they utilised this research method, (iii) an indication of the kind of information that could be improved upon if this method were taken up by other researchers who could apply it more continually and observe more trends in identification shifts over longer periods, hence keeping the trajectories short-term and well-informed by cumulative data.

Identification Stability Outside and During Securitizations

Finally, my research has produced data regarding the stability of identifications both outside of and during securitizations, along with a method for analysing this stability. My method for analysing identification strength places identifications on continuums for strength. Identifications can have different positions on these continuums and these positions can change over time or be quickly shifted by specific significant events. This reconciles and accommodates differing research on identification strength which contrastingly emphasises the persistence or changeability of identifications, as I will detail below in the ***Contributions and Recommendations*** section. While this method can be applied across different cases, the data I have produced on identification strength over the course of my research is highly context-specific, relating to the evolution of British identifications over the course of months in two recent time periods. It is also a purely empirical dataset, which I do not accompany with theoretical explanations. As such, I have presented this data within this thesis as empirical and context-conscious data which can be treated as a base. This base can be built upon through continued and regularly refined research into identification strength, research that can utilise these continuums for identification strength.

The main data points on identification strength both outside of and during securitizations which I present in this thesis are as follows.

1. In the contemporary British context, identifications only weakened 5.5% of the time over which they were observed.
2. Out of the 32 identifications which showed periods of prolonged strength only three eventually weakened.
3. Securitizations displayed a low (but not non-existent) ability to affect identification strength.
4. Identifications seemed to weaken in response specific shifts in attributions of decisiveness to different nations, shifts which seem to have been brought on by securitizations.

Contributions and Recommendations

I will now detail how these findings contribute to important literatures, and will also lay out specific recommendations for these fields based on my findings.

Contributions and Recommendations for Securitization Studies

As I overviewed in Chapter One, when asking the question of "what causes securitization success and failure?" the securitization literature to date has primarily adopted three different outlooks. These are (i) non-causal perspectives on securitization success, (ii) securitizing move-focused explanations of this success, and (iii) securitizing actor-focused explanations of this success. My findings into how the audience influences securitization success/failure challenges these three outlooks.

My findings challenge non-causal perspectives on securitization success by clearly demonstrating that pre-existing audience identifications have direct impacts on securitization processes which are initiated in a time frame *following* the origins of these identifications. In other words, a pre-existing element (identifications) impacts a new element (securitizing rhetoric) in a manner that can be regarded as causal. My finding further undermines the non-causal perspectives on securitization that have been noted by Guzzini, Van Rythoven, and Baele and Thompson.[422] Each of these securitization critics (as I detailed in Chapter One) have noted that the original securitization theory equates speech acts with securitizations to an unwarranted extent, and in doing so the theory allowed for a non-causal perspective on securitization success wherein the speech act itself signals a securitization. My findings contribute to this line of critique by empirically demonstrating that securitizing arguments must first interact with pre-existing identifications before they can impact security vernaculars and meanings in local contexts. The utterance itself does not guarantee any outcome, agreement, or rejection. For the securitization to occur, there must first be the negotiation of meaning which is guided in part by the relationship or co-location between arguments and audience identifications. My findings therefore act as a defence of causality in securitization and provide empirical evidence undermining the equation of speech acts with securitizations.

Existing causal explanations of securitization outcomes have, as I overviewed in Chapter One, focused strongly on the securitizing move and the securitizing actor as the primary variables on which securitization success depends. My findings further contribute to the underdeveloped but growing body of literature arguing that the audience must be considered as an important factor alongside these two already well-document factors. My findings clearly show that in two scenarios in which the securitizing move and securitizing actors are in many ways identical or highly similar, differences in audience identifications can be seen to sway securitization success and failure. To be clear, I am arguing that the securitizing move and the securitizing actor both influence securitization success *in tandem* with the influence of the audience. I do not seek to undermine the validity or importance of securitizing move-focused and securitizing actor-focused explanations. Instead, my findings seek to undermine any heavy focus on one or both of those two types of explanations of securitization success. Variations in securitizing moves and securitizing actors will surely impact securitizations' probability of success. However, I have empirically demonstrated that so does variations in audience characteristics, specifically their identifications and the relationship of these identifications to securitizing arguments. All things being equal, these audience identifications can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization.

[422] Guzzini, "Securitization as a Causal Mechanism," 329; Van Rythoven, "Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear?," 443; Baele and Thomson, "An Experimental Agenda for Securitization Theory," 651.

My findings not only lend weight to the argument that the audience must be taken into account in securitization analysis, but also contributes a specific, applicable, and systematic means of analysing the effect of audience identifications in securitization case studies. I have demonstrated that audience identifications have specific effects on audience receptivities to different arguments, and have presented an applicable method for examining and ascertaining this effect. My method of analysis enquires into, rather than assumes, the status of identifications, and therefore can be applied across contexts. It also provides a clear means of ascertaining the relationship between identifications and arguments. It does so by highlighting that the central characteristics of identifications are their strength, density, and alignment to arguments, and further highlighting which aspects of identification content (norms, influence, etc.) co-locate with which aspects of securitizing arguments (objects of worth, threats, etc.).

Such a method of analysis not only contributes to future securitization studies across a range of contexts, it also directly upgrades existing critiques of securitization and turns these critiques into a concrete and applicable tool of analysis. As I outlined in Chapter One, I have adopted Balzacq's[423] arguments regarding the importance of psycho-cultural orientations and perlocutionary effects of speech. I operationalise these orientations and effects as being encapsulated in audience identifications and audience acceptance of arguments. I further adopt Bubandt and Bourbeau's emphases on vernacular security talk by basing all interpretations of what securitizing arguments "meant" in my cases on intertextual analyses of contemporary identifications.[424] Additionally, I have adopted Stritzel's arguments on resonant values in sociopolitical/linguistic contexts by examining how securitizing arguments resonate and ring true or misalign with pre-existing identifications.[425] By building from and synthesising the above works, I have contributed an applicable and systematic method of analysis for examining the effects of the audience in securitizations.

I further contribute to securitization studies a strong empirical demonstration of the promise of adopting insights from cognitive studies into a field traditionally dominated by politically-based ontologies. As I outlined in Chapter One, securitization studies began with the Copenhagen School's highly discursive ontology in which speech acts were the paramount if not exclusive forces at play. Critiques and adaptations of this perspective led to the praxis-based ontology of the Paris School[426], which included a range of institutional elements beyond speech. Several leading securitization critics including Vuori, Salter, Leonard, and Kaunert[427] went on to adopt even broader cultural ontologies. I now add to this mix a cognitive ontology, that forwards insights into physiologically influenced schemata, human development, and learning. For some, this may prove unsatisfyingly non-political, even denying of agency. As I argued previously, my analysis of securitization processes does not seek to deny the place of human agency and consequent political contestation entirely. Instead, it limits this to a form of

[423] Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization".
[424] Bubandt, "Vernacular Security"; Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*.
[425] Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond".
[426] Bigo and Guild, *Controlling Frontiers*; Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease"; Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe".
[427] Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders"; Leonard and Kaunert, "Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory"; Salter, "Securitization and Desecuritization".

conditional agency, whereby those individuals with strong, thick self-schemata that misalign with securitizing arguments are strongly pre-disposed to reject these arguments without truly considering them. Adopting a focus on such cognitive predispositions undermines the primacy of speech, praxis, and even culture in securitization studies to an extent, but not entirely. I forward that cognition should be seen as a building block of commonly held political and cultural knowledge. Our analysis of the evolution, development, or short-term shifts in such knowledge (including knowledge of security) should therefore take cognitive processes into account. In this vein, I further Ted Hopf's push to bring cognition into identity studies[428]. Hopf has argued for identity scholars to adopt a cognitive perspective on identity. I have argued that securitization should take into account identifications as viewed through a cognitive lens. In doing so, I extend Hopf's work on cognition into the field of securitization, and I demonstrate the promise this has for securitization analysis.

I additionally contribute not only empirical evidence that the public can be a relevant audience for securitizations, but also a set of criteria for identifying when the public will be so. This contribution lends weight to the significantly underdeveloped securitization literature focusing on the role of the public in securitizations. As I overviewed in Chapter One, the public audience has long been overshadowed by works treating bureaucratic, technocratic, and elite audiences as the key actors who need convincing in order for a securitization to be successful. I do not deny that for several securitizations such as those most examined by the Paris School[429] (including policing tactics, border patrol policies, and the militarization of police), the public may only pay a belated and marginal role. Nonetheless, in securitizations which are publicly visible and that require the approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can come into effect, the public will be a relevant audience for the securitization and must be analytically treated as such. As such, I contribute to securitization studies a complementary focus to that of the Paris School, explicitly calling for attention to be paid to the mass audience out in the open as well as the elite one sitting behind closed doors. This also ties in well with the FPA literature which in recent years has dedicated increasing focus to the public's ability to consistently constrain the actions of state elites. This is in contrast to previous assumptions in the FPA literature which held the public to be irrational, incoherent, and generally malleable[430], as I outlined in Chapter One.

As such, my findings contribute empirical weight to the argument that the audience, including the public audience and their cognitively managed identifications, must be taken into account alongside securitizing move and actor focused explanations of securitization success. Consequently, a core recommendation I present to the securitization field here is to pursue a more holistic analysis of the contestation that occurs when security discourses clash. When securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments contest each other, we must account for this

[428] Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations"; Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*.
[429] Bigo and Guild, *Controlling Frontiers*; Crowley, "Where Does the State Actually Start?"; Floyd, "When Foucault Met Security Studies"; Tsoukala, "Looking at Migrants as Enemies"; Bonelli, "The Control of the Enemy Within?"; Ceyhan, "Policing By Dossier"; Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease"; Bigo, "When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe"; Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*.
[430] Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," 44; Aldrich et al., "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection," 478.

process and the eventual winner by looking at how these discourses relate to each other, to their speakers, and to their audience's identifications. To do so more effectively, a series of comparative studies should be conducted wherein different securitizations involving similar and disparate actors, moves, and audience identifications are analysed. Such a study could reveal the relative levels of influence these different factors have on securitization success. Until such a study or series of studies is conducted we can only conclude that each of these factors has a role to play, and we must adopt a much more self-conscious admission that any attempts to prioritise any one factor over the other are indeed assumptions. In order to bolster the development of such a holistic vision of securitization processes, the case selection bias towards instances of successful securitizations must be tempered with a higher attention to instances of securitization failures. Without doing so, the impact of various types of audiences on securitization processes can never be fully grasped.

These analytical enhancements can have practical impacts. Adopting these perspectives regarding what moves public acceptance of securitizations is crucial for responsibly and effectively developing any security rationales/policies that are publicly visible, and even more so for those policies that require parliamentary approval. As I outlined in Chapter One, publics can influence securitization outcomes in a variety of ways, from giving moral support to directly driving the demand for securitizing or anti-securitizing measures. As was evidenced by the Iraq War, persistent decreases in public acceptance of security rationales can ultimately render these rationales and subsequent policies unsustainable, while short term bursts in public acceptance can enable the passage of policies that are unworkable in the long run. As such, understandings of how the public powers securitization processes can enable us to monitor and potentially impact these processes through our awareness of what makes them pan out in different ways. Very importantly, this applies just as much to monitoring and crafting better securitizations as to monitoring and crafting better anti-securitizations. Securitizing and anti-securitizing actors, as well as those studying them, can use this knowledge to better understand and influence the discourses that enable and deter (un)desirable security practices. Indeed, this knowledge should overall deter securitizing actors from attempting securitizations by highlighting how difficult it is to generate new security rationales that do not largely reflect concepts about the nation that the public already closely holds.

Overall then, my research contributes to the securitization field empirical evidence that the audience must be considered alongside securitizing move and actor focused factors that influence securitization success. At the same time, my research provides a systematic and applicable method for taking the audience into account. Building on and synthesising previous critiques of securitization studies, I introduce a perspective that emphasises the importance of the public audience and its psycho-cultural orientation – as encapsulated in their cognitively managed identifications – in constituting highly important sociopolitical and sociolinguistic contexts in securitization processes. By demonstrating how these audiences and identifications significantly affect the development of security meanings, my perspective emphasises the negotiated character of securitization processes and empirically counters the previous emphasis on the power of speech acts to generate security rationales.

Contributions and Recommendations for Literature on the Security-Identity Link

In Chapter One, I reviewed how Campbell has argued that security and foreign policy discourse and practices produce identities, and that we should view identity as the "outcome" of security practice and speech.[431] This perspective adopts a heavy emphasis on the processes whereby identity is produced by security, rather than the other way around. Meanwhile Hansen argues for a much more multi-directional link between security and identity, asserting that foreign policy "draws upon" representations of identity and in doing so helps shape and reproduce them.[432] My research lends weight to Hansen's argument and undermines Campbell's by showing that securitizing rhetoric must draw upon and resonate with pre-existing identifications if it is to succeed in its reorientation of security meanings. While I accept fully that state security rhetoric/actions impact identity discourses, my research highlights that identity discourses simultaneously delimit the range of security rhetoric/actions available to the state. In doing so, it presents a challenge not to Campbell's findings, but to his tight analytical focus (and, to be more direct, his overemphasis) on security's impact on identity. Simultaneously, it buoys up Hansen's more two-way approach to the identity-security link.

At the same time, however, my research presents a challenge to the non-causal epistemology that Hansen employs. While Hansen seeks to argue that identity and security are so intertwined that neither can be seen as truly being the influencer of the other[433], I have shown that in the moment of a securitization pre-existing identifications have a great sway in permitting and delimiting possible securitizing rhetoric. This securitizing rhetoric can in turn shape identifications, but my research demonstrates that the influence of pre-existing identifications on securitizations is considerable and empirically traceable. I agree that identity and policy are mutually constitutive, but securitizations take place in time and identities often precede them. Once they meet they then shape each other, but we cannot ignore the extent to which pre-existing identifications delimit and permit securitizing rhetoric. This undermines non-causal outlooks on the security-identity link. Nonetheless, Hansen's argument that "the goal of foreign policy discourse is to create a stable link between representations of identity and the proposed policy"[434] is one that my research provides strong empirical backing to, as I have empirically demonstrated that this process of linking identifications to proposed security policies (finding alignment between identifications and securitizing rhetoric) is central to the success of a securitization.

Furthermore, my research contributes empirical backing to Huysmans' argument that alternative constructions of security must contest each other and do not do so in a vacuum.[435] It does so by showing that securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments must find means of aligning themselves to the public identifications that constitute the sociolinguistic environment these arguments are deployed within. Their comparative ability to do so will directly impact which argument will successfully reorient security meanings in this environment. Moreover, I have examined this contestation of security discourses in highly recent time periods. These

[431] Campbell, *Writing Security*, p8
[432] Hansen, *Security as Practice*, p30.
[433] Hansen, p9.
[434] Hansen, 16.
[435] Huysmans, "Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies"

periods involved a hyper-fragmented media landscape in which few people receive the same news in the same way. In doing so, I have contributed an update to research conducted by Campbell, Hansen, and Williams into elites' ability to reshape security meanings in previous time periods which held a very different media landscape[436]. While their research may have indicated that elite rhetoric had a strong ability to reshape security meanings and consequently identities in those time periods, my research shows that in the 21st century elites have a greater need to draw upon existing identities rather than reshape them.

This further substantiates Waever's observation on "security identities". As I outlined in Chapter One, Waever observed that by the end of the 20th century publics across Europe were increasingly adopting different identity discourses to their state elites[437]. Consequently, state discourses that were based on European identities and highlighting European security needs were being undermined by national discourses that were based on national identities and highlighting national security needs. National populations were therefore increasingly rejecting state rhetoric if this rhetoric was based on identity formulations not held by the nation's public. My research adds to this observation by highlighting that publics in the modern era demonstrate a strong capacity to reject state security discourses that do not align with their identity discourses. Finally, my research lends weight to the argument put forward by Browning that securitizations should not be (as they often are) treated as forces that reify and therefore stabilise identities through invocations of dangerous Others. Instead, Browning argues, security rhetoric that goes against existing identifications can be destabilising for identities.[438] My research backs up this argument by showing that security rhetoric can go against the grain of existing identifications, and if it does so it is likely to be rejected due to cognitive mechanisms seeking stability of self-knowledge.

Overall then, my research contributes to the literature on the security-identity link by presenting a challenge to Campbell's overemphasis on the ability of security discourse to shape identities and tempering it with empirical support for Hansen's argument that security rhetoric must draw upon local representations of identity. I also provide empirical evidence for Hansen's argument that the process of linking identity to security is central to security policy production, while at the same time I challenge Hansen's non-causal perspective on the security-identity link. Additionally, I take Huysmans' argument that alternative security discourses must go through an engagement in a pre-existing environment, and I provide an empirical overview of such a contestation. I do so in a way that highlights how the public audience is an influential group in the modern era with the capacity to reject elite discourses that do not align with their pre-existing identifications. In doing so I provide backing for observations and arguments of Waever and Browning, while also updating Campbell, Hansen, and Williams' older case studies with two case studies from the modern era.

In conjunction with these contributions, I recommend that future research on the security-identity link be conducted in a manner that strongly acknowledges the dependency of both elements upon the other – rather than the primacy of one over the other – yet that does so with a causal epistemology which accepts that security rhetoric often enters environments pre-

[436] Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security;" Campbell, *Writing Security*; Hansen, *Security as Practice*.
[437] Waever, "European Security Identities".
[438] Browning and Joenniemi, "Ontological Security, Self-Articulation and the Securitization of Identity."

populated with identity discourse. Such research should continue to take note of previous works done in older time periods, but be conscious of how the changing nature of the modern media landscape undermines previous elite capabilities to use security rhetoric to shape – rather than simply find alignment with – public identifications.

Contributions and Recommendation for Literature on UK Foreign Policy of Intervention

My research also has implications for studies into Britain's foreign policy of intervention. To begin, my research undermines the longstanding perspective within this literature that interventionist policies are the preserve of the British executive branch. Much of this literature has seen the British parliament as having little to no role to play in the development or even the prevention of British interventionist policies. Kaarbo and Kenealy describe "the UK parliament's weak reputation in foreign policy generally, and security policy specifically" along with "its tendency when consulted to respond with strong cross-party consensus in support of PMs' preferences."[439] When it comes to interventionism, Heffernan has depicted the Commons as "weak and reactive: a legislature that chooses never to bite, a tiger muzzled by partisan politics"[440] while Hill argues that "executives have been able to circumvent parliamentary powers without difficulty"[441]. These observations have significant implications. In an overview of parliamentary war powers from 1989 to 2004, Peters and Wagner pointed out that there is little systematic research on parliament's role in security policy because it is assumed that parliament is unimportant.[442] In short, parliament's longstanding lack of impact on British foreign interventions has created an expectation that it is a non-player in this field and therefore not worthy of extensive analytical attention. This has resulted in an over-focus on executives, with individual leaders' belief systems and even personalities becoming primary variables for analysis in literature seeking to understand British interventionism, as overviewed by Beech.[443]

My research signals that this focus on executives – and overlooking of parliament – in studies seeking to understand and perhaps forecast British interventionism needs to be reconsidered. While parliament may have had little input in the development of British interventions during previous decades, this may be set to change. Firstly, my research indicates that modern publics are capable of rejecting elite discourses that do not align with their identifications. Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that the public is likely to express this rejection through democratic channels which flow more directly through parliament than through the executive. This follows research conducted by Dieterich et al. which overviewed 25 European parliaments over the course of a decade and found that parliaments are the democratic institutions most likely to respond to war-averse public opinion[444]. This responsiveness stems mostly from the greater number of public opinion "receptors" in

[439] Kaarbo and Kenealy, "No, Prime Minister: Explaining the House of Commons' Vote on Intervention in Syria", p30
[440] Heffernan, "Why the Prime Minister Cannot Be a President," p68
[441] Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy,* p255.
[442] Peters and Wagner, "Between Military Efficiency and Democratic Legitimacy."
[443] Beech, "British Conservatism and Foreign Policy."
[444] Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall, *Strengthening Parliamentary "War Powers" in Europe: Lessons from 25 National Parliaments*.

parliament compared to the executive, and the greater incentive for parliaments to influence foreign interventions by preventing them rather than forging them (as parliaments have little to no role in initiating these interventions). Consequently, I argue that parliament should be less assumed to be a talking shop or rubber stamp in the process for developing British interventionist policies. Instead, it should be questioned whether parliament may gain a more substantial decision-making role in this process. As such, my research contributes a signpost that the British parliament may be more capable of preventing and consequently shaping British interventionist policies than previously thought, and in doing so my findings challenge conventional thinking on this issue. I consequently recommend that the British parliament be given more analytical focus and feature more prominently in research on British interventionism.

Since the parliament's decision in 2013 to veto the executive's proposed interventionist policy, some research in this field has indeed adopted a more concerted focus on the role of parliament in British interventions. This is perhaps most strongly exemplified by Strong's observation of a progression towards "the House of Commons [becoming] a forum for policy debate, where MPs exercise 'practical judgement' about foreign policy."[445] However, the literature that has focused on the role of parliament in developing interventionist policies in Syria and in wars more generally has almost exclusively focused on factors that have little to do with public attitudes. Parliament's effect on British interventionism has instead been seen as the result of intra-party politics[446], bilateral relationships between parliaments[447], parliamentary bargaining across party lines[448], and geopolitical realities which parliaments are aware of.[449] The public's attitude has not only been overlooked within this literature, but at times it has even been explicitly overviewed as a malleable factor that can be controlled or ignored by parliamentary elites.[450] My research would suggest that the public is not only a significant factor in the development of certain interventionist policies, but also an analytically reliable one. I have shown that public assent to securitizing rhetoric follows certain rules and dependencies derived from cognitive mechanisms, mechanisms which should be sustained across cases. While the form of public identifications will vary across cases, their relevance and impact will not. This insight undercuts the lack of attention paid to the public and their identifications in the literature regarding the British parliament's role in interventionist policies.

Consequently, I recommend that the public factor be considered alongside the other equally relevant non-public factors listed above. In this vein, there is one recent study into the role of the public in British interventionist policies that I would recommend should be replicated and improved upon. In a 2015 study, Leech and Gaskarth[451] identified variations in British decisions to intervene in different countries during the Arab Spring. Looking at

[445] Strong, "Interpreting the Syria Vote," p1124
[446] Kaarbo and Kenealy, "No, Prime Minister: Explaining the House of Commons' Vote on Intervention in Syria."
[447] Leech and Gaskarth, "British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring."
[448] Strong, "Interpreting the Syria Vote."
[449] Gaskarth, "The Fiasco of the 2013 Syria Votes."
[450] Kaarbo and Kenealy, "No, Prime Minister: Explaining the House of Commons' Vote on Intervention in Syria", p33
[451] Leech and Gaskarth, "British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring."

countries that had similarly high death tolls but experienced different forms and levels of UK intervention, they examined the role that bilateral networks on both the public and elite levels played in influencing British decisions to intervene or not to intervene. They concluded that the solidity and age of pre-existing elite security networks was the core determinant for British foreign policy engagement. On the one hand, this is the type of study (with its emphasis on comparing the influence of different public and non-public related factors across numerous cases) that I recommend should be conducted more extensively in order to properly identify the relative role of the public in influencing British interventionism. On the other hand, the execution of this study can be improved upon in light of my research. Leech and Gaskarth examined public societal links between Britain and various states in terms of the *extent* of media coverage and NGO attention that each state received.[452] Doing so, they eventually found no correlation between these non-elite links and the likelihood of British intervention. Instead of examining *how much* the British people look at each state, my research indicates that future studies should examine *how* the British public envisions each state in relation to Britain. This is much more likely to reveal the influence of the public in the development of interventionist policies, and will provide a more reliable measure of the relative impact the public has compared to elite factors.

As my findings signal that scholarly research into British interventionist policies should focus more on the influence that public identifications have in the process of developing these policies, they further indicate that British interventionism is likely to become an increasingly democratized policy. This undercuts a core point of analysis from previous studies concerning British war powers and foreign policy development. Between 2003 to 2009, research conducted by three British think-tanks – Democratic Audit, the Federal Trust, and One World Trust – and a Swiss think tank – the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces – concluded that British war powers were among the least democratic in Europe, with the public displaying little to no ability to oversee the process whereby interventionist policies were developed[453]. My findings would indicate that this trend may be set to change, and in doing so they back up Strong's more recent observation that "parliamentary contestation both democratizes and challenges the process by which Britain adopts particular roles in the world." Accordingly, it will be necessary to openly and honestly examine the advantages and disadvantages, opportunities and potential pitfalls, of democratizing this process. On the one hand, more public engagement may well deter particularly undesirable instances of interventionism. Nonetheless, increased democratization of interventionist policy may also lead to an inconsistency of Britain's stance on the world stage, with my research showing that even over the course of two years British public identifications are changeable enough to allow for the emergence of two very different attitudes to foreign interventions. As such, I contribute a signpost that British interventionist policy is likely to experience increasing democratization, and consequently scholarly research evidencing how British war powers were recently rather undemocratic may need to be reconsidered. I further recommend that we openly consider the

[452] Leech and Gaskarth, p151.

[453] Burall, Donnelly, and Weir, *Not in Our Name*; Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall, *Strengthening Parliamentary "War Powers" in Europe: Lessons from 25 National Parliaments*.

opportunities and problems that such a democratization would engender in the modern era, particularly post-Trump and post-Brexit.

Furthermore, my research indicates that analysis of debates on British foreign interventions should treat these debates as reflecting British role contestations, not just practical debates about immediate plans of action. I have shown that effective (anti-)securitizing arguments are those that align with national identifications held by members of the public, and contestations between securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments are in part decided by the extent of alignment with national identifications that these arguments enjoy. As such, debates on British foreign interventions – while partly reflecting arguments about the efficacy or practicality of proposed actions – also serve as forums in which varying British self-images contest each other in pursuit of the loudest "chime" with contemporary national attitudes. This contestation is not motivated purely out of a desire to form the most effective type of intervention (including a non-intervention). It is also motivated by individual citizens' desire (a desire that is channelled through their representatives) for their vision of Britain (which they fundamentally believe to be true but which they know is contested by others) to be both expressed and gain dominance within an important national institution. Both this expression and this dominance afford the individuals who hold these images of Britain with a sense of empowerment, as the expression and/or dominance of certain "Britain is x" visions within an important national institution offers a level of demonstrable legitimacy to the claim that "Britain is x." In other words, varying images of what Britain "is" on the international stage contest each other in the context of an intervention debate, in pursuit of both expression and dominance over other British self-images. Both this expression and this dominance provide the constituencies holding these self-images with a sense of empowerment by apparently legitimising the truth of their claim that "Britain is x." As such, interventionism should be treated more explicitly and consciously as a medium for national self-expression and role contestations. As for which self-images we are likely to see expressed through British interventionist debates, my research would indicate that in the coming years certain identifications are likely to have increased salience for the British public and consequently for these debates. Based on the identification trajectories I previously laid out, we are likely to see a Britain that seeks to be more active and forthright on the international stage, more committed to perceived international duties, less wary of EU concerns or oversight, and more willing to use its military power. Future studies into continuing or potential British interventionism should therefore examine the continued salience of these identifications in the development of British interventionist policies.

Overall then, my research contributes to the scholarly literature on British foreign policy of intervention by highlighting the influence of public identifications in the processes developing such policies. This raises questions about whether previous research highlighting the ineffectiveness and non-role of the British parliament in developing interventionist policies needs to be reconsidered. I consequently recommend that parliament be given a stronger analytical focus, and highlight that existing research into parliament's role has largely ignored the influence of public identifications. I also highlight specific comparative research that shows promise in this regard, and I indicate how such research may be improved in light of my findings. My research further indicates that the development of British interventionist policies may soon experience increasing democratization, and I recommend that in preparation for such

democratization we seriously consider the advantages and disadvantages of such a development. Finally, I highlight that British interventionist policy development should be viewed, in part, as a forum for British role contestations, and I indicate a likelihood of particular public identifications becoming more salient in these contestations.

Contributions and Recommendations for Identity Studies

My research presents a method for analysing identification strength by placing identifications on continuums for strength. Identifications can have different positions on these continuums and these positions can change over time or be quickly shifted by specific significant events. This reconciles and accommodates differing research on identification strength – research laid out in Chapter Two – which contrastingly emphasises the persistence or changeability of identifications. This method encourages and facilitates empirical identification tracking studies in order to establish trends of identification strengths in different contexts. As such, my findings on identification strength in the contemporary British context can be treated as a base and example for establishing trends of identification strength in other contexts and for extending our understanding of these trends in the contemporary British context. This base and example can be built on in these contexts through continued and regularly refined research that utilises this method for empirically analysing identification strength and cumulates its findings over time so as to produce reinforced identification trend data and cautious identification trajectories.

The implications of my findings on identification strength at first glance seem to reinforce assertions that identifications tend to be persistent and influential, at least in the contemporary British context. Identifications have been shown to rarely weaken in the short term, and have displayed notable influences on the success of different securitizations. This should encourage identity scholars to utilise their research foci and data to contribute to the study of both securitizations and other important rationale formations affected by national self-images. However, while my research certainly highlights that identifications must be taken seriously as a factor that influences the success of securitizations, a closer look at my findings suggests that identifications cannot be expected to maintain or generate any specific security rationales or demand that any specific security policy be adopted in any securitization. Those scholars who emphasise identifications' persistence and influence, particularly those who argue that identity group members can actually generate and uphold conflicts with other groups as a means of maintaining their group identity[454], should therefore be cautious in their claims and keep the following aspect – and its implications – of my research in mind.

My research into contemporary Britain has shown that in this context *many of the national identifications that are core to securitizations are strong in the short term and weak in the long term*. As I detailed towards the end of Chapter Five – where I also detailed important trajectories of modern British identifications – half of all identifications in 2013 disappeared between the cases, almost all of these disappeared identifications had been strong in 2013, and 17 of the 24 identifications in 2013 either disappeared or became weak between the cases. This long-term disappearing or weakening of identifications is particularly prevalent among the more specific identifications that are directly related to contemporary issues or events,

[454] See footnotes 202 and 203 on page 55.

including those relating directly to upcoming securitizations. By extension, the only identifications with long-term strength are those that are particularly broad/non-specific and rather unrelated to current securitizations. The short-term strength and influence of both specific and non-specific identifications is nonetheless evident.

These findings directly address the differing identity research laid out in Chapter Two that contrastingly emphasises the persistence or changeability of identifications in the face of broader forces. While my research shows that the modern British do steadily maintain their self-images in the short term and reject ideas that conflict with these, it also reveals that these self-images are either very broad or weak in the long/middle term. Consequently, *the range of specific discourses that have a chance of aligning or at least not misaligning with these self-images will become very large over time*. Indeed, even over a period of just two years between 2013 and 2015 the British identity discourses that had greatly diminished the chances of any military action finding favour among the British public in 2013 had been sufficiently replaced.

This changeability of identifications over the course of a few years may be explained by a variety of factors, but I would posit here that a core reason for it is that, as I outlined in Chapter Two, identifications are not held by states or institutions, but rather by the individuals within these states and institutions. States and institutions are constructs with no reflexive capacity and therefore no "self-image." They can have images attributed to them, but cannot hold these images themselves. As a result, while states or institutions may maintain a great degree of stability over time (which would tempt us to think that the identity maintenance needs of the state or institution would be maintained over time, and consequently security discourses would be maintained and specific security discourses generated), the identifications that are core to securitization processes are actually being held by individuals within these states or institutions. These individuals are not nearly so path-dependent and stable over time as states or institutions. These individually held identifications consequently display the breadth and long-term weakness that my research has illustrated.

This breadth and weakness mean that as contexts shift over time basic identifications will not only shift but also be interpreted in an increasingly wide range of ways. This means that seeing identifications as persistent and influential can be helpful but must be done cautiously. On the one hand, identity maintenance demands that certain currently held concepts be verified and complemented by securitizing rhetoric, and consequently looking at identifications provides very helpful in-roads for understanding how securitizations will play out in immediate contexts. On the other hand, the human need for identity maintenance cannot be expected to sustain anything more than the broadest of identity discourses as contexts evolve, and therefore should not be expected to give rise to or generate any specific security discourses over time. However, it does help explain why in the short term identifications display a great deal of stability, resistance to manipulation, and influence over securitizations.

Identity studies should therefore seek to integrate their findings, foci, and concepts with the study of short-term persuasion processes such as securitizations so as to mutually enhance these studies fruitfully. At the same time, they must be highly cautious when forecasting the longer maintenance of security rationales and indeed hold back from any predictions of specific discourses or conflicts being generated or maintained as a result of identity maintenance needs. Identifications are a function of context, and over long periods only the broadest elements of

these contexts will maintain themselves. Predictions of the longer maintenance or generation of specific security discourses as a result of identity maintenance are therefore best avoided.

Normative Implications and Recommendations

This research is not without normative implications. Taking these considerations and analytical perspectives seriously requires affording the public and their pre-existing concepts, visions, hopes, fears, and beliefs about their nation a greater role in securitization processes. Ultimately, this is an admission that the public themselves play a significant role in securitization processes and determine the range of (anti-)securitizing rhetoric which will work, and which will not. This idea runs directly counter to the overwhelming normative standpoint that currently dominates the securitization field.

I refer to the standpoint that securitization is a self-interested trick which is played by and for elites and which ultimately undermines democratic processes and norms. In the original securitization framework Buzan and Waever both detail the way in which securitization processes interrupt so-called "normal" democratic affairs and deter the routine procedures that democratic governance is usually supposed to enshrine[455]. The Paris School's influential take on securitization details how security professionals drive securitizations for their own institutional interests, with Bigo stating that "securitization is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over territorial boundaries" and that "the transformation of security is directly related to the interests…of professionals in the management of unease"[456]. In a decisively anti-securitization work, Aradau argues that securitizations encourage and indeed demand rapid and non-publicly mitigated executive decisions, which is undesirable for democracy[457]. This normative leaning, which has been overviewed in great detail by Roe[458], sits firmly within the tradition of seeing securitizations as projects devised and driven by powerful and self-interested elites.

However, our ability to place responsibility for securitizations and emergent security rationales with self-interested and manipulative elites who interrupt democratic processes in order to forward their interests is greatly undermined by the perspectives laid out in my thesis. My research has shown that – as security rhetoric must align with pre-existing public identifications in order to be successful – the public's sentiments *not only find expression in but also delimit* the range of available security policies that can emerge through securitization processes. This seems a quintessentially democratic process, even if it results in policies – such as heavily policed borders and international wars – that are out of sync with modern liberal ideals. Indeed, the "rapid" nature of securitizations which Aradau, Buzan, and Waever criticize seems, in my research, to have been entirely thwarted by the public unease in 2013 with a rush to military airstrikes which was perceived as hurried and lacking necessary deliberation.

None of this is to say that securitizing actors do not forward private or institutional interests through securitizations that can subvert the production of security policies that are truly in the public interest. The argument here is simply that publics too exert their will on the

[455] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security,* p29; Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization".
[456] Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease", p64-65
[457] Aradau, "Security and the Democratic Scene", p392.
[458] Roe, "Is Securitization a 'Negative' Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics"

securitization process, and the form of the security rationale that emerges from securitizations will in some way reflect (and certainly will not fall outside of) the desires, visions, and understandings of the public audience, even if these visions are not what is "best" for the public. Again, this influence of the public on securitization outcomes and the *conditional* nature of public assent to security rhetoric is something that is far more easily picked up on when we study failed securitizations (indeed, the conditional nature of public assent can only be missed by ignoring failed securitization case studies, which, as outlined previously, much of the securitization field has). To ignore this public influence – and the way in which public self-schemata are a filter that security policies must pass through – and instead to attribute the power to drive securitizations primarily in elite hands can therefore be a form of moral absolution for the wider public that is both unwarranted and dangerous.

This normative bias towards seeing securitizations as undemocratically elite projects is unwarranted as the public does have a role to play beyond being passive recipients of information. Publics have conditional agency and influential points of view that do not simply fall on the side of assenting to elites regularly (or even often). This agency and the commensurate power of the "will of the people" is often triumphed and celebrated if public sentiments influence long-celebrated political changes (such as the civil rights movement). Public agency is just as quickly forgotten and replaced with memories of being tricked or foolishly trusting elites if public sentiments approve – and indeed drive demand for – policies that are later seen as folly (such as Brexit). Even if we were to see publics as sometimes passive, we would still have to acknowledge that different publics allow different securitizations to gain assent. When the Iraq War was being argued for in 2003 the logic behind it was broadcast to the world, where it was accepted by the American public and rejected by the French.

Furthermore, this normative bias towards seeing securitizations as undemocratically elite projects is dangerous because a problem cannot be fixed (if we see securitization as a problem) unless its source is properly identified and unashamedly acknowledged. If we hope to ensure that (anti-)securitizations are conducted either responsibly or not at all then we need to acknowledge the role played by the public and attribute relevant credit and blame for (anti-)securitizations to elites *and* publics. When as academics we provide the academic/institutional knowledge that informs (anti-)securitizations, when as practitioners we execute these processes, and when as citizens we debate and seek to prevent any undesirable developments of these processes, we must focus our attention on publics and elites proportionately and then commensurately apply appropriate normative and practical pressures to both these societal foci.

Implications and Recommendations for International Policy Formation

My research has broader implications for international policy formation. I have shown that highly visible (anti-)securitizations are processed by (and consequently their success and long-term sustainability depends on) a public's conceptions of their nation. This is because (anti-)securitizing arguments contain assertions that directly relate to the character of the nation, and consequently these assertions are filtered in/out by public audiences' identifications, specifically their national identifications. This same dynamic would therefore apply to arguments made by elites regarding any international policy that reflects the character of the nation. These include arguments regarding commitments to international institutions, normative frameworks underpinning international affiliations, and varying sides of moral

debates such as migration and interventionism. Broader public notions of what the nation is, stands for, and can do are therefore key components affecting the success of strategic communications between elites and publics regarding these policies. The success of these communications greatly contributes to making these policies sustainable and/or feasible.

My research does not simply illustrate that attempts to generate new international policy rationales which run counter to certain pre-existing notions held by a potentially influential and hostile public audience are likely doomed to fail. To translate this concern into actionable output, my research provides an applicable research method and a concrete recommendation for its use. Specifically, I strongly advocate that identification tracking studies, such as that which I have conducted for contemporary Britain, need to be consistently conducted in specific contexts. These studies would utilise a method placing identifications on continuums for strength and would aim to uncover national identifications' strengths, densities, and content in these contexts. This will establish and reinforce key data on what different publics believe about their nations. The research I have conducted on British identifications' strength in the contemporary British context can be treated as a base and example for this research. Additionally, the trajectories of modern British identifications which I presented in Chapter Five could be improved upon and kept short-term and well-informed by cumulative data if such a tracking study were continued or regularly updated for the modern British context.

By conducting such studies in specific and varying contexts we can begin to develop more detailed ideas of broader identification trends, particularly trends of identification strength. This data will do more than just provide future speakers with the information they need to successfully communicate the reasons why a public should or should not accept a certain international policy. It will also inform policymakers themselves of what types of policies are doomed to fail due to being based on concepts and national visions that are not in line with public schemata. Additionally, and very importantly, it can inform the policymakers and academics estimating various policies' long-term sustainability of the likelihood of these schemata being changed. This will enhance the study and practice of the strategic communications between the political institutions developing these policies and wider publics. Such an enhancement can directly produce more politically feasible and hence sustainable policy output, along with higher quality academic research.

To Close

By adopting the concepts of identifications and schemata from identity and cognitive studies, and combining them with core critiques of the securitization field, I have produced and tested a hypothesis regarding the influence of identifications in securitizations, and have additionally produced pictures of the content and possible trajectory of modern British identifications. My hypothesis regarding how specific characteristics of identifications affect receptivity to (anti-)securitizing arguments is re-illustrated in the below diagram and table.


The public audience's pre-existing identifications
Are they strong or weak?
Weak (*no schemata – receptivity increases*)
+1 Increase in Receptivity
Strong (*more restricted sec. actor*)
Are they national or non-national?
Non-national (*receptivity decreases*)
-1 Decrease in Receptivity
National
Are they thick or thin or usually thin but sometimes thick??
Thin (*less regularly invoked schemata – receptivity increases*)
+1 Increase in Receptivity
Usually Thin but Sometimes Thick (*inconsistent effects*)
(*more restricted* Thick *sec. actor)*
Is their content aligned or non-aligned to the (anti-) securitizing argument?
Is their content aligned or non-aligned to the (anti-) securitizing argument?
Aligned (*receptivity and resonance increase*)
Misaligned (*receptivity decreases*)
Aligned (*receptivity and sometimes resonance increase*)
Misaligned (*receptivity sometimes increases and sometimes decreases*)
+2 Increase in Receptivity
-1 Decrease in Receptivity
+1.5 Increase in Receptivity
0 Effect on Receptivity

Identification Co-Located With Argument	Receptivity Score For Argument
Strong, Thick, Aligned	+2
Strong, Usually Thin, Aligned	+1.5
Weak/Thin/Not Present	+1
Strong, Usually Thin, Misaligned	0
Strong, Thick, Misaligned	-1

This information can be used to uncover key data indicating how and why securitization success and failure is influenced by public audience identifications. This translates a range of securitization criticisms into a concrete analytical tool. It also shifts the emphasis in securitization research from elites, executives, and professionals to publics, with commensurate and important analytical and normative implications. Securitizations therefore must and can be seen as public and elite processes which are driven by both parties and which are poorly understood unless both these parties' knowledge bases and intuitions are taken into account.

I have additionally produced a method that positions identifications on continuums for strength. The application of these continuums in specific contexts allows us to uncover important contextual information about identifications along with their likelihood of shifting, data which informs research on identity, securitizations, and broader international policy formation. This application reveals what types of information are likely to find favour amongst specific publics, along with the role that identity maintenance plays in the development of security and other policy rationales in both the long and short term. This directly contributes to the development of a more systematic, yet cautious and context-aware, understanding of the stability of identifications and the processes which power important international policy formations.

This work lays the groundwork for continuing research with impact in several fields. Future identification tracking studies utilising this my method can reveal more detailed and ongoing identification trends and trajectories. This can inform both securitizations and the formation of broader international policies, along with contributing to research on identifications' persistence. Scholars and practitioners of (anti-)securitization can therefore utilise my research to highlight and better understand the role of public audiences in (anti-)securitizations, and consequently to craft and study these processes more effectively. This can lead to better scholarship and the deterrence of undesirable policies. My research has further implications for studies into the link between security and identity, as well as for research into British foreign policy of intervention. I encourage both fields towards a more concerted acknowledgement of the role of the public and the role of contestations between varying British self-images in important processes which develop security and interventionist policies and attitudes.

I would like to close by addressing a question not asked by myself but by Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg near the conclusion of the 2013 House of Commons debate on whether or not to authorise airstrikes in Syria. The Deputy Prime Minister claimed that alongside the core question of whether or not to authorise those strikes "there is another question facing us tonight,

which is what kind of nation are we?"[459] Although at first glance my research suggests that Clegg asked the truly pertinent question of the evening, I encourage you to consider that he asked the right question at the wrong time. The question of "what nation are we?" is not one that the British nor any nation answer on the eve of security crises. It is one that is answered and asked anew every day, and one whose answer is always in flux. Scholars of identity discourse, along with scholars and practitioners of security and international policies, both separately and in concert, must therefore find ways to keep up with this question and the answers given to it, or face losing touch with the imagined realities this question and these answers represent and affect. I commend this thesis to you, in the hope that it highlights the importance of, and contributes to, this endeavour.

[459] Source: TheyWorkForYou, https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2013-08-29c.1425.2

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Cameron and Conservative Party 2013:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/tre1r35zar/YG-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-160813.pdf

Cameron 2015:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/z5m43tlvmq/YG-Archive-151026-%20Leader'sRatings.pdf

Conservative Party 2015:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/82cc6m777i/Eurotrack_October_Trackers_website.pdf

Syria 2013:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/jeg8gvexyy/YG-Archive-Times-results-280813-Syria.pdf

Syria 2015:
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6j3n6x9dvb/TimesResults_151201_Syria_W1.pdf

Appendix

Sheet One: Readership Data

The below data displays the average online and print readership of all news sources read by more than 0.1% of the British public during my 2015 and 2013 case studies. It also states the source of each data point. Links to these sources are laid out in Sheet Two.

2015		
UK News Sources		
	Avg. UK Daily Unique Browsers	**Avg. UK Daily Print Circulation**
National Newspapers		
Daily Mail	14,631,628 (source ABC)	1,587,986 (source ABC)
The Guardian	9,276,546 (source ABC)	165,672 (source ABC)
The Telegraph	5,022,155 (source ABC)	480,730 (source ABC)
Daily Mirror	4,565,253 (source ABC)	825,829 (source ABC)
The Independent	3,277,301 (source ABC)	56,005 (source ABC)
The Sun	1,616,705 (source ABC)	1,788,860 (source ABC)
The Metro	1,450,287 (source ABC)	n/a
The Express	1,310,768 (source ABC)	403,343 (source ABC)
Daily Star	651,577 (source ABC)	450,045 (source ABC)
The Times	605,000 (source ABC)	407,566 (source ABC)
i	n/a (no website set up in 2015)	273,961 (source ABC)
The Financial Times	224,088 (source PWC)	205,695 (source ABC)
Regional Newspapers		
Manchester Evening News	558,095 (source ABC)	51,864 (source ABC)
Evening Standard	440,299 (source ABC)	n/a
Liverpool Echo	422,360 (source ABC)	52,389 (source ABC)
Belfast Telegraph	n/a (figure not available)	44,141 (source ABC)
Newcastle Chronicle	203,436 (source ABC)	30,361 (source ABC)
Birmingham Mail	196,284 (source ABC)	24,260 (source ABC)
Daily Record	138,600 (source Quantcast/SimilarWeb)	176,845 (source ABC)
Teeside Evening Gazette	101,305 (source ABC)	23,774 (source ABC)
Bristol Post	97,261 (source ABC)	17,554 (source ABC)
The Scotsman	94,928 (source ABC)	22,740 (source ABC)
The Herald	79,835 (source ABC)	32,141 (source ABC)
Daily Post (Wales)	77,177 (source ABC)	23,272 (source ABC)
Nottingham Post	76,103 (source ABC)	19,824 (source ABC)
Yorkshire Evening Post	75,860 (source ABC)	19,914 (source ABC)
Stoke Sentinel	73,637 (source ABC)	30,957 (source ABC)
Leicester Mercury	72,769 (source ABC)	28,756 (source ABC)
Daily Echo	72,737 (source ABC)	18,772 (source ABC)
Derby Telegraph	71,415 (source ABC)	21,183 (source ABC)
The Telegraph and Argus	69,307 (source ABC)	15,913 (source ABC)
Specialist	**Avg. UK Monthly Unique Browsers**	
The Economist	1,097,732 (source Quantcast/SimilarWeb)	235,350 (source ABC)
The Spectator	348,980 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	71,707 (source ABC)

New Statesman	178,604 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	33,395 (source ABC)
Websites		
Wales Online	258,964 (source ABC)	
Non-UK News Sources		
	Avg. UK Monthly Unique Browsers	
Newspapers		
New York Times	928,714 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
Washington Post	845,000 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
Irish Times	339,150 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
Wall Street Journal	272,673 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
NY Daily News	88,200 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
Specialist		
Politico	278,297 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
The Atlantic	276,920 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
SpiegelOnline International	268,736 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
The New Yorker	215,384 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
Newsweek	148,945 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
Christian Science Monitor	115,146 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)	
Websites		
Huffington Post	13,000,000 (source comScore)	
Vice	4,000,000 (source comScore)	

2013		
UK News Sources		
	Avg. UK Daily Unique Browsers	**Avg. UK Daily Print Circulation**
National Newspapers		
Daily Mail	7,193,926 (source ABC)	1,802,083 (source ABC)
The Guardian	4,294,582 (source ABC)	189,646 (source ABC)
Daily Telegraph	2,875,848 (source ABC)	557,536 (source ABC)
The Sun	1,680,273 (source ABC)	2,258,359 (source ABC)
Daily Mirror	1,123,000 (source NRS)	1,045,971 (source ABC)
The Independent	1,221,330 (source ABC)	68,696 (source ABC)
Financial Times	334,000 (source NRS)	236,281 (source ABC)
Metro	320,140 (source ABC)	n/a
Daily Express	291,000 (source NRS)	530,631 (source ABC)
The Times	178,000 (source NRS)	391,643 (source ABC)
Daily Star	151,000 (source NRS)	547,955 (source ABC)
i	n/a (no website set up in 2013)	295,179 (source ABC)
Regional Newspapers		
Daily Record	188,000 (source NRS)	252,575 (source ABC)
Evening Standard	183,845 (source ABC)	n/a
The Scotsman	119,672 (source ABC)	32,433 (source ABC)
Aberdeen Press & Journal	117,254 (source ABC)	65,482 (source ABC)

Liverpool Echo	91,136 (source ABC)	74,984 (source ABC)
Herald Scotland	63,695 (source ABC)	23,176 (source ABC)
Newcastle Chronicle	41,809 (source ABC)	43,308 (source ABC)
Birmingham Mail	41,498 (source ABC)	40,280 (source ABC)
Hull Daily Mail	38,583 (source ABC)	38,309 (source ABC)
Leicester Mercury	31,977 (source ABC)	40,172 (source ABC)
Belfast Telegraph	n/a (figure not available)	49,228 (source ABC)
Specialist	**Avg. UK Monthly Unique Browsers**	**Avg. UK Daily Print Circulation**
The Economist	n/a (figure not available)	209,000 (source ABC)
The Spectator	349,000 (source ABC)	62,000 (source ABC)
New Statesman	n/a (figure not available)	29,000 (source ABC)
Websites		
Wales Online	63,972 (source ABC)	n/a
Non-UK News Sources		
	Avg. UK Monthly Unique Browsers	
Newspapers		
New York Times	No precise data, but over 100k	
Washington Post	No precise data, but over 100k	
Irish Times	No precise data, but over 100k	
Wall Street Journal	No precise data, but over 100k	
Specialist		
Spiegel Online International	No precise data, but over 100k	
The New Yorker	No precise data, but over 100k	
Newsweek	No precise data, but over 100k	
Websites		
Huffington Post	No precise data, but over 100k	

Sheet Two: Complete List of Sources on Readership Data

The below are links to all the sources mentioned in Sheet One.

Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC)

General
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/category/media_metrics/

UK National Papers Daily Print Circulation
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/national-press-excel-chart/

http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/national-newspaper-abcs-november-2015-stars-rise-after-price-cuts-times-titles-benefit-bulks/

https://www.theguardian.com/media/table/2013/sep/06/abcs-national-newspapers

UK National Papers Daily Unique Browsers
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/newspaper-website-abcs-nov-2015-paris-coverage-helps-guardian-grow-more-50-cent-year/

http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/independent-fastest-growing-national-newspaper-website-march/

UK Regional Papers Daily Print Circulation
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/regional-press-abcs-dailies-liverpool-echos-positive-relaunch-has-negative-impact-sales/

http://www.holdthefrontpage.co.uk/2013/news/abc-figures-how-the-regional-dailies-performed-6/

UK Regional Papers Daily Unique Browsers
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/regional-abcs-online-north-wales-daily-post-leads-way-local-press-websites-grow-more-20-cent/

http://www.holdthefrontpage.co.uk/2013/news/online-readership-soars-for-most-regional-news-sites/

http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/regional-publishers-increase-web-traffic-kent-messenger-series-leading-way/

UK Specialist Publications Daily Print and Digital Edition Circulation
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/current-affairs-magazine-abcs-2015-spectator-new-statesman-private-eye-and-economist-all-grow/

Broadcasters' Audience Research Board (BARB) http://www.barb.co.uk/viewing-data/monthly-viewing-summary/

comScore https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourbeeb/alice-enders-leo-watkins-douglas-mccabe/bbc-press-and-online-news

National Readership Survey (NRS)
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/uk-newspapers-ranked-total-readership-print-and-online/

Ofcom Report http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/tv-research/news/2014/News_Report_2014.pdf

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC)
http://www.fttoolkit.com/d/audience/ADGA_Methodology_PwC_Opinion_Jan_15_-_Dec_15.pdf

Quantcast https://www.quantcast.com/

Reuters Digital News Report 2015
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reuters%20Institute%20Digital%20News%20Report%202015_Full%20Report.pdf

SimilarWeb https://www.similarweb.com/blog/index-top-u-k-media-publishers-and-publications-of-2015

Sheet Three: Links to All Analysed Articles

These are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have included every article which I analysed for articulations in both my cases, along with links to these articles' sources.

2015 Articles with Links: http://docdro.id/6IdHIZc
970 articles containing 697,113 words.

2013 Articles with Links: http://docdro.id/xubcwI6
779 articles containing 606,078 words.

Total of 1749 articles containing 1,303,191 words.

Sheet Four: Links to All Segments Coded for Articulations

Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have gathered every segment from every article which I analysed for articulations in both my cases, along with these coded articulations.

During my research, I manually and interpretively analysed and coded the articles linked in Sheet Three for articulations in the manner detailed in my Methodology Chapter. Upon completion of this coding exercise, I downloaded my coded segments in master excel sheets. The documents I have linked below are copies of these master Excel sheets.

Here is an example segment from these sheets:

Document name	Code	Segment
31-10-2015 9 Huffington Post	Articulations\National Influence\Syria Manageability\Syria-Complex Quagmire	An incredibly complex web of belligerents within the country is further muddied by the involvement of international actors.

In this example, under "Document name" we see that this segment came from Huffington Post on the 31st of October 2015. Under "code", we can see that I coded this segment as containing an articulation that fell under the "National Influence" category. The articulation further fell under the sub-category of "Ability to Manage Syria". The precise articulation was coded as "Syria is a Complex Quagmire." Note that segments may be coded multiple times with multiple codes/articulations. Each of these coded segments represents one coded articulation. When I completed my coding exercise and downloaded these codes/articulations along with their time stamps into Excel I was then able to analyse them on a macro level by plotting the appearance of different articulations over time (this was easy to do via Excel). This produced the Articulation Graphs, Strength/Content Graphs, Density Graphs, and Master Graphs presented in this thesis.

2015 Coded Segments: http://docdro.id/Jr3DbHr

2013 Coded Segments: http://docdro.id/bVEhFn9

Sheet Five: Links to Public Documents Analysed for (Anti-)Securitizing Rhetoric

These are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have included every public document containing securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric which I analysed for both my cases, along with links to these documents' sources.

2013 Public Documents Containing Securitizing Rhetoric: http://docdro.id/81VwDwx

2013 Public Documents Containing Anti Securitizing Rhetoric: http://docdro.id/p1qWgeo

2015 Public Documents Containing Securitizing Rhetoric: http://docdro.id/kwxyW5S

2015 Public Documents Containing Anti Securitizing Rhetoric: http://docdro.id/C7Dn3MO

Sheet Six: Links to All Segments Coded for (Anti-)Securitizing Rhetoric

Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have included every segment from every document which I analysed for (anti-)securitizing rhetoric in both my cases.

During my research, I manually and interpretively analysed and coded the public documents linked in Sheet Five for rhetorical assertions pertaining to objects of worth, threats to these objects and feasible and appropriate ("appropriate" being subdivided into "just" and "necessary") actions for resolving these threats. Upon completion of this coding exercise, I downloaded my coded segments in master excel sheets. The documents I have linked below are copies of these master excel sheets.

Here is an example segment:

Document name	Code	Segment
29-08-2013 Cameron Commons	Just Action\Action Will Be Legal And Proportionate\Action Will Be Legal	Let me set out what the House has in front of it today in respect of how we reached our conclusions. We have a summary of the Government's legal position, which makes it explicit that military action would have a clear legal basis.

Here we can see that this segment, from the 29th of August 2013, was coded as asserting a reason why the securitizing proposition was proposing a just action. The action was described as "just" because it was legal. Note that segments may be coded multiple times with multiple codes. Each of these coded segments represents one coded assertion. When I completed my coding exercise and downloaded these codes/assertions along with their time stamps into Excel I was then able to analyse them on a macro level by plotting the appearance of different rhetorical assertions over time (this was easy to do via Excel). This produced the Securitizing and Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Graphs presented in this thesis.

2013 Coded Securitizing Rhetoric Segments: http://docdro.id/w6cczKI

2013 Coded Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Segments: http://docdro.id/mHMvwzb

2015 Coded Securitizing Rhetoric Segments: http://docdro.id/F8P5aqI

2015 Coded Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Segments: http://docdro.id/b2YbWNT

Sheet Seven: Links to Detailed Graphs on (Anti-)Securitizing Rhetoric

Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have included detailed graphs outlining all the assertions that made up the different elements of the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments in 2013 and 2015 as well as the proportions to which they did so.

2013 Securitizing Rhetoric Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/ooDGT0G

2013 Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/igUD1FA

2015 Securitizing Rhetoric Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/5gyvaxW

2015 Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/F3ykzmg

Sheet Eight: Links to Detailed Graphs on Identification Data

Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have included detailed graphs outlining all the identification data from both cases.

2013 Identifications Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/22OLqPw

2015 Identifications Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/OjnAuXF